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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
This paper studies post-conflict peacebuilding in relation to non-state armed groups, notably insurgencies. Peacebuilding in
general refers to long-term policies that have as their end-goal a just and self-sustaining peace. The view taken of
peacebuilding here is state-centered: strengthening a legitimate and accountable state is the best way to protect individuals.
The focus is on outside intervention. Also, security is a key concept.
The framework advances by 1.) analysing the nature of the problem and the main security threats to peace posed by non-state
armed groups, and 2.) examines the current policy-options to these problems, and sees what is effective and what is
problematic. The assumption is that there is a common model of peacebuilding, that is not necessarily effective. This is
referred to as 'rule-of-thumb peacebuilding. This paper uses literature review as its methods. A number of different types of
sources were chosen: theoretical literature on conflicts and peacebuilding including statistical and qualitative research, articles
by authoritative experts on each subject, policy handbooks by experts, lessons learned reports, as well as commissioned
evaluations.
Non-state armed groups are analyzed through their means (capacity) and end-goals. Gangs, organized crime, paramilitary
groups, private military companies and insurgencies are examined. While all of these contest the monopoly of violence of the
state, only insurgencies pose an existential threat both with respect to its means and end-goals. Yet one of the central findings
is that non-state armed groups today have converging interests, and thanks to globalization new weaker but more resilient
forms of insurgency emerge relatively easily. These groups can have an interest in the continuation of conflict. Of the different
policy-option, I analyze DDR, conflict resolution methods, monitoring, arms control measures, sanctions, counterinsurgency
and the pros and cons of interventions in general. Generally, policies could be differentiated between ones that focused on the
existing armed group, and ones that focus on changing the environment that enabled them to come about.
Key problems found with the commonly applied methods of peacebuilding, or 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding, were related to
power-sharing arrangements and elections, as well as the attention given to short-term results. Additionally, a longer presence
of outside monitoring of the peace process would seem to enhance the sustainability of post-conflict peace. Finally,
interventions themselves can also be problematic: they can spread corruption and weaken the connection between the
government and the people.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ei-valtiollisia aseistautuneita ryhmiä ja rauhanrakentamista konfliktinjälkeisessä tilanteessa.
Rauhanrakentamisella viitataan kaikkeen pitkäkestoiseen toimintaan, jonka ensisijaisena tavoitteena on kestävä ja
oikeudenmukainen rauha. Rauhanrakentamista tarkastellaan tässä tutkimuksessa valtiokeskeisesti: oikeudenmukainen valtio,
joka on vastuussa kansalaisilleen, takaa parhaiten yksilöiden turvallisuuden. Pääpaino on ulkopuolisten väliintuloissa.
Turvallisuus toimii jäsentävänä käsitteenä.
Tutkimusasetelma on kaksiosainen: ensiksi pyritään ymmärtämään ongelman luonne ja löytämään keskeiset
turvallisuusongelmat ja toiseksi tarkastelemaan käytettyjä toimintamalleja sekä katsomaan mikä on koettu toimivaksi ja mitkä
ovat olleet keskeiset ongelmat. Oletuksena on, että on olemassa yleinen rauhanrakentamisen malli, jota käytetään, mutta joka
ei välttämättä aina tuota haluttuja tuloksia. Metodologiana toimii kirjallisuuskatsaus. Aineisto koostuu sekä kvantitatiivisista
että kvalitatiivisista teoreettisista töistä konflikteista ja rauhanrakentamisesta, eri aiheiden asiantuntijoiden kirjoituksista,
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1. Introduction
This paper examines post-conflict peacebuilding through outside intervention in relation 
to non-state armed groups, notably insurgencies. It gives a general overview of different 
problems concerning non-state armed groups, and an evaluation of the current policies 
applied to them. No case studies are used. Since it is peacebuilding that is being studied, 
issues are analyzed through a security perspective. 
The first section of the paper introduces the central themes, and shows why non-state 
armed groups and peacebuilding are important subjects to study.
1.1. Internal conflicts and non-state armed groups
Why are non-state armed groups significant for post-conflict  peacebuilding? Today’s 
conflicts are predominantly internal: 2008 was the fifth year running, when no major 
interstate conflicts were active1. This does not mean that interstate conflicts  will  not 
occur; global military expenditure in 2008, for example, rose by 4%2. Yet compared to 
interstate  conflicts  and  relations  between  states,  the  focus  on  internal  conflicts  is 
relatively new, and our knowledge of effective policy tools, also for the post-conflict 
stage,  is not well  developed3. It  should be noted that while not all internal conflicts 
become ‘internationalized’ - that is spill over to other states, for example when troops 
move over uncontrolled borders, or other states are directly implicated with one of the 
conflicting  parties  –  practically  all  internal  conflicts  have  some  level  of  outside 
involvement, for example through the financial backing of one party. Additionally, all 
internal conflicts are dependent on the global environment today, through finances, arms  
procurement and so forth. 
Internal conflicts by definition involve one or more non-state armed groups. Non-state 
armed groups thus merit special attention. There are many types of different non-state 
armed  groups:  gangs,  militias,  paramilitaries,  warlords,  organized  crime,  private 
military companies and insurgencies. This study will examine gangs, organized crime, 
private military companies, paramilitaries and insurgencies. The focus will be on the 
1 It should be noted troops from other states did aid governments in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq.
2 SIPRI 2009b.
3 Krasner, Stephen 2007.
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potential  security  threat  they  might  pose  for  post-conflict  peace,  and  the  linkages 
between different kinds of groups. Understanding linkages between different groups, 
also in relation to the state, is essential for comprehending the conflict and post-conflict 
environments of today. I will analyze these groups through their means and end-goals. 
Militias and warlords will not be examined – I consider them to be a combination of the 
same logics that are behind gangs, paramilitaries, organized crime, and in the case of 
some warlords, localized insurgencies. The logics driving militias and warlords will be 
analyzed through these groups. 
The most serious threat to post-conflict  peace however is posed by old or emerging 
insurgencies – this will be the main focus of this paper. On the ‘solution’ -side, the focus 
will be uniquely on insurgencies. This paper will use the words insurgency, rebellion 
and guerrilla synonymously. For purpose of this paper, terrorism is considered a specific 
tactic that can be used by insurgents – not a type of organisation.
It should be noted that insurgency is today intimately related to asymmetric warfare. 
Some  guerrilla  forces  ultimately  aim  to  confront  the  regular  state  armed  forces  in 
conventional warfare to overthrow the government, but only after having built up their 
forces to the necessary strength. However, all insurgencies begin as small groups using 
guerrilla tactics – essentially meaning asymmetric warfare, which refers to disparity of 
power  between  warring  parties.  This  weaker  position  is  often  compensated  by 
insurgents by hiding amongst and relying on the civilian population.
 
While one might at first think that rebel organisations are not a central problem in the 
post-conflict  situation,  this  paper  argues  that  this  is  a  mistaken  assumption.  Rebel 
organisations are problematic in two different ways. First, the old rebel organisation(s) 
must  be  dealt  with,  and can  form a  powerful  political  block  that  may return  to  or 
threaten the use of violence to achieve its interests in the post-conflict  environment. 
Organizational structures and wartime interests are rarely dismantled. Signing a peace 
agreement  is  only  the  beginning  of  integrating  groups  into  civilian  life,  which 
encourages them to forsake the use of violence to pursue their interests. Yet this only 
manages the effects of the initial root causes for the emergence of insurgent groups.  On 
a second and deeper  level,  the environment that encourages and makes possible the 
forming of rebel groups has to be dealt with, which is no easy task. Simply dismantling 
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rebel organizations will create power vacuums, where new predatory groups will step 
in. Establishing the legitimate monopoly of violence of the state in these areas, as well 
as controlling the enabling factors such as available sources of finance and population 
discontent are essential for sustainable peace. Root causes need to be tackled.
Most of the current intrastate conflicts include more than one rebel group. The trend of 
splintering  rebel  groups  affects  the  nature  of  today’s  conflicts.  It  “tends  to  protract 
conflict by weakening the ability of any one party to attain outright military victory,
creating multiple centres of violence within a country and provoking competition
between  groups,  usually  reflected  in  an  increased  intensity  of  violence”4.  Multiple 
groups that are badly organized also make conflict resolution more complicated.
This paper argues that the variety of different insurgent groups is immense, and it is 
questionable whether they should be conflated into one category.  At one extreme are 
small, dispersed, loosely connected groups inspired by a common ideology and without 
a  clear  leadership  structure,  such  as  al-Qaeda.   At  the  other  extreme  are  highly 
organized,  hierarchical  transnational  organizations  participating  in  politics  and 
producing social services, such as Hezbollah. Secondly I argue that, through the use of 
terrorist  tactics,  cheap  weapons,  available  global  finances,  and  cooperation  and 
information exchange between insurgent groups – phenomena enabled by globalization 
– the threshold for the emergence of a low-level insurgency has become relatively low. 
Thirdly, the mutually reinforcing linkages between different non-state (and state) armed 
groups create power and economic interests against peace ('spoilers'). Many groups can 
maintain their position and power in the system thanks to a chaotic environment, and 
profit  heavily  for  example  from  illicit  trade.  Fourthly,  many  of  today’s  conflict 
resolution  tools  pose  inherent  problems  for  self-sustaining  peace  that  need  to  be 
recognized. Fifth, since many of the problems generating today’s conflicts have been 
enabled by globalization, the responses equally require global action.
Because of  the predominance of internal  conflicts  today, the lack of developed and 
effective policy tools, the links between different kinds of non-state armed groups, and 
the specific problems for post-conflict peacebuilding they pose, non-state armed groups 
4 Dwan, Renata & Holmqvist, Caroline 2005. p.90.
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- notably insurgent organizations - merit special attention. This is why they are the focus 
of this study.
1.2  . Post-conflict peacebuilding 
Post-war reconstruction is not a new idea, but the extent to which it is understood as 
preventing return to conflict and the extent to which it is practiced and applied as a 
standard policy  tool  is  new. The concept  of building structures  for  a  self-sustaining 
peace is also new.
A recent comparative quantitative study produced by the World Bank points out that 
40%  of  post-conflict  situations  experience  a  reversion  to  conflict  within  the  first 
decade5. This risk is twice as high as for pre-conflict situations6. Indeed, if rebellion is 
difficult to organize and does not emerge everywhere, then post-conflict societies have 
by definition proven to be places where these conditions exist7. Thus, a post-conflict 
environment  is  vulnerable  for  two  reasons:  it  has  the  conditions  that  enabled  the 
conflict, and it has inherited certain structures from the active conflict phase. To quote 
Collier on the renewal of conflict: “Civil war is fuelled partly by the circumstances that 
account for the initial resort to large-scale violence, and partly by forces generated once 
violence has started and that tend to perpetuate it. We refer to the initial circumstances 
as the root causes and the perpetuating forces as the conflict trap” 8. Both need to be 
dealt with for peace to be sustainable. 
There is a growing awareness of the importance of peacebuilding efforts, however one 
calls them, in post-conflict situations. The founding of the Peacebuilding Commission 
by  the  United  Nations,  and  the  appearance  of  peacebuilding  efforts  in  the  policy-
guidelines of various major international organizations, such as the World Bank, the EU
9, the OECD10, attest to this. The implementation of these policies on the ground in post-
5 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. 
6 Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.
7 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008. p.464.
8 Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p53–83.
9 See for example: European Security and Defence Policy, Civilian Crisis Management. 
10  the OECD DAC guidelines.
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conflict operations by a variety of different actors is also evident.  What is meant by 
peacebuilding efforts?
Peacebuilding  is  generally  considered  to  begin  after  the  end  of  conflict.  It  is  then 
different  from  peacemaking,  which  aims  at  the  cessation  of  ongoing  conflict. 
Peacemaking is implemented at earlier stages of the conflict cycle, for example through 
peacekeeping and mediation,  whereas  peacebuilding refers  to  longer-term actions  in 
later cycles of conflict, when its intensity is lower. Often, a ten-year period after the 
signing of a peace agreement is used. Policies used for conflict prevention also apply for 
post-conflict peacebuilding11, but are insufficient, as the risk of regression to conflict is 
much higher. The logic of post-conflict situations also differs from pre-conflict ones, 
notably  due  to  structures  established  during  the  conflict  period.  Existing  organized 
armed  groups,  availability  of  arms,  culture  of  predation  and  impunity  and  lack  of 
economically viable options are some of these.
Peacebuilding has as its end-goal a self-sustaining peace. 'Self-sustaining' implies a kind 
of peace that would last without, and make possible the withdrawal of, the intervening 
third  party.  Peacebuilding  also  reflects  our  reconceptualization  of  peace  itself  from 
'negative peace',  meaning peace as absence of war, to 'positive peace'  which implies 
structures  of  peace  in  a  society.  Structures  of  peace,  refers  to  institutions  (broadly 
speaking) in society that make possible the resolution of conflicts in society in non-
violent ways. Thus, peace  building  implies that peace has content.  Symmetrically,  it 
aims at diffusing the structures in a society that caused the conflict and its manifestation 
through violence in the first place. These are often called the 'root causes' of conflict.  
This  means  changing  society  in  a  fundamental  way.  The  notion  of  'conflict 
transformation' emphasises this point. It should be noted, that by ‘third-party’, I mean 
all the different and uncoordinated outside actors engaged in intervention efforts in one 
country.
Peacebuilding can then be seen as ultimately aiming at what Karl Deutsch has called a 
‘security community’. A security community is a group of people which has become 
integrated.  Integration  refers  to  the  attainment,  within  a  territory,  of  a  sense  of 
community, and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to 
11 Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.
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assure,  for  a  ‘long’ time,  dependable  expectations  of  peaceful  change  among  its 
population. Sense of community implies a belief on the part of individuals in a group 
that they have come to agreement on at least the point that common social problems 
must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change. Peaceful change means the 
resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort 
to  large-scale  violence.  For  Deutsch,  the  security  community  can  be,  but  isn’t 
necessarily,  a  state12.  However,  peacebuilding  efforts  today  focus  exclusively  on 
establishing a state that is at peace– some refer to it as state or nation-building. Others  
prefer to emphasise creating institutions of governance. Yet it is clear from Deutsch’s 
definition, that the change is a qualitatively profound one – it must be a phenomenon 
that  includes  the  community  and  individual  level,  not  just  a  solution  of  political 
structure.
Generally speaking, we could say that peacebuilding captures two aspects for policy: 
length and depth. The slow realization that the mere cessation of hostilities does not 
guarantee  lasting  peace,  has  forced  policymakers  to  consider  long-term policies  for 
peace.  It  is  evident  from  experience  that  this  has  not  been  the  standard  when  we 
consider the planned (or unplanned) length of many of the past third-party interventions.  
Also, mere power mediation is not sufficient if policies aim at deeply changing society. 
As a DCAF report states: "What the peacebuilding concept captures, however, is the 
emerging  consensus  that  the  transition  from armed conflict  to  self-sustaining  peace 
requires  more  than  physical  security  and  reconstruction.  It  addresses,  rather,  the 
political, social and economic transformation of a society after conflict: in other words, 
the root causes of conflict"13.
It  should be noted that applying the  term 'peacebuilding'  for this  study,  imposes an 
inherent difficulty. The term has a double role: peacebuilding as an official policy (and 
possibly  institutionally  established),  and  as  a  'grouping  term'  for  long  term, 
transformative activities, that have as their end-goal self-sustaining peace. The focus in 
this study is naturally on the latter. Peacebuilding as such, is not necessarily the official  
term employed in all official policies. This study will use peacebuilding as a 'grouping 
12 Deutsch, Karl 1969. p. 5.
13 DCAF 2005. p.17
9
term', and so what is called reconstruction, reconciliation, civilian crisis management, 
state-building can also partially fall under peacebuilding. 
Thirdly, peacebuilding, although a recent policy concept, already has content. A general 
policy model for peacebuilding exists. The study mentioned above made for the World 
Bank  states  that,  although  there  are  ‘enormous  differences  among  post-conflict 
situations’ and that ‘generalization is dangerous’, there exists conventional wisdom on 
peacebuilding that is consistently applied for planning missions. It could be considered 
as a pre-existing policy-model. ‘Conventional wisdom’ emphasises how practitioner-led 
the field is. Peacebuilding has mostly been ‘learned by doing’, and both academia and 
codified policy have lagged behind14. This raises two questions: is this model correct, 
and can it be applied generically from situation to situation? I will call this 'rule-of-
thumb' peacebuilding.
To summarize, in this paper, by ‘peacebuilding’ we can then understand four different 
things.  First,  peacebuilding  can  refer  to  an  official  and  declared  part  of  policy  or 
strategy. Secondly, peacebuilding can be a ‘grouping term’, for all long-term policy in 
post-conflict situations that have as their end-goal self-sustaining peace. Thirdly, it can 
mean the ‘conventional wisdom’ peacebuilding, in other words, the rule of thumb for 
what  is  today understood by practitioners  as  peacebuilding  policies  that  work.  This 
could crudely be compared to a template that is  identically applied from conflict  to 
conflict, with little emphasis on local context. The last sense in which peacebuilding can 
be understood could be coined ‘effective peacebuilding’. With this term I emphasise the 
on-the-ground empirical requirements for self-sustaining peace. These are, of course, 
partly  unknown,  but  ideally  guide  the  formation  of  policy.  This  end-goal  for 
peacebuilding will be the focus of this study, notably by looking at policy handbooks, 
evaluations and critical articles by experts. To summarize, peacebuilding can refer to 
official  policy,  it  can  be  a  grouping  term for  different  post-conflict  peace-oriented 
activities  (many actors  use  different  terms),  conventional  wisdom or  'rule-of-thumb' 
peacebuilding  by  practitioners,  and  lastly  policies  that  are  guided  by  needs  on  the 
ground and are effective – which is the focus of this paper. Namely, I am going to try to 
compare 'rule-of-thumb' peacebuilding and effective peacebuilding.
14 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007.
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A  word  should  be  said  about  the  different  concepts  used  by  different  actors. 
Peacebuilding is a concept mainly used by the UN. Much of what has been said above 
applies to the UN conceptualization of peacebuilding. The UN especially emphasises 
the complementarity of different policy tools for achieving peace, and in some cases 
everything from peacekeeping to development aid is included in ‘peacebuilding’15. The 
EU more often speaks of ‘civilian crisis management,’ which is a negative definition 
with relation to all action that is non-military in the post-conflict phase. In practice, the 
EU has focused on police missions, with an increasing importance also in rule of law 
missions and Security Sector Reform. The EU’s concept is focused almost uniquely on 
the state16. The US and Canada often speak of stabilization and reconstruction, which is 
a relatively new term and is in part a reaction to the post-invasion reality of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It  refers mainly to capacity building, that is,  creating a reserve pool of 
experts from different areas. It also seeks to emphasise the importance of civilian tasks, 
where  the  military  has  often  been  given  the  leading  role.  Stabilization  and 
reconstruction is also referred to as nation-building17.  Lastly,  NATO speaks of civil-
military cooperation (‘CIMIC’).  This term however  purely  refers  to the  cooperation 
between  military  and  civilian  elements,  and  is  not  limited  only  to  post-conflict 
situations, but also disaster relief for NATO. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan  have  however  become  a  platform  for  talking  about  what  could  be 
understood as peacebuilding for NATO itself, as well as for dialogue between NATO 
and  other  actors18.  Civil-military  cooperation  can  also  be  associated  with  the 
‘comprehensive  approach’,  which emphasises  strategic cooperation  and coordination 
between  all  sectors  (military,  development,  reconstruction,  humanitarian)19.  An 
analogous  term,  but  at  the  national  level  of  each  government  is  the  ‘whole  of 
government’ term (WGA), that emphasises coordination between different sectors of 
government - something that has been lacking in many interventions. 
All of these terms however have in common that they are policies that have as their end-
goal a self-sustaining and just peace. While it need not be the case, the reality is that 
today all actors focus on achieving a legitimate and effective state-structure into post-
15 Saxén, Niklas 2008. 
16 Saxén, Niklas 2008b. 
17 Saxén, Niklas 2008c. 
18 Comprehensive Approach Seminar (CAS), Helsinki 2008.
19 Saxén, Niklas 2008c.
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conflict countries. As an example of an alternative approach, conflict transformation is 
often referred to as the bottom-up transformation of society, often specifically through 
civil society. Lastly, there are differences in whether the military is understood as doing 
‘peacebuilding’ as well,  and to what extent.  This paper takes the standpoint that the 
military does have a function in peacebuilding, notably in reforming the military of a 
country, peacekeeping, and possible counterinsurgency operations if this is necessary. 
The remainder of this paper will only use the term peacebuilding.
Why has peacebuilding become such a major policy issue? The immediate post-Cold 
War period changed the conflict environment in significant ways: as conflicts between 
states declined, intrastate conflicts accounted for the large majority of conflicts as well 
as battle-related deaths; more than twice as many conflicts began yearly than in any 
other decade since the 1950s; during the 1990s more conflicts also ended than began 
than in previous  periods;  and contrary to the Cold War period, most  wars ended in 
negotiated settlement rather than military victory by one side. At the same time, 44% of 
negotiated settlements failed within the first five years and conflict began again20. The 
end of the Cold War also saw a weakening of the concept of state sovereignty, in the 
sense of non-interference in internal affairs. Interventions became more acceptable, and 
where during the Cold War they were part of the realpolitik of states, interventions were 
now perceived as more 'neutral', and done to promote human rights21. This was later 
followed  with  what  was  termed  the  'human  security'  paradigm,  which  saw  a  shift 
towards  guaranteeing  security  to  individual  citizens  rather  than  the  state22.  The 
'responsibility  to protect' (or R2P) doctrine also emerged, which argues that it is "the 
responsibility  of  states,  and where  they fail  the  international  community,  to  protect 
civilians from mass atrocity crimes"23. 
These  changes  in  the  international  system were  accompanied  by new demands  and 
responses by the UN, which in turn generated reflection on peacebuilding. Whereas in 
1988 there were  10,000 people  serving in  seven operations,  in  1994 there were  17 
20 Human Security Brief 2007. p.33-35.
21 Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.11-14.
22 " The traditional goal of ‘national security’ has been the defence of the state from external threats. The 
focus of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individiuals ---. In its broadest formulations the 
human security agenda also encompasses economic insecurity and ‘threats to human dignity’." Human 
Security Report, 2006.
23 icg.org: Responsibility to Protect.
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peacekeeping operations numbering 87,000 persons24. Although the number of conflicts 
has  decreased  after  2000,  in  2007  there  were  130,000  people  serving  in  UN 
peacekeeping operations25.
The  nature  of  peacekeeping  missions  also  changed.  Previous  'first  generation' 
peacekeeping  missions  primarily  monitored  and  supervised  ceasefires.   They  were 
placed between opposing sides with the consent of both, and were not mandated to use 
force.  Missions  were  intended  to  run  for  as  long  as  negotiations  produced  peace 
agreements.  During  the  1990s,  peacekeeping operations  were  increasingly  a  part  of 
internal conflicts and became a part of the actual peace deals, in order to guarantee post-
conflict stability. Missions included more robust mandates for use of force, and were not  
necessarily neutral anymore. Internal conflicts were also "complex emergencies", where 
state  structures  had  possibly  collapsed,  there  was  large-scale  targeting  of  civilians, 
irregular forces, and extensive human rights abuses - all of which presented a whole 
different set of problems to tackle. In turn, this placed pressure on UN peacekeeping 
operations to include such tasks as DDR, policing, human rights monitoring, organizing 
elections  and  administration.  The  most  extensive  examples  were  the  situations  in 
Kosovo  and  East  Timor,  where  the  UN  completely  administered  territories  and 
conducted state-building. The increasing complexity of missions and their tasks came as 
a result of the understanding that peace could not be achieved without security on the 
ground, which was in turn dependent on law and order. UN peacekeeping failures in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica were examined by the Brahimi report in 2000, which 
made peacebuilding a UN priority26. As stated in the report: 
"[T]raditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict, 
has  no  built  in  exit  strategy  and  associated  peacemaking  was  often  slow  to  make 
progress.  ---  Since  the  end  of  the  cold  war,  United  Nations  peacekeeping  has  often 
combined with peace-building in  complex peace operations  deployed into settings of 
intra-State conflict. --- Moreover, the complexity of the tasks assigned to these missions  
and  the  volatility  of  the situation  on  the  ground tend  to  increase  together.  ---  When 
complex  peace  operations  do  go  into  the  field,  it  is  the  task  of  the  operation’s 
peacekeepers  to  maintain  a  secure  local  environment  for  peacebuilding,  and  the 
peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social and economic changes that create a 
secure environment that is self-sustaining."27
24 Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.12.
25 un.org 2009. Honouring 60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping.
26 Thakur, Ramesh & Albert Schnabel 2001. p.10-17.
27 Brahimi Report 2000. p.3-5.
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These are the origins of peacebuilding. In essence, it has been an essential answer to 
involvement into more complex conflict and post-conflict environments. Much of this 
paper goes on to explain what it is in practice and substance today, vis-à-vis non-state 
actors.
To summarize,  there  are  a  number  of  factors  that  make  effective  peacebuilding  an 
important object of study. To begin with, peace, and thus (effective) operations towards 
that end, can and should be seen as a value in itself. Concretely, this ideology is today 
manifested in the policies for 'human security', which take the human individual, and 
not the nation-state, as the object of security. The challenge to national sovereignty after 
the Cold War, especially through the notion of protecting the individual, is what has 
justified even forceful third-party interventions inside states. As I already mentioned, 
the growing realization that mere cessation of hostilities is insufficient, has made the 
question of what exactly constitutes effective peacebuilding more acute. In addition to 
being ethically and politically pertinent, peacebuilding is scientifically underdeveloped. 
As a field of study it is relevantly new, and there is little consensus on what makes for 
effective peacebuilding. Thus, an analysis of the current policies in different areas of 
post-conflict  peacebuilding  sheds  light  on  their  difficulties  and interconnectivity.  At 
best, it will uncover commonalities in necessities for peacebuilding, where 'there are 
enormous  differences  among  post-conflict  situations',  and  at  worst  it  will  show the 
limitations  of  generalizing  about  conflicts.  While  there  are  studies  that  compare 
different  cases  around  a  specific  post-conflict  problem  or  policy,  and  there  are 
comparative statistical studies on post-conflict  environments and policies generally, I 
am not aware of any study looking at both problems and policy-solutions qualitatively 
on a general level, nor of any looking specifically at non-state armed groups.
1.2  .1. Rule-of-thumb peacebuilding 
Understanding the model of commonly used peacebuilding methods or what I termed 
'rule  of  thumb'   peacebuilding  is  essential  for  answering  my  following  research 
questions:  What  are  the  policy-options for  [peacebuilding],  notably  through 
international  outside intervention? What are the  problems with these policies? What 
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solutions have proven effective? In this study, the rule-of-thumb model is thus what is 
compared to 'effective peacebuilding' or on-the-ground requirements.
On the basis of the literature read for this study, I have drawn the following table, which 
I  believe  to  accurately  represent  both the most  commonly used methods of  conflict 
management and their sequencing. This model includes not just peacebuilding methods 
used  in  the  post-conflict  phase,  but  also  describes  peacemaking  and  other  conflict 
management methods in the active conflict  phase.  This is why it  is  called 'common 
conflict  management methods'.  Some  methods  can  be  used  both  during  the  active 
conflict  phase  and in  the  post-conflict  phase  for  peacebuilding  (see  3.  Solutions  to 
problems posed by insurgencies). Generally, everything from 'ceasefire' onwards could 
be  considered  as  peacebuilding,  and  representing  the  'rule-of-thumb'  peacebuilding 
model:
 
As  an  example  Collier,  Hoeffler  and  Söderblom  give  a  description  of  the  typical 
peacebuilding model. They argue that the most common tasks are sequenced as follows: 
1.) a negotiated settlement (rather than letting them fight it out), 2.) light presence of 
peacekeeping troops, 3.) a new constitution, aimed at pump-priming democracy, and 
possibly  decentralizing  power,  although  preferring  a  unified  state,  4.)  setting  up  or 
strengthening governance structures, according to the 'light footprint' approach, leaving 
the economy on the back burner. 5.) post-conflict elections, to help reduce tensions, 6.) 
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withdrawal of peacekeeping troops, often after elections, since there is a supposition 
that elections will reduce tensions28. Alternatively, Stedman describes a 'standard care 
regimen for dealing with civil wars' as including: mediating, getting a peace agreement, 
putting a peacekeeping force on the ground, DDR, and "a number of other tasks"29. 
While I found a degree of consensus on the different methods and tasks, I found less 
descriptions on the sequencing.
1.3  . Research questions 
Having explained and justified the objects of my research, I move to specific research 
questions.  My  general  research  question  is  what  makes  for  effective  post-conflict 
peacebuilding? As already mentioned, I am starting from the working hypothesis, that 
there is a 'rule-of-thumb' set of peacebuilding policies that is generically applied, due to 
the  field  being  practitioner-led  and  academic  research  just  now  catching  up.  My 
working  hypothesis  is  that  the  conventional  and  'rule-of-thumb'  peacebuilding 
model applied today has significant problems, and may not in all cases be 'effective 
peacebuilding'. While this is not a very brave hypothesis, it is the guideline for this 
work. It poses two sub-questions: 1.) Is this model of peacebuilding correct? 2.) Can it  
be  applied  identically  from  context  to  context?  I  have  operationalized  the  general 
question  "What makes for  effective  post-conflict  peacebuilding?"  into the  following 
variables, that will be the basis for analysis in this paper:
1.) What are the main security  problems with  non-state armed groups, and especially 
insurgencies for a self-sustaining peace in the post-conflict period?
2.)  What  are  the  policy-options for  these  problems,  notably  through  international 
outside intervention?
a.) What are the problems with these policies, and what 
has proven effective (solutions)?
An additional question that is also implicitly posed is:
- What are the typical features of today's post-conflict environments?
28 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. 
29 Stedman, Stephen 2006.
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1.4  . Framework for analysis 
While many theoretical debates are relevant to this paper, for example when discussing 
peacebuilding, I prefer calling my framework an analytical one rather than a theoretical 
one. The less theoretically oriented approach stems form my research question: what 
makes  for  effective  peacebuilding?  I  have  chosen  to  study  this  question  by  first 
examining what the main problems on the ground are. As a question of delimiting the 
possible objects of study, I have chosen non-state armed groups, for reasons explained 
above. They are an inherent feature of today's internal conflicts. Non-state armed groups 
are then further broken down into specific security problems. Thus, the point of view is 
essentially a security one, since this is the issue for peacebuilding. From these field-
level problems, I begin to examine the different policies applied to these problems, and 
looking at what is successful and what is problematic. This is done notably from the 
view of an international outside intervention. While it may sound counter-intuitive, and 
is a definite limitation of this study, this framework has the result  of not examining 
interventions in themselves on a macro-level, as a whole, since it is primarily focused 
on specific problems and corresponding policy-efforts. Thus, it should be noted that my 
research questions do bear theoretical underpinnings. 
Notably, the implicit approach taken throughout this whole study could be characterized 
as carrots and sticks. The frame of analysis is rather simple: there are given actors, who 
have certain amounts  of power  and given interests,  and pursue both.  Following the 
rational-actor  model,  actors  form strategies  accordingly.  Rhetorics  and ideology,  for 
example, are mostly from derivatives of interests. Consequently, I assume that policies 
have an effect on actors, by affecting their interests and relative power - through 'carrots 
and sticks'. This simple model allows for analysis of complex issues.
There are a number of key variables for this study. First,  there are the geographical 
variables:  local,  national,  regional  and  international  (or  global)  level.  Many  of  the 
phenomena in this paper relate to all  these levels.  This variable is then relevant for 
actors, the possible phenomenon and policy-answers, which can all be placed at one or 
more geographical level. However,  only the most pertinent level for each individual 
problem will be analysed. Another key variable is, naturally, the actors involved. These 
are policy implementers, notably outside interveners and the objects of the policies. This  
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is an implicitly condescending approach that gives priority to interveners. However, I 
hope I  amply compensate for  this  by giving plenty of agency to the objects  of the 
policies and by questioning the simplicity of such a view in each case. Probably the 
most important variable for this paper is whether the problems that are dealt with are 
either root causes, or effects of root causes of conflict. Respectively, it is pertinent to 
analyse whether policies tackle effects or causes of conflict. The presumption is that 
root causes need to be dealt with for a self-sustaining peace to be possible. Again, this is 
done  implicitly  throughout  much  of  the  paper.  There  is  unfortunately  no  temporal 
variable in this paper to look for differences in the post-conflict period due to lack of  
space.
1.5  . Key concepts 
The key concepts of my analytical framework are the following:
Internal conflict (also intrastate conflict, civil war). An internal conflict is a conflict 
where there are two or more parties to the conflict within a country, and there are over  
25 battle-related deaths a year.  This is the lowest  possible threshold,  and I use it  to 
include  low-intensity  conflicts  as  well.  This  is  used  by  the  Uppsala  Conflict  Data 
Program (UCDP).  Other  options would include a minimum of 100 deaths,  and still 
another uses a 1000 deaths, which is defined as war30. A minimum of five percent of 
deaths have to have been incurred by each side - otherwise it would be massacre or 
genocide31.  Instead  of  this  criteria,  many  datasets  however  only  require  effective 
organization from both sides of the conflict. Note that it is only civil war after the 1000 
mark has been reached. It should be noted that an intrastate war can also be waged by 
two or more non-state armed groups. This issue is unfortunately largely neglected in this  
paper.
Post-conflict. This generally refers to the period after the signing of a peace agreement. 
Optionally, it can also be described as a function of conflict intensity. A country is in the 
post-conflict phase, when no battle-related deaths exceeding the threshold mentioned 
occur for consecutive years. This is in fact a negative definition in relation to relapse 
into conflict. This is the definition taken here, since battle-related deaths are a better 
30 Eck, Christine 2005. p.11
31  Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.11.
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proxy of cessation of hostilities than a peace agreement, which in itself guarantees little, 
except sometimes a consequent peacekeeping mission. There can for example be peace 
through a ceasefire  without  any agreement.  A figure  that  is  often cited,  is  the  first 
decade of peace being post-conflict32. The post-conflict phase has a very high risk of 
reversion to conflict, and has certain structures inherited from the active conflict phase, 
of which non-state armed groups are some. As an example of an alternative view, the 
Bloomfield-Leiss Conflict Model subdivides the post-conflict phase into post-hostilities 
conflict (where military options still exist), post-hostilities dispute (where the dispute 
remains unsettled) and settlement (where the parties create or accept conflict resolution)
33.
Peacebuilding. There is no clear consensus on the definition of peacebuilding, and the 
activities it refers to. The definition taken in this paper is that peacebuilding refers to all 
the different longer-term activities conducted in the post-conflict phase,  that have as 
their primary goal the building of a just and self-sustaining peace with an emphasis on 
civilian efforts. This excludes humanitarian aid and development aid that have different 
(but  complementary)  primary  goals.  It  does  not  exclude  peacekeeping  or 
counterinsurgency, but places the accent on non-military efforts. While the post-conflict 
period was above defined as a decade, many peacebuilding efforts, such as statebuilding 
efforts  need  a  longer  time.  Additionally,  key  terms  in  this  paper  are  rule-of-thumb 
peacebuilding,  referring  to  the  practitioner  formulated  approach,  and  effective 
peacebuilding, which is the optimal answer to the needs on the ground. For what the 
rule of thumb peacebuilding looks like, see Table 1. in section 1.3.1.
Non-state  armed  groups.  This  is  another  negative  definition,  that  includes  all 
organized armed groups that are not regular armed forces of the state, such as: gangs, 
organized crime, militias, paramilitaries, warlords, private military companies (PMCs) 
and insurgencies.  Gangs can be defined as loose groups that have informal ownership 
of small urban spaces through a local monopoly of force. They provide some measure 
of  entrepreneurial  opportunity  as  well  as  local  prestige  and  warrior-glamour;  they 
frequently act as neighbourhood militias to police public spaces, enforce or resist ethnic 
32 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. p.465.
33 Eck, Christine 2005. p.19.
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and racial borders34. Organized crime can be defined as groups organized primarily to 
make economic gains in different illicit markets. They often rely on use of violence, 
which can give them a comparative advantage  in licit  markets as well.  Militias are 
armed ‘self-defence’ groups of civilians that can support government, parties or local 
rulers. They can be volunteers, and do not specifically aim to take over the state or 
secede,  but  are  significant  for  political  patronage  networks  in  many  countries.  A 
paramilitary group refers primarily to the type of organization and tasks the group is 
meant to conduct, which are military in nature. They can belong to or be connected to 
the regular  armed forces  or police,  but  do not have same status as regular  military. 
While these can be a part  of the police forces,  this paper is mainly concerned with 
irregular or non-official forces with a military character, that often have unofficial ties to  
the government and either the armed forces or police.  Warlords  are individuals who 
autonomously control a territory through military power. The term is often used in the 
context of weak or collapsed states today.  Private military companies (PMCs) (also 
private military firms, PMFs, or private security companies, PSCs) are private business 
entities that provide different kinds military and/or security services from combat to 
supply activities, and some of them are transnational in nature.
Insurgencies (used here synonymously with rebellion, guerrilla, insurrection).  An 
insurgency  can  be  defined  as  an  organized,  protracted  politico-military  struggle 
designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Political power is 
the central issue in insurgencies - to get the people to accept its governance or authority 
as legitimate. It can have one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and 
reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an 
autonomous  entity  or  ungoverned  space  that  they  can  control35.  Insurgencies  are 
strongly  associated  with  asymmetric  warfare,  where  there  is  a  disparity  of  power 
between opposing sides. Though it is used synonymously here, 'guerrilla' also refers to a 
specific set of military tactics associated with asymmetric warfare. Terrorism is also a 
military tactic, where the target of violence, often civilians, are struck to create fear in 
order to have a political effect on the actual target. Of the different non-state armed 
34 Adapted from: Hagedorn, John 2008. 
35 US Army 2006. p.1,2.
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groups, insurgencies are the main focus of this paper, since they by definition pose by 
far the most significant threat to post-conflict peace.
Outside intervention - an outside intervention in the context of this paper, refers to any 
intervention, be it military, humanitarian or civilian crisis management that claims to be 
done to establish peace in a given country. It is by definition international, but is not 
necessarily  -  although  it  most  often  is  -  multilateral.  UN integrated  missions  are  a 
typical example of the kinds of multiactor interventions referred to in this paper that 
combine peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and possibly humanitarian efforts.
1.6  . Methodology and data 
This study uses qualitative analysis based on existing literature. Pre-existing data was 
largely available, and because of the number of different issues and the macro-level at 
which they were analysed, there would have been little value added in either fieldwork 
or individual expert interviews. All data is thus at least secondary. As already described, 
the theoretical literature was read intensively to thematically pick out salient problems 
in  today's  post-conflict  environments,  of  which  non-state  armed  groups,  and 
insurgencies in particular were chosen. The state, an entity and subject on its own, is not 
analyzed in this paper. 'Non-state armed groups' was further divided into sub-problems. 
After this, literature concerning policy-options to the different problems were examined. 
Literature for each section was read almost until the saturation point, when there was 
confidence in having a grasp of the main arguments and authorities of each issue.
The data can respectively be divided in two. The first part, concerning post-conflict 
problems, examined theoretical literature on post-conflict environments. Comparative 
statistical studies, which in the last ten years have developed intensely, were favoured. 
The most used among these were the work of Paul Collier and his colleagues, notably 
"Breaking the Conflict Trap", a World Bank policy research report. Collier is a professor 
of economics at Oxford and has worked as director of the Development Research Group 
of the World Bank. Other sources providing quantitative analyses were the Journal of 
Peace Research and the SIPRI Yearbook publications. After having looked at the most 
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salient problems, the particular themes were explored through works by the most quoted 
authors, most respected NGOs or think-tanks, and other qualitative sources.
Secondly, with respect to the different policies, the data used was somewhat different. 
Although the authoritative experts still held a key place, they were complemented with 
policy handbooks by experts (leading opinions on what works), lessons learned reports 
(analyses  on  what  works and what  does  not),  as  well  as  commissioned  evaluations 
(often commissioned when there is a problem or lack of knowledge, and are intended to 
be critical). Reports by people or organisations that at the time of writing were involved 
in policy-making were given less attention, as these are often diplomatic compromises 
with less self-critique. In some places, quantitative studies were informative as well, 
notably in looking at the risks different policy-options have incurred in the past. Thus, 
for each subject, different sources were used to increase the validity of the study. 
Methodologically  speaking,  there  was  a  problem  of  defining  the  audience.  Three 
potential audiences were possible: 1.) the general public, 2.) academic readers, and 3.) 
conflict management experts. My goal was to be able to write to all of these, which in 
turn is reflected in the presentation of both the problems and solutions. Evidently, this 
lead  to  some difficult  compromises.  Each  issue  was  thus  presented by 1.)  giving  a 
descriptive and lengthy introduction, 2.) nonetheless, using a scientific approach, and 
3.) key tensions reflected in cutting-edge analyses were mulled over.
1.7  . Weaknesses 
The  subject,  the  framework  of  analysis  and  the  methodology  of  this  paper  pose  a 
number of weaknesses for this study. 
First,  this  paper  is  a  generalization  of  different  post-conflict  environments.  It  is 
important  to  ask  whether  it  is  meaningful  to  generalize  on  conflicts  that  can  be 
immensely  different.  I  believe  that  it  is,  if  we  acknowledge  that  this  is  a  limited 
approach - there are some general tendencies in post-conflict environments, but they are 
always expressed locally and are context-dependent. Secondly, there is a problem with 
generalization  and  peacebuilding.  While  this  study  aims  at  being  critical  of  a 
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peacebuilding  model  that  is  generically  applied,  because  of  lack  of  case  studies,  it 
cannot  but  result  in  giving  a  description  of  peacebuilding  that  is  general.  This  is 
essentially  a  question  of  choice,  where  priority  was  given  to  a  holistic  and 
comprehensive view of different peacebuilding problems and policies together, while 
neglecting case studies.  I  have tried to make up for this by giving examples,  being 
critical and emphasising - indeed one of the key findings of this paper - that all policies 
are context-dependent. 
The second big problem stems from the amount of problems and policies analysed. 
Breadth has been favoured over depth. Analyses are necessarily superficial, even though 
a lot of effort has been put into understanding each issue deeply and giving a correct 
overview.  Lastly,  the  frame  of  analysis  is  inherently  political,  since  current 
peacebuilding favours the state against rebels. Studying how to build peace is also a 
political departure point.
There  is  a  danger  of  tautology  due to  used  data.  I  am trying  to  be  critical  of  the 
practitioner-led conventional rule-of-thumb model of peacebuilding, by analysing data 
that is largely produced by practitioners. I hope to make up for this by being critical, 
using other kinds of sources, and relying on the academic work available.
Lastly, in retrospect I can say that some key themes have been undeservingly left out. 
Peacekeeping is almost absent. I, wrongly, presumed peacekeeping mainly to be done 
during the active conflict  phase, whereas for example Collier et al. find that lengthy 
post-conflict  peacekeeping  reduces  risks  of  reversion  considerably36.  The  role  of 
drafting new constitutions is also absent. Militias, I have come to realize, play a central 
role in post-conflict patronage politics, especially for electoral politics. Optionally, their 
role as local self-defence groups gives them a character of their own, and may grant 
them special legitimacy37. Warlords are also left out, whereas they play a significant role 
in collapsed states. I presumed, somewhat correctly, that these two share the same logics 
or part of the logics, of the other non-state armed groups that are described here. Truth 
commissions  and  transitional  justice,  and  other  social  reconciliation  methods  are 
missing. The lack of any temporal analysis is also a major weakness. Conflicts between 
36 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008.
37 See for example lashkars in Pakistan: latimes.com 26th October 2009.
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different non-state armed groups are another neglected subject. Secessionist conflicts 
also  get  little  attention,  and it  is  a  good question  how they would  play out  in  my 
state/non-state  framework,  notably  when  becoming  states  of  their  own in  the  post-
conflict period. Probably state-related peacebuilding policies, not treated in this paper, 
would then apply. Additionally, I would like to add, that the difference between non-
state armed groups and state armed groups is less clear than I present it in this paper: for 
example, non-state armed groups are often expected to enter politics in the post-conflict 
phase, in effect becoming state-actors. Lastly, there is a conceptual difference between 
policies (applied) and solutions (effective action), that is not as clear as it should be in 
my analysis.
1.8  . The state-centric approach and weak states 
While  the  state  is  not  the  object  of  study  in  this  paper,  both  the  subject  and  the 
perspective  taken  in  this  paper  demand  a  brief  comment  about  it.  The  subject  is 
peacebuilding and non-state actors; the inseparable second half of the peacebuilding 
coin is  the state.  More importantly however,  the perspective of this paper explicitly 
favours the state. One reason for this is that almost all peacebuilding policies today are 
aimed at setting up a functioning and legitimate state structure (however realistic this  
is). This is unsurprising, since the weightiest interventions are conducted by states, or 
organizations  representing  and  upholding  a  system  of  states  such  as  the  UN. 
Additionally, it is often the Western liberal democratic and capitalist version of the state 
that is the end-goal of peacebuilding. By following this mould, this paper is extremely 
uncritical. 
Another reason why I want to mention states, is to make the reader aware that the state, 
as Westerners understand it, probably does not exist in post-conflict areas nor in most of 
the  regions of the world for that  matter.  This  section is  essential  for  answering the 
research  question  on  what  today's  post-conflict  environments  look  like.  The 
misconception  of  the  universality  of  effective  First  World  states  even  in  political 
sciences is exemplified in leading currents of International Relations, where ’the state’ is  
a given unit and departure point in the international system. Weber’s definition of the 
state is probably the most famous one. According to it, an organization is a state: ”if and 
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insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order”38. This is probably the way 
many people think about states in the West. However, for example during an internal 
conflict  this  formulation  -  monopoly  of  violence  -  does  not  by  definition  hold. 
Furthermore,  it  can be argued that the majority of states do not actually control the 
entire  territory  accorded to  them by internationally  recognized borders39.  Lastly  and 
perhaps  most  importantly  from  the  point  of  view  of  peacebuilding,  while  Weber’s 
mention  of  ‘legitimacy’ might  have  been  a  non-normative  observation,  this  criteria 
probably holds for very few of the post-conflict entities we designate as states. Weber’s 
definition is however applicable as a desirable end-goal from the point of view of the 
definition  of  peacebuilding  taken  by  this  paper  –  a  normative  ‘should-be’.  I  will 
cursorily  point  to  some  ideas  which  will  hopefully  help  the  reader  to  think  about 
differences  between  what  we  call  states,  notably  when  thinking  about  post-conflict 
peacebuilding.
Sovereignty is a concept we link to states as inherent. Stephen Krasner argues that there 
are three different attributes to sovereignty, that often get confused: 1.) international 
legal sovereignty. This means states mutually recognize each other and enables states to 
join  international  organizations,  and  sign  legally  binding  treaties.  2.)  Westphalian 
sovereignty. This implies non-intervention into the internal affairs of other states. This is 
the political sense in which sovereignty is often used: each state is independent and 
autonomous, is not subject to external authority and can make its own internal rules. 3.) 
Domestic sovereignty.  This refers to the political  internal order in a country and its 
degree of effectiveness40. Essentially, this refers to what Weber alluded to as accepted 
monopoly  of  use  of  force.  All  states  do  not  have  all  three  of  these  attributes  of 
sovereignty. As already mentioned, the principle of non-intervention, while it has never 
been absolute, is today not supremely important especially in areas affected by conflict. 
Many  post-conflict  states  (notably  their  governments)  can  be  described  as  having 
international legal sovereignty, which grants them some international legitimacy, some 
38 Weber, Max 1968. p. 154
39 See for example: Failed State Index 2009. While this measurement takes into account a multitude of 
factors and is mainly aimed at assessing the risk of collapse or conflict, it is indicative that out of 177 only 
13 countries are listed as ’sustainable’, and 46 as either ’sustainable’ or ’moderate’ (out of 4 categories).
40 Krasner, Stephen 2007.
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support from other states, a seat at the UN and probably access to foreign aid. But they 
do not have effective domestic sovereignty.
Tilly analyses the formation of the modern European state since 990AD. His analysis 
describes  political  organizations,  states,  that  are  vastly  different  from the  notion  of 
today’s  Western  state.  He differentiates  between states  and  national states.  National 
states are states that govern multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of 
centralized,  differentiated  and autonomous structures  -  what  I  have termed here  the 
Western conception of the state. He concludes however, that these have been rare and 
only very recently became the dominant way of organizing states. States, on the other 
hand, are ‘coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship 
groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within 
substantial  territories’.  This  looser  definition  allows  for  many  different  kinds  of 
organizations that have competed for dominance in Europe until recently, for example 
city-states, empires, theocracies and federations. Tilly goes on to show how the form of 
European states have today is the result of an arduous competition between different 
organizations through warfare and struggling to set up the means for it (both military 
and financial).
Tribute-taking empires had large military apparatuses, but left local administration to 
regional  power-holders  who  had  considerable  autonomy.  These  empires  were  the 
dominant form in regions where there were relatively few means (both men and military 
capabilities such as weapons), but these means were concentrated in few hands. War 
was waged by rulers for loot, and consequent tribute to the centre. City-states and urban 
federations on the other hand tend to form systems of fragmented sovereignty, where 
each holds some means of coercion and no one is supreme, and capital is concentrated 
and  accumulated  in  cities.  Temporary  coalitions  and  consultative  institutions  are 
important in such situations41. Thus the monopoly of violence, and notably the way of 
making  money  by  it,  which  in  turn  was  used  to  sustain  the  monopoly,  could  be 
organized in many different ways. I think that through this lens, it is already easier to 
understand events in many conflict and post-conflict states, where alliances are struck 
and power battles fought between different elites, warlords, local militias, urban centres, 
organized criminals and insurgencies. Tilly’s state has four core functions without which 
41 Tilly, Charles 1990. p. 1-3, 19-21, 65.
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it cannot exist: 1.) statemaking – attacking and checking competitors within the territory 
claimed  by  the  state,  2.)  warmaking  –  attacking  rivals  outside  its  territories,  3.) 
protection – attacking and checking rivals of the ruler’s most important allies, inside 
and/or outside the territory, 4.) extraction – acquiring the means for the above (finances, 
resources, labour)42. 
Tilly also examines the Third World states and their armies, at the time they became 
independent of colonialism. He argues that: “on average, [they] were following coercion 
intensive  paths  to  statehood.  The  departing  colonial  powers  left  little  accumulated 
capital behind them, but bequeathed to their successor states' military forces drawn from 
and modelled on the repressive forces they had previously established to maintain their 
own  local  administration.  Relatively  well  equipped  and  trained  armed  forces  then 
specialized in control of civilian population and in combat against insurgents rather than 
interstate war. --- Third World armies commonly resisted civilian control. --- To the 
extent that their states generated revenues by selling commodities on the international 
market,  bought  arms  overseas,  and  received  military  aid  from  great  powers, 
furthermore,  the  armed  forces  enjoyed  insulation  from  reliance  on  taxation  and 
conscription authorized by civilian governments”43. 
Clapham and Reno both offer us a complex image of post-Cold War Third World states. 
Like Tilly, Clapham notes that states are not always an achievable form of political 
organization,  or  at  least  not  easily,  since  they  are  expensive  both  in  economic  and 
organizational terms, because they require the military capacity to defend themselves 
and extract  the necessary resources  from the population.  He goes on to analyze the 
eroding  effects  on  state  sovereignty  (in  terms  of  control)  of  African  states  through 
increased dependency of and intrusion by the international system. Government control 
is  limited  by  electoral  democratic  as  well  as  human  rights  requirements,  outside 
observers such as NGOs, dependency on foreign aid and debt repayment. Additionally, 
insurgents are now being accorded many of the same rights in the international arena as 
are governments  – notably with international  mediation,  that  places government and 
insurgents on an equal footing. Effectively in some places, governments control only the  




questionable in many places.  Many rulers have used states as personal  fiefdoms for 
themselves and their clique. Using the state structures to participate in trade, both licit 
and illicit,  for personal profit is not uncommon. Thus Clapham states that while there 
are wide differences in the different combinations of these factors African states take, 
the notion of statehood in the many senses it is used (public institution, sovereign entity 
both internally and externally), should essentially be considered a relative concept and 
as a question of degree – not of existence or non-existence44. 
I would like to add that the link between Third World governments and extraction of 
resources from their population may not be the most pertinent relationship for rulers 
today, and that rulers too might be insulated, notably through natural resources. The 
Economist for example writes on the extensive international sanctions imposed on the 
Guinean military  junta,  following a  massacre  of  opposition  protesters  in  September 
2009: "Guinea, which is rich in bauxite and gold, is said to be set to earn $7 billion in  
return for mineral and oil rights, recently granted to a Chinese company, so it could get 
by without the help from its old friends in the West. Captain Camara has yet to declare  
his candidacy in a presidential election due in January. In fact, he has not said whether  
there will be an election at all"45.
Reno  goes  further  in  formulating  what  he  calls  the  'Shadow  State'.  Some  African 
governments use the facade of official state institutions and internationally recognized 
sovereignty to manipulate external  actors'  access to internal  markets,  both legal  and 
illegal. The Shadow State however is where the real power is, essentially being a form 
of personal rule. These rulers participate in lucrative illicit commerce which forms their 
foundation for patronage and power. This commerce is often associated with, causes, 
and prolongs  conflict.  Rulers may even have an interest  against  formal  institutions, 
which can acquire interests and powers of their own. According to Reno, personal rule 
is exercised by arming youths to intimidate economic and political opponents. Thus, "a 
range of activities that are commonly defined as corruption and evasion of government 
authority, or as consequences of incompetent and bad policies, actually grows out of the 
purposeful  strategies  of  rulers".  Additionally,  the  strategy  can  include  "abandoning 
44 Clapham, Cristopher 1998.
45 The Economist 7th-13th November 2009. p.44.
28
attempts to control territory within formally recognized borders"46. Hentz for example 
argues, that in Africa wars move fluidly across borders, since in practice borders are 
often either poorly implemented or non-existent in practice47. 
In general, states that have weak governance, whatever the reason may be, are in today’s  
discourse  referred  to  as  ’weak  states’,  ’failed  states’  and  ’collapsed  states’. 
’Uncontrolled  areas’ are  also  often  referred  to  when  speaking  of  territories  where 
governments are absent. What weakens or may collapse a state – supposing that there 
was a stronger state to begin with – is beyond the scope of this paper48. 
Weak states have become the centre of the discussion for security issues today. The US 
2002 National Security Strategy identifies weak states as a source of new threats49. To 
quote just one of innumerable studies, Fearon and Laitin state that: 
"Increasingly, however, the major powers must worry about bad ‘externalities’ that result 
from  the  combination  of  the  scientific  revolution  and  political  disorder,  economic 
collapse, and anger in the third world. These externalities include risks of catastrophic 
terrorism using WMD, refugee flows, health threats, enhanced drug smuggling networks, 
and  disruption  of  oil  supplies.  Major  powers  can  also  suffer  from  destabilizing 
consequences  of  protracted  civil  wars  for  whole  regions,  as  neighboring  states  are 
weakened  or  regional  incentives  for  weapons  acquisition  and  proliferation  increase. 
Finally, the major powers have faced significant and justified pressures for intervention 
on humanitarian grounds as well"50.
State failure can be defined as the non-performance of key state functions. This broad 
definition however leaves the problematic question of what are the core functions of the 
state.  'Failure'  as  a  term is  also  normative,  whereas  'weak'  is  more  descriptive  and 
useful. State collapse, a much deeper (and quite rare) kind of weakness is often linked to 
46 Reno, William 2000. p.433-435.
47 Hentz, James 2007. 
48 For example, the Failed State Index used a four-step process to analyze country risks of conflict or 
collapse (two different things, to my mind): (1) rating 12 social, economic, and political/military 
indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining 
security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic factors and surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map 
that shows the risk history of countries being analyzed. Demonstrating the complexity of the issue, the 
twelve different indicators are: Social Indicators - 1.  Mounting Demographic Pressures, 2. Massive 
Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies,  
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia, 4. Chronic and Sustained Human 
Flight; Economic Indicators - 5.  Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines, 6.  Sharp and/or 
Severe Economic Decline; Political Indicators - 7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State, 8. 
Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, 9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law 
and Widespread Violation of Human Rights, 10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State",  
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites, 12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors.
49 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002.
50 Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004.
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institutional bankruptcy. An often used definition by Zartman defines state collapse as: 
”a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power,) law, and political order 
have fallen apart”51. 
In light of this, the response formulated by the Western World has been to 're-build' the 
states in their mirror image. Essentially, a state would have the legitimate monopoly of 
violence over its territory, be democratic and respect human rights, and have functioning 
legislative, judicial and penal systems. Often, such peacebuilding efforts are planned for 
a span of five to ten years. How realistic this is, considering it took European states 
hundreds of years to develop such institutions, is questionable. Whether it is possible at 
all, is also a good question. 
1.8  .1. The dichotomy between state and non-state armed groups 
I wish to draw attention to two aspects of relations between state and non-state armed 
groups:  1.)  the  fact  that  the  reality  on  the  ground  puts  into  question  the  implicit 
perspective in this division, and that 2.) it is an inherently political division, that is not  
neutral, and has clear implications for peacebuilding.
While  it  does  not  apply  to  all  cases,  Policzer's  argument  questions  the  simple 
conceptualization  between  state  and  non-state  armed  groups,  and  the  way  it  is 
commonly used: "Contrary to the dichotomy it predicts, there is a great deal of overlap 
between states and non-state armed groups. In some cases, non-state groups look and 
behave like would-be states, with administrations that provide services to populations 
under their de facto control. In other cases, de jure states are such in name only, having 
dismantled their bureaucracies (or failed to build it in the first place), and operating as a 
series of loosely connected networks. --- In many cases, the only difference between 
states and nonstate groups is international recognition"52.
Looking at the realities on the ground, state and non-state armed groups can differ quite 
little. This is certainly not the case in all situations, but for example according to one 
study both sides were culpable when examining the war crime of one-sided violence 
51 Clapham, Cristopher 2003. p.26.
52 Policzer, Pablo 2002. p.2.
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against civilians. Government forces were responsible for the most deadly acts, rebels 
for a greater number of acts53. Both can have the monopoly of violence in certain areas, 
extract resources to uphold this monopoly from the population or territory, often enforce 
some kind of legal code, and possibly provide 'public' services to the populace. While it 
is clear that this description does not hold for all non-state armed groups, it blurs the 
distinction in practice between the two. Certainly, both can be 'predatory' - employing 
means of violence and coercion for personal benefits.
There are at least two significant ways in which governments can differ from non-state 
armed groups in theory. First, they have internationally recognized sovereignty, granting 
them  certain  benefits.  To  continue  to  profit  from  these  benefits,  internationally 
recognized governments are likely to be more dependent on legitimacy in the eyes of 
the international community. Secondly, governments can be elected, and again in theory, 
answerable to their electorate. Yet as I have described above, this is not necessarily the 
case for all governments. On the other hand, many - though not all - insurgent groups do 
seek international legitimacy and recognition, since they wish to one day become either 
a  part  of  the  legitimate  government  or  a  legitimate  government  on  their  own. 
Additionally,  many insurgent  groups might  be  partly  internationally  recognized.  For 
example,  numerous  states  recognized  the  state  of  Palestine  in  1988  after  the  PLO 
proclamation of independence. Non-state armed groups have foreign policies and some 
have diplomatic relations with states54. Insurgent groups can also be highly dependent 
on the population for cover, resources, recruitment and information, leading some of 
them to treat the civilian population well (although in practice most groups use both 
coercion and co-optation of the population). 
Politically, the division between state and non-state armed groups is significant. This is 
well  captured  by  Clapham,  describing  the  Cold  War  period  and  internationally 
recognized sovereignty: "--- the conventions of juridical statehood continued to impose 
certain  limits  on  external  intervention.  Most  critically,  the  principle  of  juridical 
statehood helped to define whoever held power in the capital as the ‘government’ of the 
state  concerned,  and correspondingly to define the insurgent  movements as ‘rebels’. 
This in turn gave the ‘government’ greatly enhanced access to external aid". With the 
53 Stepanova, Ekaterina 2009. 
54 Clapham, Cristopher 1998. p.152.
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ending of the Cold War however, this has changed somewhat: "Instead of regarding one 
party as representing the state, and the others as opposing it, external mediators came to 
conceive all the parties as subsisting on a more or less equal footing; their function in 
turn  was  no  longer  to  protect  those  who could  claim  (under  the  rules  of  ‘negative 
sovereignty’) to represent the state, but rather to achieve a political settlement through 
recognition  of  all  the  competing  parties,  and the  articulation  of  some constitutional 
structure which would encompass them. In the process, the international standing of 
insurgents was greatly enhanced".  Reflecting this process,  power-sharing agreements 
between governments and rebels, also dealt with in this paper, are a key peacebuilding 
policy-tool today. 
The point is however, that if we exclude supporting purely secessionist movements, the 
international strategy is to take the rebels into the government, and possibly support the 
elimination of the factions that refuse to do so. For secessionist movements, the aim is 
still statebuilding, looking at Kosovo as an example. While it is not as clear-cut as I 
suggest here, I think it is useful to think of the division between state and non-state 
armed groups as significant in the sense that it implies two sets of different policy-tools. 
For non-state armed groups, it will include co-optation into power-sharing agreements 
and  unity  governments  or  elimination,  DDR  (disarmament,  demobilisation  and 
reintegration - dismantling instruments of coersion) and possible amnesty or reduced 
sentences for crimes committed during the conflict55. For the government however the 
key policy-tools are good governance, respect for human rights, SSR (security sector 
reform  -  strengthening  the  instruments  of  coercion,  while  making  them  more 
accountable),  and  possibly  a  partial  DDR  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  army.  This  is 
essentially the perspective from which peacebuilding is conducted today, and treated in 
this paper.
1.8  .2. Security Sector Reform 
While the state is not the object of study of this paper, the reform of the security sector 
of the state is referred to so many times that it needs a short description. Security Sector  
Reform (SSR) has becomes one of the most central peacebuilding policies. The EU for 
55 Some actors do attempt to increase respect for human rights and humanitarian law by insurgents. The 
ICRC for example is actively involved in disseminating IHL to non-state armed gorups.
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example, focuses the majority of its civilian crisis management efforts in actions falling 
under SSR56. 
The  SSR can  be  understood  in  broad  or  narrow  terms  in  relation  to  the  actors  it  
concerns. The narrower definition would mainly include the core security actors and 
their  reform: police,  defence  and intelligence.  The UN Department  of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) uses this term. The broader definition includes four types of actors 
and their reform: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and 
rule of law, and non-statutory (unofficial) security forces. The term is relatively new, 
and there is no absolute consensus on the definition. Other UN bodies for example use 
justice and security reform (JSSR), and the DPKO uses 'rule of law' for activities that 
are related to police, penal, justice or other law enforcement agencies.
According to  the OECD, an SSR aims at:  "transforming the security system, which 
includes all  the actors, their  roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to 
manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms 
and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning 
security framework". The view taken in this paper is that the objective of an SSR is to 
guarantee that the state  has the legitimate monopoly of violence in its territory.  The 
OECD additionally notes that there are three central challenges to SSR: providing an 
institutional  framework  for  the  security  sector,  strengthening the  governance  of  the 
different parts of the security sector, and assuring that security forces are both capable 
and accountable to civil authorities. Testifying to the broadness of the tasks involved, 
UN integrated missions for example have mandates that include: "police and defence 
reform, restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and 
reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and 
administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for civil 
society; and assistance to constitutional processes"57.
While  SSR  can  also  be  conducted  in  peaceful  societies,  SSR  in  post-conflict 
environments poses its own challenges. David Law for example differentiates between 
situations where the security sector has to be reconstructed and those where it has to be 
56 consilium.europa.eu: EU Operations.
57 Hänggi, Heiner & Scherrer, Vicenza 2007. p.1, 3-5.
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built from scratch, such as in Kosovo. Whereas in peaceful environments the focus is on 
institutional reform, in post-conflict settings notably if violence is still high, the primary 
concern is security and actual reform can only be conducted in more peaceful areas. The 
focus on security, and the lead role that is given to the military, often results in the 
military reform taking undesirable precedence over police, judicial,  penal, legislative 
and institutional reform in the long run. An overly military approach in providing law 
and  order  in  detriment  to  communal  policing  tends  to  alienate  the  population  and 
delegitimize the emerging security forces. Also, efficiency of the security forces has 
often been favoured over accountability. The reality of security forces in conflict areas 
also needs to be recognized. Looking at six case studies, Law finds that already before 
conflicts  occurred,  different  security  sector  jurisdictions  could  be  characterized  as 
fiercely competing over scarce resources, not being under the control of the civilian 
administration but rather an elite, and whereas the population saw them as threats to 
rather than providers of security, the security forces' main interest was in controlling, 
not protecting, the civilian population. Also, the problem of transferring responsibility 
to locals (the exit strategy and condition for sustainability) in the immediate aftermath 
of conflicts poses two problems: 1.) a lack of capacity, and 2.) many of the potential 
actors have been heavily involved in the conflict, and thus represent certain factions 
possibly responsible for war crimes, and SSR may actually entrench their power58.
All  parts of the security  sector  are interrelated and interdependent,  and their  reform 
needs to be synchronized. In Afghanistan, where each sector was initially given to a lead 
country, people caught by the Afghan police sometimes had to be let go, because there 
were no courts to try them in59. Importantly for post-conflict peacebuilding, SSR can 
include the integration of former rebel combatants into the new security sector. This 
type  of power-sharing  has  however,  has proven to be extremely difficult60.  Security 
sector  posts  also tend to  be among the most  contested  and sought  for61.  Additional 
problems with respect to the international actors have included lack of overall strategic 
planning, lack of inter-institutional coordination and decision-making processes among 
different actors, and lack of long-term commitment by donors62.
58 Law, David 2006.
59 Sedra, Mark 2004. p.13-14.
60 See for example, The Economist 7th May 2009. 
61 See for example: Sedra, Mark 2002. p.9-11.
62 Law, David 2006. 
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Ultimately, SSR is intended to complement the broader governance and administration 
reforms linked to  statebuilding,  effectively  guaranteeing  the  state's  capacity  to  levy 
taxes, which in turn guarantees the sustainability of the reforms63. This exit strategy, has 
however proven extremely difficult.  David Law writes that:  "Expectations  about the 
ability of external actors to restore more or less functioning security sectors, where they 
have long been absent or where they did not exist pre-conflict, need to be tempered by a 
strong dose  of  realism.  To assume that  they  can,  in  half  a  generation  or  so,  build 
structures securing the accountability of the security sector, where little or none existed
pre-conflict, is unrealistic"64.
1.9  . Intervention - why it is not a solution to every problem 
This paper takes as the point of departure that there is an outside intervention in a post-
conflict environment. There are however a number of arguments against interventions 
as well. Naturally, the type of intervention can also vary a lot. It is possible for example 
to  talk  of  a  forceful  intervention  by  peacekeepers  to  stop  warring  factions  - 
peacemaking - or it is possible to talk only of the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts by 
outsiders. These two types of interventions are responses to different problems and use 
different  tools,  which  shape  the  terms  of  the  argument  over  whether  such  an 
intervention  should  or  should  not  be  made.  Perhaps  the  most  common  type  of 
intervention combines both, with peacekeepers having a less forceful role in monitoring 
the implementation of a peace agreement combined with other overall peacebuilding 
efforts. Because the basis for the analytical framework of this paper is ‘from-problem-
to-solution’, the macro-level analysis of interventions is given very little attention. I will 
here however outline some general problems with interventions.
Three general, somewhat overlapping, arguments are pertinent. First, it can be argued 
that  there  are  simply  situations  that  no  type  of  outside  intervention,  no  matter  the 
resources, design or mandate, can resolve65. 
63 Ruohomäki, Olli 2009. 
64 Law, David 2006. p.15-16.
65 For example:  Stedman (2006), an expert on peacebuilding for the UN, for example has created a 
difficulty score for post-conflict peacebuilding. The variables that make achieving a sustainable peace  
harder are: 1.) having over two parties implementing the peace agreement, 2.) presence of easily tradeable  
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Secondly, all interventions are not equal - some interventions are consciously incapable 
of resolving the crisis at hand. Notably, interventions that are political tokens, in the 
sense that since 'something'  needs to be done,  not least in the eyes of the public in 
Western  countries,  'something'  is  done.  The  interventions  in  Rwanda  in  the  1990's 
culminating in the genocide-period are a good example66. Interventions with too little 
resources and lacking a strong enough mandate can at worst deflect attention from what 
would really be needed, diminish faith in peace dividends and invite spoilers. 
Stedman for example looks at dollars spent per UN peacekeeping mission by regions, 
and notes that the cost of missions to Europe is "significantly higher" than to Africa, 
Latin America, the Middle East or the Caribbean. While he states that his analysis is 
only tentative, since he doesn't look at funding by regional organizations or member 
states, nor differences in costs by region, it points to the fact that all places will not get 
the same treatment (again, situations and need for treatment vary as well). Not all places 
are as likely to get an intervention in the first place: the UN also responds quicker to  
conflicts in Europe than in Africa or Asia, and less frequently in powerful states with 
large armies67. 
Interventions  can  also  be  badly  designed  simply  because  it  is  not  known  what  is 
effective.  As  I  pointed  out,  there  is  a  rule-of-thumb  model  for  post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Questioning it, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderblom write that the premises 
underlying current peacebuilding: 
"--- are not explicitly derived from political or economic theory, but rather have emerged 
over the past 15 years of practitioner experience. We suggest that, to an extent, they contrast  
with theory-based hypotheses. --- The predominant learning process has been practitioner-
based. Because it is a recent phenomenon, academic research has taken time to address the 
subject.  ---  [C]urrently  policy  addresses  post-conflict  risks  primarily  through  political 
design.  Underlying  this  is  an  implicit  theory  of  the  causes  of  conflict  which  gives  
precedence to motivation and, in particular, to grievances based on political exclusion.--- 
Unpalatable  as  it  may be,  peace  appears  to  depend upon an external  military  presence 
sustaining  a  gradual  economic  recovery,  with  political  design  playing  a  somewhat 
subsidiary role."
valuable commodities, 3.) large warring parties, 4.) secessionist conflicts, 5.) spoilers, 6.) neighbours 
hostile to agreement, 7.) a collapsed state, 8.) weak peace agreement. Stedman's argument is that while 
more difficult cases will not necessarily fail, they will require more coercive strategies and more 
resources.
66 UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004. p.70.
67 Gilligan, Michael & Stedman, Stephen 2003. 
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Lastly, interventions have some known possible bad effects. These might outweigh any 
possible positive effects that an intervention could achieve. The principle of "first, do no 
harm",  which  refers  specifically  to  taking  responsibility  for  the  unintended 
consequences of outside action, is relevant here. I am primarily concerned with post-
conflict peacebuilding (for the merits of not intervening in the active conflict phase, see 
3.3. To intervene or not). I will take the example of massive long-term interventions in 
which the negative effects become most visible. These kinds of interventions involve a 
'sustained  transitional  administration',  massive  statebuilding,  possibly  a  weak  or 
collapsed state, and sometimes outside interveners exercising key government functions 
such as policing, judging and administration. Even in these cases however, the goal is to 
build up local capacity for the intervention to end one day ('exit strategy'). 
An extreme example of an administration supported, and largely built, by outsiders is 
the Palestinian Authority (PA). While it is dangerous to generalize from this example, 
since  in  effect  the  Israeli  occupation  places  a  cap  on  the  development  of  this 
administration as well as the Palestinian economy, the personalized rule and massive 
inflows of cash for a long period of time bring out some instructive negative examples. 
Anne Le More writes of the PA, that:
"its  functioning  has  also  been  almost  entirely  reliant  on  funds  remitted  by  Israel  or 
charitably made available by donors. It should be re-emphasized that from its establishment 
to this day, the PA has never been able to contribute its own resources to public investment 
and  the  provision  of  public  services.  ---  This  raises  issues  of  acute  vulnerability  and 
sustainability, especially given heavy demographic pressures, and has been exposed most 
forcefully following the decision of Western donors to suspend direct cash flows to the PA 
after 2006. --- 
[Arafat and his clique] spent the ensuing decade [after the Oslo agreements] competing 
against one another for favours - both internally as part of Arafat's patronage system and 
with the Israeli for movement permits, security transactions, and business deals, etc. - to 
maintain positions of power and to build their own wealth. Thus --- the Palestinian regime 
which emerged --- after 1994 was authoritarian, unaccountable and repressive"68.
Le Billon also concludes that "although aid can foster governance", massive aid can 
sever the taxation-representation nexus, which refers to the leverage that populations 
have  over  governments  dependent  on  them for  revenue.  Effectively,  the  aid  donors 
become  the  most  important  constituency  for  governments69.  Weinstein  for  example 
argues that in some cases, letting groups compete with each other (of which war is one 
68 Le More, Anne 2008. p.168-169.
69 Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.80. 
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form) without intervening will lead to 'autonomous recovery'. "Autonomous recovery 
elevates strong leaders who are able to secure the resources necessary to win wars and 
have  the  power  to  implement  far-reaching  policy  reforms.  ---  [It]  offers  internal 
incentives for institution-building when the conditions are right"70.
Massive amounts of aid also have a debilitating effect on the economy in many ways. 
The 'Dutch Disease' causes inflation and strengthens the local currency, as well as draws 
investment and labour to the sectors receiving the aid (in this case, the civil service). 
Strengthening the local  currency hurts  export  industries  and rising prices will  cause 
poverty for those left outside the 'aid-sectors'71. Higher wages in the civil service and 
foreign  NGOs  draw  labour  away  from  the  private  sector,  further  dampening  the 
prospects for economic recovery, in turn further lowering incentives for the government 
to  depend  on  taxation  for  revenue72.  The  economy  matters:  Collier,  Hoeffler  and 
Söderblom find that economic recovery, when compared with other factors commonly 
believed to be significant, is one of the factors that statistically most reduces the risk of  
a return to conflict73.
Massive investment in a country's reconstruction also poses high risks of corruption. 
Corruption in turn may lead to: 
"--- the entrenchment of an imbalanced power or political status quo inherited from the 
conflict. As the groups empowered by the outcome of the war sustain dominant political 
and economic positions through corruption, they may prevent the redistribution of power, 
and  stifle  adequate  checks  and  balances.  Finally,  post-conflict  mismanagement  and 
embezzlement of reconstruction assistance can also delegitimise the local government and 
lead  to  social  unrest.  Corruption  facilitates  criminality  and  persisting  violence  in  post-
conflict  societies  by  compromising  the  conduct  and  independence  of  the  police  and 
judiciary, and through the recycling of former combatants into the private militias of corrupt  
politicians or organised crime."74
Fearon and Laitin note that there is a tendency of 'mission creep', that is for missions to 
be unable to exit in areas where state administrative, police and military capacities have 
been  low.  Missions  that  were  initially  planned  as  relatively  simple  peacekeeping 
missions end up requiring long-term statebuilding functions. This is notably the case 
70 Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.5.
71 Ebrahim-zadeh, Christine 2003. 
72 Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.80.
73 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008. 
74 Le Billon, Philippe 2005. p.76.
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with  conflicts  involving  protracted  insurgencies.  This  sort  of  "sustained transitional 
authority" has been labelled by many as occupation and imperialism. Fearon and Laitin 
note that most interventions differ however from imperialism in being multilateral, often  
seeking legitimacy through an approval by the UN and being finite in time, that is,  
desiring to exit as quickly as possible75. Yet prolonged and sustained outside governance 
structures, aided by outside military forces, can raise serious legitimacy questions. This 
is especially the case when insurgencies resurface, military responses are stepped up 
and civilian casualties rise,  installed rulers are perceived as puppets promoting their 
own factions, and corruption is rife. The situation in Afghanistan after the re-election of 
President Hamid Karzai in 2009 is a good example.
In light of these arguments, why is it sensible to intervene? First, it is morally the right  
thing to do. Today's conflicts affect not only fighters but innocent civilians who need to 
be protected by outsiders as their own governments either will not or cannot. Secondly, 
conflicts tend to be self-perpetuating downward spirals, ‘conflict traps’. Every year of 
conflict is 'development in reverse', with effects far outlasting the war. Countries with 
weak economies in turn tend to fall back into conflict  more easily76.  In a statistical 
comparative study, Collier et al. argue that: “Our central argument can be stated briefly: 
the key root of conflict is the failure of economic development. Countries with low, 
stagnant and unequally distributed per capita incomes that have remained dependent on 
primary  commodities  for  their  exports  face  dangerously  high  risks  of  prolonged 
conflict”77. Thus Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom for example conclude that: "given the 
enormously high costs of conflict, the risk-reductions that economic reconstruction and 
military  peacekeeping provide are likely  to  be  very cost-effective"78.  Lastly,  outside 
intervention helps fighting parties overcome commitment problems - it enables them to 
reach better outcomes than they could by themselves. Walter states that: " Negotiations 
fail because combatants cannot credibly promise to abide by terms that create numerous 
opportunities for exploitation after the treaty is signed ---. Only if a third party is willing 
to enforce or verify demobilization, and only if the combatants are willing to extend 
power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be credible and 
75 Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004. 
76 Collier, Paul & al. 2003. p.13-32.
77 Ibid.
78 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2008. p.473.
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negotiations  succeed"79.  Still,  interventions  need  to  be  backed  by  the  sufficient 
resources,  assessment  of  the  depth  of  the  tasks  at  hand,  a  realistic  time  frame and 
sobriety on the inherent problems of such efforts, with the know-how and willingness to 
address them.
2.  Non-state  armed  groups  and  problems  for  peacebuilding  in  post-conflict 
environments 
This section deals with one type of structure inherited from the conflict phase that make 
peace more fragile compared to the pre-conflict stage: organized violence not pertaining 
to the state. While there is organized non-state violence in peacetimes, internal conflicts 
by definition imply higher intensity and a qualitative difference. The main focus is on 
insurgency. Implicit problems with thinking in terms of state and non-state organized 
violence have been addressed above (see 1.9.1. The dichotomy between state and non-
state armed groups). The function of this section then is to explain in detail the type of 
problem non-state armed groups are for self-sustaining peace.
Organizing an armed threat against the state is a daunting task. Since this is relational in 
terms of power, it will also depend on the strength of the state. It requires organization, 
recruitment, finance, armament, secrecy, often a doctrine and lastly all these need to be 
in place to counter and survive attacks by government forces. The rebel forces need to 
be viable. Rebellions or insurgencies do not occur everywhere. There is then, an entry 
threshold  to  the  market  of  use of  violence80.  The striking fact  about  a  post-conflict 
situation is, that we can assume that there are already individuals who have the know-
how and means to pass this threshold and organize rebellion. We can already assume 
that  the  country possesses  the  inherent  factors  (natural  resources,  geography,  ethnic 
divides) that make rebellion likely in the first place, and secondly the factors acquired 
during the conflict phase (networks and technical know-how, weapons, finances).
Finally,  non-state  armed  groups  includes  a  huge  range  of  different  terms  and 
phenomena:  rebellion,  insurgency,  terrorists,  gangs,  militias,  paramilitary,  guerrilla, 
organised crime, and warlords. Is it meaningful to group these together - do they have 
79 Walter, Barbara 2001. p.5-6.
80 Weinstein, Jeremy 2005b. p.602.
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enough in common to be analysed as one category? Essentially all these groups have 
one thing in common: they all challenge the monopoly of violence of the state. This 
means that 1) they use violence for specific objectives, which is why they are often also 
called entrepreneurs of violence, and 2) they are willing to confront the machinery of 
violence of the state with violence. 
Our focus  is  on sustainability  of  peace,  and so the  key question  is  which  of  these 
phenomena actually pose a significant threat to peace, and which of them pose the most 
significant threats. A rebellion is often defined as a group trying to overtake the state or 
parts  of  the  territory  through  use  of  violence.  It  would  then  by definition  pose  an 
existential threat to the stability or integrity of the state. Note that this line of thinking 
makes the state, and not necessarily for example the population, the primary object of 
security. The argument is of course, that securing a stable state is the means to securing 
individuals. As I stated above though, this line of argument has big holes in it. 
Table 2. Definitions of non-state armed groups
Insurgency An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control 
and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in 
insurgencies,  ---  to  get  the  people  to  accept  its  governance  or  authority  as 
legitimate. One of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate 
power  within  a  single  state,  or  to  break  away from state  control  and  form an 
autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control.81
Rebellion Used synonymously with insurgency.
Guerrilla Same as rebellion or insurgency, but focus of term is on tactics  used: 'guerrilla 
warfare', referring to non-conventional asymmetrical warfare.
Terrorism Focus on means (asymmetrical warfare tactics), specifically "acts with the aim of 
seriously intimidating a population or of unduly compelling a government or an 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or with 
the  aim  of  seriously  destabilising  or  destroying  the  fundamental  political, 
constitutional,  economic,  or  social  structures  of  a  country  or  international 
organisation"82. Political scientists usually note that the target of the attack, often 
civilians,  is  other  than the intended political  target,  often the  government.  This 
creates pressure on the government or rulers by instilling fear in the population.  
Also states can use terrorism, for  example to create fear and quiescence in the 
population (state-terrorism). Terrorism is also a legal category.
81 US Army 2006. p.1,2.






Private  business  entities  that  provide  military  and/or  security  services.  These 
include  armed guards  and  protection  of  persons  and  objects,  such  as  convoys, 
buildings  and  other  places;  maintenance  and  operation  of  weapons  systems; 
prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security
personnel83.  Also  supply  or  logistics  providers  are  PMCs.  Today  some  are 
transnational  corporations.  Also  called  private  military  firms  (PMFs)  or 
contractors,  and  private  security  companies  (PSC)  and  mercenaries  (somewhat 
different).
Coup d'état Small group of plotters - leaders and a militant cadre from inside the government, 
usually military - replace state leaders and seize control of government structures 
with little support  from the people at  large.  Often secretive approach.  Can also 
exploit  revolutionary situation84.  While  they  pose a significant  threat,  these  are 
state-actors and will not be dealt with in this paper.
Paramilitaries Refers  primarily  to  the  type  of  organization  and  tasks  the  group  is  meant  to 
conduct. These are military in nature. They can belong to or be connected to the 
regular armed forces or police, but do not have same status as regular military. This 
can then mean two separate things:  1.  a part of the police,  such as the French 
Gendarmerie, that has a more military structure and capabilities, and is connected 
to both the Ministry of Interior and Defence85, or 2. Irregular or non-official forces 
with a military character,  that  often have unofficial  ties  to  the government and 
either the armed forces or police. Sometimes used synonymously with militia.
Warlords Individuals  autonomously  controlling  a  territory  through  military  power.  Often 
used in the context of weak or collapsed states today.
Organised 
crime
Groups organized primarily to make economic gains in different illicit markets. 
Often rely on use of violence, which can give them a comparative advantage in licit 
markets as well.
Militias Armed ‘self-defence’ groups of civilians. Can support government, parties or local 
rulers. Can be volunteers. Do not specifically aim to take over state or secede. Can 
be significant for patronage politics.
Gangs Informal ownership of small urban spaces through a local monopoly of force. Also 
provide some measure of entrepreneurial opportunity as well as local prestige and 
warrior-glamour; frequently act as neighbourhood militias to police public spaces, 
enforce  or  resist  ethnic  and  racial  borders.  Institutionalized  gangs  are 
intergenerational and have acquired complex set of beliefs around them86.
If we accept that the state is the vehicle for peace and the security of the individuals 
living in its territory, these groups must be analysed by looking at how likely they are to  
engage in military confrontation with the state's armed forces. There are two reasons 
83 Swiss Government & ICRC 2008. 
84 US Army 2006. p.5.
85 Lutterbeck, Derek 2004.
86 Adapted from: Hagedorn, John 2008. 
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why groups that pose a more existential threat to the state (overtake it or secede from it) 
are more dangerous for civilians: they are likely to try to militarily confront the state to 
take it  over,  and conversely the state is bound to answer any existential  threat with 
force, building up conflict intensity. Irregular armed groups can also fight each other. 
I  pose a number of questions in relation to non-state armed groups from a security 
perspective.  What  kind  of  military  capacity  do  these  different  forms  of  organized 
violence have? This is the perspective from which they are analysed in this paper. I will  
also observe the size and level of organization of the different groups - what level of  
conflict  can they  militarily cause and sustain?  Obviously,  there  is  huge variation in 
groups,  and overlap between groups.  Another  way I  differentiate  between non-state 
armed  groups  is  by  looking  at  their  objectives.  Objectives  should  be  distinguished 
between instrumental ones and final ones. I will thus estimate the threat to peace by 
different groups, through the threat posed to the state, as a function of means and final 
goals. Lastly, it is necessary to ask how likely it is that one type of group will change 
into another or be used for more threatening action. 
I will proceed by types of groups first, and then through key requirements for organized 
violence – namely weapons, recruits and finance. I come to the conclusion that groups 
that have the characteristics of insurgency pose the biggest threat to a sustainable post-
conflict  peace.  Thus,  most  of  the  analysis  will  be  done from the  point  of  view of 
insurgencies,  although all  armed  groups  require  weapons,  finances,  etc.  In  the  next 
section,  I  analyse  how the  different  issues  regarding  insurgencies  can  be  countered 
through today's peacebuilding policies.
2.1. Gangs
Gangs are not a post-conflict phenomena, but largely associated with urbanization and 
increasingly  alienated  (economically  and  socially)  young  men  seeking  power  and 
respect.  Gangs  combine  neighbourhood  (small  urban  territories)  with  identity  and 
possible sources of income (especially illicit). Gangs can reinforce ethnic divides if this 
is a source of identity for them, especially since gangs tend to oppose each other as they 
compete for urban spaces. Although groups can have a codified system of organization, 
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this  is not necessary and at least it  is not a hierarchical military type that  would be 
capable of conducting large scale military operations threatening the state. There is huge 
variation  within  this  type  of  group:  from small  local  unorganized  youths,  to  gangs 
present  in  many  countries  with  a  capability  to  oppose  state  forces  in  their 
neighbourhoods, of which the MS-13 is an example. The MS-13 has been identified as 
one of seven Priority Groups of the FBI's National Gang Strategy. Even of this level of 
group the  FBI  states,  that:  "based upon available  intelligence  ---,  the  MS-13 in the 
United  States  is  still  a  loosely  structured  street  gang;  ---  Gang  members  affiliate 
themselves into groups known as cliques. Each clique will have a local leader called the 
"shot  caller."  There  is  no  evidence  to  support  the  existence  of  a  single  leader  or 
governing authority  which is directing the daily activity of all  MS-13 cliques in the 
United States"87. The primary objective of these groups is not political, reformist or anti-
state,  even  if  revolutionary  rhetoric  may  be  used.  The  focus  is  on  control  of 
neighbourhoods,  identity,  and income88.  What  is  the significance of such groups for 
conflict?
There are three aspects.  First,  gangs can be a formidable recruitment  base: they are 
made up of angry young men with a disposition to use violence for some economic 
incentive. Secondly, they can be taken into the rebellion effort either by incorporating 
them or as allies. For example, the RUF of Sierra Leone both actively recruited poor 
uneducated youths from urban areas89 and allied with the West Side Boys gang, that 
then took part in the military effort90. Lastly, gangs can be used by politicians to build up 
power and patronage networks based on use of violence91 or in electoral  periods to 
intimidate opponents and buy blocks of votes.
Gangs however, almost never start changing into rebellion movements on their own. 
Gangs  thus  usually  lack  the  means  organizationally,  although  they  have  already 
succeeded in acquiring weapons and recruiting. Their objectives are also ill-suited for 
independent rebellion, but they can have an interest in rebellion that promises loot. It 
87 Swecker, Chris 20th April 2005. 
88 Hagedorn, John 2008.
89 Weinstein, Jeremy & Humphreys Macartan 2004. p.18-21.
90 independent.co.uk 11th September 2000. 
91 Reno, William 2001.
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should be noted that some scholars link gangs with insurgencies, because they contest 
the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state92.
2.2. Organised crime
Organised  crime  is  not  a  uniquely  post-conflict  phenomenon,  but  international 
organised crime can be the result  of conflict.   This is especially the case when new 
groups form, or existing groups move to profit from, illicit economies, of which drug 
trade  and control  of  borders  are obvious  examples.  These  groups can then  have an 
interest in the continuation of conflict,  as their revenues may be dependent upon the 
disorder. These would be ‘spoilers’ to the peace process. Their final goal however is 
economic gain, and they use violence to gain comparative advantages in markets.
In general, the maintenance of a relatively weak state is in the interests of organized 
crime. In an article on collapsed states and international terrorists, the Economist writes 
that terrorists: "need to be able to travel, communicate and transfer funds; they need to 
be within reach of functioning population centres. [In his new book] Stewart Patrick --- 
argues  ---  that  international  terrorists  do  not  find  the  most  failed  states  particularly 
attractive;  they  prefer  “weak  but  moderately  functional”  states.  The  shell  of  state 
sovereignty  protects  them from outside  intervention,  but  state  weakness  gives  them 
space to operate autonomously"93. The same could be said of organized crime.
If persistent organized crime emerges, self-perpetuating economic systems can develop, 
with increased implication by state officials, and the merging of interests of these two94. 
For example in  an interview,  a  Guatemalan official  postulated  that  organized crime 
passes  through  three  stages:  the  formation  phase;  the  parasitical  phase in  which 
organized criminals extract rents in the form of extortion and security provision; and 
finally when organized crime is successful, it forms a symbiotic relationship with the 
state95.
92 Manwaring, Max 2005. p.V
93 The Economist Jan 29th 2009. 
94 Sung, Hung-En 2004. 
95 Richani, Nazih 2007. p.28.
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Essentially  then,  organized  crime  does  not  attempt  to  overthrow  the  state,  but  be 
parasitic. In this function it may try to infiltrate and corrupt the state. Organized crime 
does  raise  levels  of  violence  and does  compete  with  the  state  for  the  monopoly of 
violence. Yet a key difference needs to be made between groups whose economic gain is 
based on conflict itself, such as arms traffickers, and groups who profit the most from 
weak states with relatively low conflict intensity. The first group has an interest in the 
continuation or restart of conflict, and will pose a threat to peace to the degree that it is 
capable of disturbing it.
If the state attempts to establish a monopoly of use of force by going against organized 
crime groups, this may lead to conflict. This may further force organized crime to seek a 
more military structure to counter the existential threat posed by the state. This would 
also  be  the  case  when organized  crime  groups  compete  with  each  other.  Examples 
include the drug cartels in Colombia, or the current conflict between the state of Mexico 
and the drug cartels.
Specific  attention  needs  to  be  given  to  the  relationship  between  drug  trade  and 
organized crime for two reasons. First, most known organized crime groups engage in 
drug dealing.  Drugs generate  more  profits  than  any other  form of  trafficking96 and 
constitutes the world's second largest market97. Secondly, organizations often have to 
control or at least have access to territories in order to sustainably trade drugs: either for 
growing crops or accessing transit points, especially borders. Territoriality will make 
this activity more conflict-prone, and profitability will raise competition, finances, and 
level of organization.
Groups participate in many other types of economic activity. For example in Central 
Asia, organized crime groups practice racketeering, control of prostitution, infiltration 
of the banking system and oil industry, cattle rustling, car theft, trafficking in wildlife 
and  in  precious  metals,  defrauding  states  of  resources,  agricultural  products  and 
manufactured goods, smuggling, tax evasion, tax fraud, trafficking in firearms, as well 
as trafficking in women, and organs98.
96 UNODC 2007. p.170.
97 Engvall, Johan 2006. p. 827.
98 UNODC 2007b. 
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While traditionally large organized crime groups have been viewed as highly structured 
and hierarchical,  today there is  increasing emphasis  on flexible  structures  involving 
networks of skilled individuals.  According to Europol: "many groups are in practice 
loose networks of relatively independent members that coalesce around one or more 
prominent  criminals.  These  networks  take  up tasks  of  varying structure,  length  and 
complexity according to the demand and concrete profits"99. Naturally, there are wide 
differences in scale of size and organization between groups100.
Considering  that  conflict  situations  can  either  give  rise  to  or  make  possible  the 
spreading of organized crime, and that the politically and economically weak conditions 
in  post-conflict  situations  favour  them,  organized  crime  is  positively  affected  by 
conflict. The key questions are 1) how do they undermine state capacity, and 2) can they 
start a conflict?
Over time, organized crime becomes entrenched. Criminal groups will seek to contact 
or  infiltrate  the  state  and its  officials  through corruption.  This leads  to  impunity  of 
criminals. Officials also benefit from the capacity of criminals to intimidate political 
rivals  and consolidate their  power.  Eventually,  interests  will  converge.  Impunity and 
weaker law enforcement further decrease the opportunity costs  of crime (anticipated 
gain weighed against  the probability and severity  of punishment)101.  Corruption also 
undermines faith in state institutions, such as police, politicians and judicial institution, 
affecting the legitimacy of the state102. Corruption is essentially a form of extra taxation 
on the poor, but additionally "when there is corruption, key drivers in the fight against 
poverty,  such  as  political  accountability,  transparency  and  inclusiveness,  are 
significantly  undermined  and  at  times  even  absent".  Corruption  marginalizes  the 
socially  excluded  by reducing their  access  to  political  rights,  and increases  income 
inequalities by creating market failures103. It weakens the state's redistributive capacities 
especially  in  sectors  such  as  healthcare,  education  and  social  benefits,  further 
undermining the legitimacy of the state104. Weakened distributive capacities can increase 
99 Europol 2006.
100 See for example: UNODC 2007b. Or also OCTAs by EUROPOL.
101 Richani, Nazih 2007.
102 See for example: Jane's Intelligence Review 1st March 2007. 
103 Transparency International 2008. 
104 Richani, Nazih 2007.
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the amount of people for whom crime is the only viable source of income. The World 
Bank has stated that corruption is 'the greatest obstacle to reducing poverty'105. At the 
level of society, there is an acculturation to the use of violence106. 
It is fair to say that organized crime can increase the likelihood of conflict indirectly by 
undermining the state. This lowers the threshold for the emergence of armed groups. 
Organized crime also dampens the economy107, which some scholars argue increases the 
likeliness of civil war. It should also be noted though, that in many poor countries there 
can be an initial boost in the economy - indeed, superior profits are one of the reasons 
farmers choose to cultivate drugs for example. Presence of organized crime means that 
there are weapons, specialists of violence, networks, weapons and finances for mid-
scale use of armed action. Generally though, this might not be of a military nature nor 
of a scale to existentially threaten the state. Again, this is generally not the objective of 
organized crime groups. What is the likelihood that these groups will engage in conflict 
either against each other or the state?
The  dynamics  between  organized  crime  and  conflict  can  be  illustrated  by  shortly 
looking at Mexico. Mexico is the world's twelfth largest economy and Latin America's 
second biggest108. It ranks 51st on the Human Development Index with 'High Human 
Development'109. On the Fund for Peace "Failed State Index" it ranks somewhat above 
the median, placing it in 'Warning', the second worst category out of four110. It is fair to 
say Mexico is not a collapsed or weak state.
Yet  there  are  an  estimated  seven  drug  cartels  in  Mexico,  and  90% of  the  cocaine 
consumed in North America transits through Mexico111. According to the International 
Crisis Group, daily commerce in drugs between Mexico and the U.S. is close to $900 
million112. Organized criminal groups also practice a variety of other trades.
105 See worldbank.org : Anticorruption. 
106 See for example: : Jane's Intelligence Review 1st March 2007.
107 Sung, Hung-En 2004. p.115.
108 World Bank, 2009. 
109 UNDP 2009.
110 The Fund for Peace 2009. 
111 Cook, Colleen 2007. 
112 ICG 2008. p. 26.
48
Though originally hired to work for Colombian cartels,  the Mexican ones have now 
become  independent  operators.  They  "often  have  a  dynastic  character,  involving 
multiple family members at the top of the command structure"113.  During the 1990's 
organized crime grew more sophisticated and entrenched on all levels. Before President 
Fox's active engagement against organized crime in 2000, "the authorities sought to 
keep the negative effects, in particular violence, to a minimum by 'administering drug-
trafficking'. This meant that central and regional government officials more often than 
not turned a blind eye, whether for profit or to maintain tranquillity"114. During the late 
1990's  the  Gulf  Cartel  recruited  special  unit  soldiers  from  the  Mexican  army  for 
protection and intimidation of other cartels. This prompted other cartels to form groups 
of their own with military capacity, with today perhaps over a hundred fighters115. While 
Mexican cartels have been very hierarchically organized, there is a growing emphasis 
on cell-based structures especially in response to law-enforcement efforts116, which have 
shown resilience even if the cartel heads are captured117. 
Cartels have both penetrated and confronted the state. For example in 1997 an army 
general  named as  Mexico’s  top  anti-drug official  was  found to  be  working for  the 
traffickers. Last year two officials from the attorney-general's office were arrested for 
passing information to  one of the cartels  for 450 000$ a month: these included the 
official in charge of assigning police to organised-crime investigations, and one of his 
deputies in charge of intelligence118. In 2009, it was the turn of the prosecutor in charge 
of organized crime to be arrested119. Cartels "exert influence, through intimidation and 
bribes,  over  Mexico’s  federal,  state  and  municipal  police,  lawmakers,  governors, 
mayors and judges"120. 
Between December 2006 and March 2009, more than 800 police officers and soldiers 
have been killed in Mexico. In 2006, President Calderone launched 45 000 army troops 
against traffickers - since then 10 000 people have died in drug related violence. Police 
113 UNODC 2007. p.181.
114 ICG 2008.
115 Grayson, George 2008. 
116 ICG 2008.
117 UNODC 2007.
118 The Economist 30th October 2008.
119 The Economist 5th March 2009. 
120 ICG 2008. p.24.
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say  criminals  are  armed  with  rocket-launchers,  grenades,  machineguns  and  armor-
piercing sniper rifles121. 
Cartels also fight each other. Captures of heads of cartels and other efforts against them 
have increased turf wars between the cartels themselves122. Sixty percent of killings take 
place in just three areas where the drug trade is concentrated, and four fifths of these are 
inter-gang killings123.
The  attorney  general  stated  in  an  interview  that  the  objective  is  not  to  end  drug-
trafficking, “because that is unachievable”. Rather, it is “to take back from organised 
criminal groups the economic power and armament they’ve established in the past 20 
years, to take away their capacity to undermine institutions and to contest the state’s 
monopoly of force.”124 
The case of Mexico demonstrates  that organized criminal  groups can take part  in a 
conflict in certain cases where protection of economic interests or the group's existence 
requires use of armed force both against the state or competitors. Lastly, it should be 
noted, that rebel groups that finance themselves with illicit activities can in time turn 
into organized criminal groups, aiming primarily to make economic gain. Many argue 
this is the case with the FARC today.
2.3. Paramilitaries
Paramilitary means an armed group with a military-like structure and capability to 
carry out some military tasks. This can mean two different things: 1.) official, militarily 
organized police, such as the French Gendarmerie, or 2.) unofficial armed groups, that 
nonetheless  have  unofficial  ties  to  the  government  and  support  their  policies  -  for 
example anti-leftist groups in Latin America. The focus here is on the latter.
121 The Economist 5th March 2009.
122 ICG 2008. p.25.
123 The Economist 5th March 2009.
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Official  paramilitaries are  described  by  Lutterbeck  as:  "Security  agencies  which 
occupy  an  intermediary  position  between  internal  and  external  security  forces", 
referring to the police and army respectively. These kinds of units  can be under the 
Ministry of Defence (or also Interior).  They can recruit from the military, be assigned 
such tasks as riot-policing, fighting organized crime, and border control, have a number 
of war-time tasks, and possess heavier weaponry such as light infantry weapons or tanks 
in  some  cases.125 But,  they  are  tasked  with  internal  security  against  their  own 
population. In general, it can be said that official paramilitary units can mainly affect 
large-scale conflict by delegitimizing the state by excessive repression. Being part of the 
state however, they fall outside this study. 
Non-official  paramilitary groups are  a  higher  risk.  Latin  America  has  seen  many 
unofficial  rightist  counter-guerrilla  groups,  such  as  the  death  squads  under  military 
juntas or the AUC in Colombia.  These groups are often aligned with or formed by 
government officials or members of the armed forces, and can receive training by them. 
They are often formed to perform tasks that would not be considered legal. During the 
military junta in Argentina, various unofficial 'task forces' were set up to capture, torture 
and kill people, which were either directly linked to military and police structures126 or 
individuals in power127. The AUC in Colombia began as militias against the leftist forces 
to protect  big landowners,  with the help of politicians  and the military.  Later,  these 
groups grew increasingly powerful and guided by narcotrafficking. The state negotiated 
a DDR with them, later putting some of their leaders in jail and extraditing them to the 
U.S128. The AUC is also responsible for wide-scale human-rights abuses. 
These kinds of groups are potentially similar in character to rebel groups, although they 
are more often 'pro-state'. If they have illegal economic interests, they can view the state 
in the same way as organized crime. Unofficial paramilitaries will be part of any post-
conflict situation where the state or certain officials have set them up and made use of 
them during the conflict.
125 Lutterbeck, Derek 2004.
126 nuncamas.org
127 For example the 'Triple A'. See: agenciapulsar.org 27th December 2006.
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2.4. PMCs
Private military companies (also called private security companies or firms) are "profit-
driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to conflict and 
warfare", as compared to public regular armed forces of the state. PMCs are often also 
referred to as mercenaries. 'Mercenary' is however also a legal term, and the practice is 
banned by international law. As one author states: "the term 'mercenary'  is a loaded, 
subjective one,  carrying lots of emotional baggage and connotations".  Comparing to 
PMCs, mercenaries are usually temporary groupings of individual soldiers, often hired 
in non-transparent ways to avoid legal prosecution129. 
PMCs  on  the  other  hand  perform  'complex  multiservice  tasks',  that  common 
mercenaries  could  not130. Today's  PMCs are  a  new phenomenon in  being large  and 
extremely transnational corporations. A company can be based in one country, recruit in 
other countries and actually operate in yet another place131. Their scale and use is also 
incomparable to the past. 
The rise of PMCs can be attributed to three factors: the end of the Cold War that led to  
the downsizing of many armed forces resulting in smaller armies and large numbers of 
skilled soldiers looking for work; at the same time conflicts in the Third World became 
messier  and  the  demand  for  intervention  rose,  while  Western  governments  became 
increasingly reluctant to intervene; and lastly a general trend in privatizing government 
functions – including the military ones132. Anna Leander argues that the incapacity of - 
especially African - states' public means of regulating violence (weak states) has led to a 
wide acceptance of privatizing the use of violence, that contrasts strongly with the trend 
during  previous  centuries133.  These  factors  and  the  wide  use  of  PMCs  have 
institutionalized them as strategic options for governments, making them a phenomenon 
that is here to stay.
129 Schreir, Fred & Caparini, Marina 2005. p.15-18.
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PMCs are often divided into three categories according to the services that they provide: 
“Military provider firms (also known as "private security firms"), which offer tactical 
military  assistance,  including  actual  combat  services,  to  clients;  military  consulting 
firms, which employ retired officers to provide strategic advice and military training; 
and  military  support  firms,  which  provide  logistics,  intelligence,  and  maintenance 
services to armed forces,  allowing the latter's  soldiers to concentrate  on combat  and 
reducing their government's need to recruit more troops or call up more reserves”134.
PMCs  offer  a  number  of  benefits.  Firstly,  they  are  willing  to  enter  places  where 
governments might not be willing to send their troops, and can be deployed much faster. 
This  also  means  that  NGOs,  International  Organisations  (including  the  UN),  other 
public actors and private companies can work in areas where they could not without the 
protection offered by PMCs. Privatized violence can also be cheaper - they only need to 
be paid for the job they do, while standing armies need to be held up permanently135. 
While  privatization  can  make  PMCs  a  cheaper  alternative  through  competition, 
experience has shown that many governments have failed to use PMCs in a way that 
would take advantage of this - the US' use of PMCs in Iraq being the prime example.  
Singer explains the economics behind PMCs: "PMFs use public funds to offer soldiers 
higher  pay,  and then charge the government  at  an even higher rate,  all  for services 
provided by the human capital that the military itself originally helped build"136. Also, 
for many poor governments, the fact that many PMCs are willing to work for promises 
of  concessions  for  mining  or  oil  makes  them  a  viable  option.  For  democratically 
responsible  governments,  PMCs make engagement  in  conflict  politically  less  costly 
than sending their own troops to war137. As already mentioned, outsourcing for example 
the  supply  and  logistics  functions  frees  limited  government  resources,  that  can  be 
focused on the most important tasks.
While  there  clear  advantages  to  PMCs,  they  also  pose  a  number  of  very  serious 
problems,  which  we  can  divide  into  legal  ones,  and  problems  associated  to  the 
privatization of violence. These two are interconnected. 
134 Singer, P.W. 2005. 
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Firstly, states, although purchasing the service, cannot know that their decisions will be 
implemented  in  the same way as they would with regular  armed forces.  PMCs can 
simply decide not fulfill their contract and pull away, for example under heavy fighting, 
as  happened  in  Iraq  in  2004.  During  the  Sadr  uprising,  many  supply  companies 
suspended operations, which caused fuel and ammunition stocks to dwindle138. PMCs 
work for profit, which means they can offer their services to the highest bidder. They 
have for example been  employed by: "dictatorships,  rebel groups,  drug cartels,  and, 
prior to September 11, 2001, at least two al Qaeda-linked jihadi groups"139. They thus 
cannot  be  considered  a  substitute  for  regular  armed  forces.  While  many  large 
transnational companies may be somewhat inhibited from gross misconduct, because 
they rely on a good reputation for clients, this phenomenon essentially creates a large 
global pool of private military force open to anyone with the right amount of money. 
This is a substantial change in the global system.
Because the use of private contractors may make the use of violence politically less 
expensive, this depoliticization undermines the level of democracy involved in decision-
making by circumventing the need for legislative and public approval. Privatization also 
undermines  the  accountability  for  use  of  violence.  Since  PMCs  are  very  poorly 
regulated,  the  chain  of  command  is  partly  external  to  the  government,  making 
monitoring  more  difficult.  Lastly,  governments  can  to  a  certain  extent  deny 
responsibility for the actions of private companies140. 
Anna  Leander  describes  the  ways  in  which  PMCs  as  a  phenomenon  pose  more 
fundamental  problems to state authority  and the state system. PMCs, as opposed to 
regular armed forces, are profit-seeking. It is in their interest to have more perceived 
insecurity because this increases demand for their services, in the same way as arms 
suppliers might have an interest in conflict where they supply weapons to both sides. 
There is also some evidence of the linking up of broader economic interests and PMCs 
(such  as  in  the  case  of  advance  mining  concessions).  PMCs  offer  a  comparative 
advantage in the use of violence, and this can be especially useful in conflict areas. "The 
linking up of interests [of the PMCs and firms operating in conflict areas] is likely to 
138 Singer, P.W. 2008. 
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create powerful structures which favour the reliance on private security". Also, relying 
on PMCs relieves states from the duty to create responsible and effective institutions for 
the use of force.  This is  especially  true of governments that do not actually  seek a 
monopoly of violence, but merely over sectors or areas of economic interest. Lastly, in 
the long run the reliance on non-governmental use of violence will lessen the need for 
the public's approval of government actions, resulting in loss of legitimacy141.
It should be noted that there are extreme differences in both governments and PMCs 
worldwide, and it is thus "impossible to make any generalisation on the relationship 
between PMCs and state authority"142.
As already mentioned, the legislative framework for PMCs is fairly weak. There is an 
absence of regulation, oversight and enforcement. Many of these feed into the problems 
stated above. As an example, in 2005, not a single one of the private contractors that had 
been working in Iraq since 2003 had been prosecuted or punished for a crime. While 
there  is  an  International  Convention  against  the  Recruitment,  Use,  Financing  and 
Training of Mercenaries, up until the end of 2007 only 30 countries had signed it143, and 
the  Convention  has  been  criticized  as  being  insufficient  for  dealing  either  with 
mercenaries or PMCs144. Additionally, according to the ICRC: "to be a mercenary, an 
employee of a PMSC has to fulfil so many criteria that most of them do not fall under 
the definition"145.
The ICRC insists however, that International Humanitarian Law applies to PMCs. Thus, 
there is a clear obligation for both the state that hires PMCs and the states in which they 
operate to enforce IHL146. But for example with respect to bringing the companies and 
employees to justice, few countries have legal systems that allow punishment for crimes 
committed outside the country, and many of the countries where PMCs operate may not 
have a functioning justice system to begin with147. The ICRC acknowledges that: "where 
the law falls short is in the field of national or international control over the services  
141 Leander, Anna 2003. p.5-12.
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PMCs/PSCs may provide and of the administrative processes, if any, which they must 
respect in order to be allowed to operate. There is no international regulatory framework 
specifically  focusing  on  this  industry  and  its  activities"148.  Also,  in  practice  the 
enforcement of IHL with respect to PMCs has proven difficult149. 
Essentially, what is needed is an international solution to a transnational problem, and 
ensuring implementation at the national level. The ICRC for example calls for a system 
that  specifically  prohibits  certain  activities  (for  example  direct  participation  in 
hostilities,  effectively  keeping  some  core  functions  as  the  monopoly  of  states150);  a 
licence system requiring PMCs to train their staff in IHL, adopting standard operating 
procedures and rules of engagement respecting IHL, proper disciplinary measures; a 
requirement for an authorization of every contract judged on a case by case basis and 
appropriate  sanctions for  PMCs that  operate  without  such an authorization151.  There 
should be clear criteria on vetting and selecting procedure of staff152. Such a system is 
especially crucial for post-conflict situations where PMCs operate, as IHL applies only 
during an armed conflict153.
From a more political perspective, the UN working group on mercenaries has stated the 
matter clearly: "States must make a clear distinction between those private companies 
which offer security services in strict compliance with imperative norms, regulations 
and accountability, such as respect for the principle of the State’s monopoly on the use 
of the force, and those recruiting, training, hiring or financing mercenaries to operate in 
zones of armed conflict, whose activities should be criminalized"154.
To conclude, it is difficult if not impossible to state any general effects that PMCs can 
have on a conflict and post-conflict situation, because of the variation in the kinds of 
PMCs out there and the tasks they perform. Yet as an unregulated transnational system 
with high mobility and an extremely skilled corps, PMCs provide considerable military 
power to any party with money. This is a worrisome and destabilizing factor in the 
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international  system.  As  already  mentioned,  there  is  potential  for  strong  coupled 
interests with firms that can profit from licit war- and post-war-economies. For example 
future extraction rights in exchange for intervention provide negative incentives against 
peace in post-conflict environments for PMCs. There have also been various instances 
where other non-state armed groups have made use of PMCs. PMCs also offer a number 
of  positive  services,  such  as  protection  for  actors  in  dangerous  environments 
unavailable elsewhere, and they are here to stay. Regulation and a clear permit system 
are needed.
2.5. Rebellion
Since 2008 was the fifth year running without interstate  wars (excludes presence of 
foreign troops supporting one party in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia), the main focus of 
this work is on rebellions. Rebellions do not only account for civil war, but also for 
internationalized civil war. These last years have seen a fragmentation of such groups, 
especially in weak states. Much of this violence is increasingly directed at civilians155. 
Rebellion will here be used interchangeably with insurgency and insurrection. I use the 
term guerilla-warfare as a tactic used by these groups.
There is a wide literature on rebel movements.  Roughly, there are two focus points: 
literature that mainly looks at the external environment of the rebel group, looking at 
what kind conditions make rebellion more likely, and literature that looks at the inner 
organization of rebel movements. I will proceed in two parts: 1.) strategy of guerrilla 
war, 2.) key aspects of a rebel group, which will include both traits of rebel-groups as 
well as conditions that favour rebellion. Much of what will be said here also applies to 
the previously mentioned armed groups.
2.5.1. Strategy of guerrilla war
I will  mainly here rely on Ernesto Che Guevara's  "Guerrilla Warfare",  based on his 
experience of the Cuban revolution.  This is known as the 'focoist'  approach, bearing 
155 SIPRI Yearbook 2009.
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resemblance  to  the  Maoist  approach.  I  will  then go on to  describe  newer  types  of 
insurgency strategies.
Essential to this approach is 1.) the slow build-up of the rebel forces during the guerrilla 
war stage in  a remote area with weak state control,  until  2.)  a balance of power is 
reached and it can conduct conventional warfare, and 3.) overthrow the state. Until this 
point, direct fights are avoided, and "no battle shall be fought unless it will be won".  
This means that guerrilla warfare essentially relies on asymmetric warfare and secrecy. 
The  build-up is  based  on seeking legitimacy with  the  population  by explaining the 
ideology  of  the  revolution.  Essentially  the  first  group,  or  nucleus,  will  create  the 
conditions for a popular revolution by growing in the areas it operates, because people 
will support it and join in. At the operational level, everything is conducted in small 
squads156. This focoist approach is focused more on military achievements, whereas the 
Maoist approach emphasises simultaneous political build-up157.
The  political  side  of  such a  strategy is  the  ultimate  objective,  and without  popular 
support, the rebellion cannot succeed158. As the U.S. counterinsurgency manual states: 
"Political power is the central issue in insurgencies, --- to get the people to accept its  
governance or authority as legitimate"159. For the conditions to be feasible, all peaceful 
ways of seeking change must be perceived as exhausted. While Guevara spoke of rural 
rebellion, many of today's insurgencies are urban or a combination of both160. 
Initially then, rebel groups succeed by creating disorder and they can often blame the 
government for the sufferings of the people. However, as they get more areas under 
their control, they must take on administrative responsibilities and the propaganda field 
between  rebels  and  state  becomes  more  levelled161.  While  Guevara  speaks  of  the 
acceptance of the locals as the most important thing, many rebellions have in fact relied 
heavily on coercion of the local population162.
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Although  this  approach  is  often  quoted,  rebel  groups  have  adopted  many  different 
strategies  and evolved.  The type  of  'classic'  rebellion of  the  20th  century described 
above is based on a hierarchical organization. Today, many rebel groups have shifted 
towards  more  cell-based  structures,  where  the  extent  of  decentralization  and 
independence of cells can be considerable. This makes it considerably harder to defeat 
the  rebels.  Decentralization  makes  coordination  of  the  groups  harder  for  the  rebels 
themselves, and there can be a fragmentation of armed groups163. 
The evolution of the media, and especially the internet, has increased the importance of 
the media for rebel movements for psychological warfare, which is essentially linked to 
the broader political objectives of the rebellion.  This is one reason why terrorism is 
efficient164.  Hitting  soft  targets  -  civilians  -  is  militarily  easy  with  a  powerful 
communicative impact. This means that: "almost any tactical action can have immediate 
strategic impact"165. Guevara for example spoke against the use of terrorism, since it 
might delegitimize the rebellion166. Kilcullen, a strategist at the US State Department, 
says  that  additionally:  "internet-based  financial  transfers,  training  and  recruitment, 
clandestine communication, planning and intelligence capabilities allow insurgents to 
exploit  virtual  sanctuary  for  more  than  just  propaganda"167.  It  is  possible  that 
globalization has lowered the operating threshold for small groups. I will discuss these 
new aspects of rebellion at the end.
2.5.2. Key aspects of a rebel group
The key aspects for a rebel group to function are:
- financing
- recruitment
- weapons and ammunition
- organization
- motivation for fighting
163 Metz, Steven 2007.
164 Ibid.
165 Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 6.
166 Guevara, Ernesto Che 1968. p.16.
167 Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 3.
59
- favourable physical and political environment
and also important attributes:
- leadership
- internal/external support
- an ideology or narrative
While they are analysed here in the context of insurgency, some of these aspects can 
apply to other non-state armed groups - namely weapons and finances. Yet the scale for 
insurgencies is different, and the other key aspects may be qualitatively very different.
2.5.2.1. Financing
Paul Collier concludes that for a rebellion to be possible in the first place, financial and 
military feasibility are the two most important things. "A rebel army is hugely more 
expensive than a political party and faces far more acute organizational difficulties of 
raising voluntary contributions from within the country"168. Rebellion is expensive, but 
once established it provides a considerable comparative economic advantage - use of 
force169. 
There are many sources of finance that have been used by rebel groups. Note, that not 
all means are available to all rebellions, and in some areas rebellion is not financially 
feasible and will never come into existence. 
Groups with force of arms and control of territories can practice any profitable illegal 
activity. Some, such as the drug trade, are extremely profitable. This is similar to the 
practices described above with organized crime (see 2.2 Organized crime). It has been 
noted,  that  although  'greed'  (referring  to  economic  profit)  may  not  be  the  initial  
objective of the rebellion, with time it may well take over as the primary objective170. 
This is especially the case when practices are illegal - the group may eventually have no 
interest in being a legitimate member of the international community, either by taking 
168 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Rohner, Dominic 2008.
169 Ibid. p.75
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over the state or seceding into an autonomous territory. The source of funding is then 
essential in shaping the nature of the rebel group171.
Another source of finance are natural resources such as oil (tapping of pipelines and 
bunkering of oil, kidnapping and ransoming of oil workers, or extortion rackets against 
oil companies), diamonds, other gems, timber, etc. Natural resources are in a specific 
area, and so territorial  control for financial gain can be the sole objective of rebels, 
instead of a means to an end172.
Rebels can also depend on foreign assistance - from states, businesses or civilians. Iran 
for example finances and also trains Hamas173 and Hezbollah174. Companies can finance 
rebels  for  example  against  promises  of  mining  concessions  in  case  of  victory175. 
Especially diasporas have been known to finance rebel groups, for example through 
remittances176.  Wealthy individuals may also play a key role177.  Lastly,  locals can be 
taxed or extorted money or provisions for protection. This can however be a very slow 
method of building up finances178. In contrast to illicit activities or natural resources, 
taxing local population at least in theory makes armed groups more dependent and thus 
accountable to the local population.
In 2001, the RAND Corporation conducted 
a study on post-Cold War insurgencies 
and external support. While states were 
still  the  biggest  form  of  external 
support,  all  other  non-state 
contributors  had  become  increasingly 
important,  especially  diasporas. 
Foreign guerrilla movements, religious 
organizations, wealthy individuals, and 
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even human rights groups ('other non-state') were also important179. Kilcullen states that 
new  insurgencies'  emphasis  on  videotaped  attacks,  is  specifically  intended  for 
fundraising purposes180.
2.5.2.2.  Weapons  and 
ammunition
All  rebel  groups  need  at  the 
minimum  weapons  and 
ammunition.  Explosive  devices 
are  also  increasingly  used.  The 
focus here is on small arms and 
light weapons, because they are 
so  common.  For  example, 
between  1989  and  1996,  small 
arms  were  the  most  commonly 
used  weapons  in  conflicts,  and  in  2003  small  arms  and  light  weapons  together 
accounted for 60-90% of direct  conflict  related deaths,  depending on the conflict181. 
"They are relatively inexpensive, portable and easy to use, and are effortlessly recycled 
from one conflict or violent community to the next. --- An assault rifle, for example, can 
be operational for 20 to 40 years with little maintenance"182. Affordability and mobility 
make  small  arms  and  light  weapons  attractive  to  rebel  groups.  Because  of  their 
durability, weapons need to be considered as one of the main peacebuilding problems in 
post-conflict  environments.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  impact  of  the  quantity  and 
quality of weapons on conflict has been studied mainly through case studies. There is 
little  comparative  statistical  work183.  There  are  conflicting  views  as  to  the  global 
availability of weapons to non-state armed groups184. 
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180 Kilcullen, David 2006. p. 7.
181 SAS 2005. p.230
182 IRIN 2006. p.3
183 Killicoat, Stephen 2006. p.22
184 Marsh, Nicholas 2007. p.58
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) 
are  portable  weapons  made  or  modified  to  military 
specifications  for  use  as  lethal  instruments  of  war.  Small 
arms  include  revolvers  and  self-loading  pistols;  rifles  and 
carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine 
guns. 
Light  weapons  are  weapons  intended  for  use  by  several 
members  of  armed  or  security  forces  serving  as  a  crew, 
including: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and 
mounted  grenade  launchers;  portable  anti-aircraft  guns; 
portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles;  portable launchers 
of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of 
anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 
100mm.
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What  kinds  of  small  arms and  light  weapons  do  rebels  use?  Of  the  estimated  500 
million  firearms  worldwide  (not  only  rebel  groups),  100  million  belong  to  the 
Kalashnikov assault rifle family. The Kalashnikov was not patented, and so could be 
freely copied, and was also relatively freely distributed by the Soviet Bloc during the 
Cold War. In a statistical study of the prices of AK-47s, Killicoat finds that the weapon 
is  much cheaper  in war-affected countries,  and especially  and increasingly cheap in 
Africa (four times cheaper than average). He states that the AK-47 variable is also a 
strong proxy for the price of conflict-specific capital in general. At least regional trade 
(and trade barriers) as well as neighbours' military spending correlated with its price185. 
Apart  from  the  Kalashnikov,  there  is  considerable  regional  variation  depending 
especially on what arms friendly states sponsor, or what arms the state armed forces use,  
since this is the most common source of weapons for insurgents186. 
Ammunition  is  also  key.  Unlike  weapons,  ammunition  cannot  be  used  twice  and 
stockpiles are quickly depleted. It has been shown that the supply of ammunition affects 
the intensity of the conflict; and that the type of ammunition can determine what kinds 
of weapons are used, and thus to some extent the tactics that are available to armed 
groups187. As for weapons, lack of ammunition may force the rebel groups to shift away 
from primary military targets to attacks intended to acquire ammunition188.
Light  weapons differ from small arms, because they have superior explosive power, 
technological  sophistication  and  greater  range.  Additionally,  one  can  differentiate 
between unguided and guided light  weapons.  According to  the Small  Arms Survey: 
“Light  weapons are becoming more lethal,  more portable,  less expensive,  and more 
durable,  increasing  the  prospect  of  their  proliferation,  especially  to  non-state  armed 
groups. Armed groups have obtained numerous guided weapons and produce unguided 
weapons  of  increasing  sophistication,  including  rocket-propelled  grenades,  mortars, 
grenade launchers,  explosively  formed projectiles,  and man-portable  rockets”189.  For 
example, many guided weapons that were considered advanced in the 1980’s are now 
widely produced. If it is true that there is an increasing transfer of technology, drop in 
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prices, and increase in availability190, and that the nature of conflict is indeed shaped by 
the kinds of weapons that are available especially to non-state armed groups191, we can 
expect changes in the kind of intrastate warfare that will be waged in the future. Non-
state groups will tend to possess increased firepower. Thanks to enhanced possibilities 
for communication between rebel groups today, there is also an increase in the exchange 
of technology and tactics192. 
Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are unguided explosives propelled by a rocket, that 
can  be  used  by  one  person.  RPGs  are:  "designed  specifically  for  close  combat 
operations. This reliable, simple and affordable weapon poses a serious threat to even 
the heaviest tanks, when used by determined fighters, in urban and guerrilla warfare"193. 
Mortars consist of a tube, a base and a shell. The tube is placed at an angle, providing a 
high-arching ballistic trajectory, which makes it possible to reach targets that cannot be 
hit with direct fire, such as bunkers. While mortars can be larger as well, small ones are  
portable, offering great mobility. While they are relatively simple to produce, mortars 
are  not  extremely  accurate194.  Man-portable  air-defence  systems,  or  MANPADS are 
small, light, weapons that launch guided surface-to air missiles against targets in the air. 
Because  of  the  advanced  technology  involved,  they  are  produced  in  relatively  few 
countries, but have nonetheless proliferated and are also available to non-state armed 
groups. MANPADS are the focus of exceptionally tight international regulation195.
Improvised explosive devices (IED) merit special attention. In an analysis of terrorist 
groups, the CSIS states that: "In terms of tactics, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
are the weapon of choice ---"196. For example, in Baghdad in 2007, IED attacks were 
only  just  surpassed  by  mortar  attacks  as  the  most  common  form of  major  violent 
incidents197. IEDs do not require highly technical knowledge and the materials can be 
common agricultural or medical supplies. Lack of a standard formula makes detection 
very difficult. IEDs can even be built to stop a tank. A common tactic is to attack the 
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most vulnerable  vehicle  in  a  convoy combined with an  ambush of  small  arms fire. 
"Total protection of vehicles against IED is virtually impossible"198. Kilcullen states that 
tactically, IED attacks require fewer fighters to produce the same lethality199.
While SALW are the weapons commonly used by insurgent groups, Nicholas Marsh 
argues  that:  ”if  insurgents  seek  to  win  decisive  military  engagements  against 
government  forces,  they  will  need  to  augment  their  forces  with  heavier  weapon 
systems”. This is crucial for the phase when insurgents seek to achieve a balance of 
power with regular armed forces and hold on to conquered territory. Some researches 
claim that at this stage, the right weapons will be more decisive than the population’s 
support200.
There are a variety of sources for weapons available to rebel groups. The armed groups 
may get weapons by taking them from their own government forces, for example by 
attacking  weapons  storages  or  through  corruption.  The  former  is  one  of  the  most 
common ways for insurgents to arm themselves. Insurgents can manufacture weapons 
themselves, but until now this has been an insufficient source by itself for rebel groups. 
Groups can also receive weapons from a friendly government.  Lastly,  there is  arms 
trade on the black market that can be divided into two categories: 1.) "ant trade" is done 
on a small scale, for example through individual small shipments, or 2.) illegal arms 
dealers and brokers transport large numbers of arms internationally, for example by ship 
or airplane. Entering large-scale arms trade requires considerable finances, thus having 
an entry-threshold.  Attacking government storages  can be easier,  depending on their 
security201. Killicoat's study of the prices of Kalashnikovs suggested that the situation of 
neighbouring countries has a strong influence202. Generally, as a conflict is drawn out, 
weapons procurement methods get more sophisticated, diverse and entrenched203. 
Marsh argues that the availability of weapons, and the amount of control over their 
distribution by military leaders, will affect the way rebellion is organized, by affecting 
the height of the entry barrier for different groups. A large amount of loose weapons will  
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result in many fragmented uncoordinated groups. As is the case for finance, the source 
of weapons may affect the objectives of the rebel groups, if they are supplied by an 
outside benefactor with own objectives 204. In a post-conflict environment there will also 
most likely be plenty of weapons in civilian hands, weapons caches, and people with the 
know-how and networks to restart arms procurement if they consider it necessary.
2.5.2.3. Organization
Many studies  treat  rebellion as one category,  even while  implicitly  recognizing  that 
there are different ways to organize rebellion. However, the way a rebellion is organized 
will  have a significant  impact  on the kind of  conflict  that  is  waged, and especially 
determines the possible solutions to such conflicts. One central variable is the level of 
effective hierarchy, and thus unity in a rebellion. The variation is well exemplified in the  
following quote from Metz's study on insurgencies:
"Militias vary greatly in organizational complexity. Some, like Hezbollah, may 
be highly complex,  with great  internal specialization and formal methods for 
recruitment, training, indoctrination, and even professional development. They 
may have  suborganizations for  planning,  intelligence  and counterintelligence, 
financial activities, social services, and so forth. They are likely to offer 'career' 
progression within the organization. Others, like some of the African militias, are  
closer to a gang in structure, with little organizational complexity other than a 
hierarchy of power and informal methods for recruitment,  indoctrination, and 
training. Complex militias are likely to be more effective at attaining objectives. 
Simple ones are likely to be more resilient"205.
There are also several authors who argue, that there is a new kind of insurgency, owing 
to a globalized world. These are organized into loose cells, often based on ethnic loyalty 
or  other  more  permanent  identity-base,  grouped  by  loose  ideologies,  using  today's 
communication technology to coordinate, but also compete with each other. They would 
have less ambitious political goals and might not even be looking at overthrowing the 
state,  but  profiting  from  the  chaos  of  conflict206.  Kilcullen  writes  that  :  "Modern 
insurgents  operate  more  like  a  self-synchronizing  swarm  of  independent,  but 
cooperating cells, than like a formal organization"207. It should be emphasized that the 
threshold, especially financially, for the creation of a gang based on looting, extraction 
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or illicit trade is low, while the build-up of an organization such as the Hezbollah or the 
LTTE is much more demanding. 
Metz argues that the major change has happened in the context where rebellion occurs: 
the spaces the state does not occupy and where complex conflicts occur. "The dynamics 
of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in 
the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory". This 
brings about complex networks of all different kinds of non-state armed groups, that 
rely more on coercion than mass support. This results in a logic that favours a form of 
organizing where: "decentralized, networked organizations [are] more survivable. No 
single  node is  vital.  They may not  have a 'centre  of  gravity'".  Resources,  decision-
making authority and information are diffused208.  It  is  clear  that conflicts  with such 
parties will result in protracted low-intensity warfare, with no apparent end in sight, as  
no-one has overall responsibility and parties have an interest in the conflict itself, not 
any change it would seek to achieve. This is one of the key findings of this study, and 
considerably complexifies our understanding of insurgencies.
There  are also things  that  are organizationally  common to most  rebellions.  The US 
counterinsurgency manual lists the following:
- Movement leaders.
- Combatants (main, regional, and local forces, including militias).
- Political cadre (also called militants or the party).
- Auxiliaries (active followers who provide important support services).
- Mass base (the bulk of the membership).
Many rebel movements separate the political cadre, responsible for the political strategy 
of the movement and aiding the leaders, which operates openly to communicate with 
the population, and the military wing, which has to operate secretly. Auxiliaries provide 
support (such as supply) services, but do not participate in combat. The mass base is the 
supporting populace (in a people's war). The importance (or existence) of each varies 
208 Metz, Steven 2007.
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from rebellion  to  rebellion.  Many  rebellions  organize  around  pre-existing  forms  of 
organizing, for example from their tribe or ethnicity209.
2.5.2.4. Motivation and recruitment
Motivation  has  been  one  of  the  most  talked-about  academic  topics  for  rebellion. 
Motivation is significant, as it explains why rebel groups form and persist (motivation 
may change over  time),  what  their  objectives  are  and what  possible  solutions  there 
might be. It will also affect the character of the conflict - a 'people's war' will differ from  
one based on economic gain (greed). The 'greed or grievance' discussion has been a 
debate on whether political or economic reasons are a more important motivation for 
rebel groups. Murshed and Tadjoeddin summarize the issue:
"Greed  and  grievance.  The  former  reflects  elite  competition  over  valuable  natural 
resource rents. The latter argues that relative deprivation and the grievance it produces 
fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of inter-ethnic or horizontal inequality. 
Identity formation is also crucial  to intra-state conflict, as it  overcomes the collective 
action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone, yet, the greed versus 
grievance hypotheses may be complementary explanations for conflict.  --- Grievances 
and  horizontal  inequalities  may  be  better  at  explaining  why  conflicts  begin,  but  not 
necessarily why they persist. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for 
the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires institutional breakdown ---."210
A further development to this has been the 'feasibility hypothesis' developed by Collier, 
Hoeffler  and Rohner,  arguing that  wherever  a  rebellion is  militarily  and financially 
feasible,  it  will  occur  -  irrespective  of  motivation211. This  question  is  extremely 
important, since our understanding of what are the actually significant factors for the 
rise of rebel  groups will  also define our approaches  to  preventing and dealing with 
them.
In their paper, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner proceeded to test the following hypothesis: 
factors that are important for the financial and militarily feasibility of rebellion, but are 
unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war. They argued that 
they  found three variables  that  proxied feasibility,  and were harder  to  confuse  with 
greed or grievance. Countries under the French security umbrella were less at risk of 
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conflict, since this would increase the threshold for a rebellion to be militarily feasible.  
Mountainous terrain increased risk of conflict, since this would allow hiding places for 
rural rebellions, making it militarily more feasible. Lastly, the greater the size of the 
male population of the ages 15-29, the demographic group that most commonly takes 
part in conflict, makes rebellion more likely, since it makes recruitment easier. They 
state that: "motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda happens to 
be  adopted  by  the  first  social  entrepreneur  to  occupy  the  viable  niche,  or  itself 
endogenous to the opportunities thereby opened for illegal income"212. 
Motivation is more likely to correspond with objectives that are 1.) attainable during the 
conflict  (more  certain  and  immediate  to  be  achieved),  instead  of  after  the  conflict 
(longer-term, more uncertain), and 2.) in the interests of the rebel leaders who are in 
power,  rather  than  the  population  under  its  control.  This  points  towards  economic 
interests being more likely to motivate rebellion than political ones, and social exclusion  
being used as a tool by rebel leaders213. If this is true, it is highly questionable whether 
giving rebel leaders a place in government through power-sharing arrangements will 
solve underlying political grievances of the disadvantaged groups they are thought to 
represent  (see  3.5.1.  Power-sharing).  Additionally,  it  is  reasonable  to  question  how 
much a rebellion motivated by economic gain would differ from organized crime. While 
the end-goals may converge, the military capacity and organization of a rebel group will 
be  unique.  Convergence  of  insurgency  and  organized  crime  and  questioning  the 
representativeness of rebel leaders in some cases are two key observations made in this 
study.
Weinstein looks at how the resource-environment in which a rebel group arises affects 
their recruitment, and thus the character and motivation of the group. In a resource-rich 
environment, rebel leaders will find it easy to recruit as they can promise immediate 
benefits. In these situations however, the rebel leaders will not be able to effectively 
distinguish from recruits  committed to  their  cause,  and ones who are profit-seeking 
opportunists. Conversely, in "resource-poor environments, leaders attract new recruits 
by drawing on social ties to make credible promises about the private rewards that will 




status, empowerment, honour, affirmation of identity. Additionally, reputation through 
social ties also places more pressure on the soldier's performance and thus the quality of 
his/her motivation through self-selection214. 
Thus while in theory groups can recruit with either social or economic endowments, 
there are generally various groups or leaders competing to come on top in the same area. 
Because economic endowments will guarantee more recruits faster than social ones, in 
an environment where they are available, these groups will dominate. The theory thus 
holds  that  the  resource  environment  will  actually  determine  the  character  of  the 
rebellion that will emerge, irrespective of the initial motivation of leaders215. It is clear 
that motivation and recruitment - an essential element for the viability-threshold of a 
rebel group - are interlinked. 
Three other themes are salient for rebel recruitment: 'angry young men', child soldiers, 
and  drugs.  'Angry  young  men'  refers  to  the  fact  that  men  between  15-29  are 
demographically most prone to armed violence as well as being the victims of it. This 
does not mean all young men are prone to crime for example: "a mere 6–7 per cent of 
young men commit 50–70 per cent of all crime and 60–85 per cent of all serious and 
violent crime". Large unemployment and rapid demographic growth create "a large pool 
of idle young men with few prospects and little to lose". With increasing urbanization 
and deterioration of traditional ways of living and authorities, men seek status, power 
and affirmation through violence. In many cultures using weapons can be part of the 
cultural role of a man216. While many studies find that more young men in a population 
will  increase  the risk of  conflict  (especially  combined with economic stagnation)217, 
only a small number of these participate in conflict. Demographic factors alone are not a  
sufficient explanation218.
Drugs are also common in a conflict in other ways beyond finance. The leadership of 
irregular groups may recruit fighters via intoxication or addiction; use the promise of 
drugs to their fighters as a reward; encourage drug use as a motivation for atrocities 
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against civilians. Long-term intense drug use among fighters may lead to command and 
control becoming problematic or nonexistent219.
While many governments also employ child soldiers, the 'vast majority' are employed 
by non-state armed groups. Between 2004-2007 child soldiers were recruited in at least 
24 countries, and have even been used for suicide attacks for example by Palestinian 
groups220. Children are particularly easy to recruit, often at gunpoint, although many 
join voluntarily too. A Congolese rebel officer described boys as good soldiers because 
"they obey orders; they are not concerned with getting back to their wife and family; 
and they don’t  know fear"221.  Sometimes children (and other soldiers)  are forced to 
commit an atrocity in their own village222 to prevent defection. Children then alleviate 
two central problems of rebel recruitment: getting people to join and keeping them from 
defecting223. According to Foreign Policy: "Accounts from the field tell of soldiers who 
are near free to recruit, cheap to feed, and quick to follow orders. They aptly learn how 
to  employ  brutal  tactics".  Childhood  is  a  particularly  important  stage  in  human 
development - a post-conflict situation where child soldiers have been used will include 
part of a generation permanently traumatised by, but grown into, conflict224. 
In an article, Mueller describes how in an environment with a low military threshold for 
irregular fighters (he is mainly concerned with paramilitaries), it is enough to find a 
small number of opportunist sadist psychopaths to terrorize the civilian population into 
fear and control. Two percent of any population will enjoy killing. Drinking and drug 
abuse  is  also  common  in  such  situations  -  this  helps  some  people  overcome  their 
barriers. Such groups have been used by armies to commit atrocities. Rebel groups can 
do the same. In areas where there is minimal or no state presence, they can be the actual 
rebel group. In cases where there is lack of control, violence will often fall along ethnic 
lines. Looting and extortion in such a situation are also incentives. "Ethnic warfare can 
be very banal: a desperate condition where life becomes debased by the predations of 
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remarkably small groups of violent marauders who purport to operate in the name of 
some imagined community"225.
It  is  clear  that  the  number  and quality  of  the  recruits  is  determined by the  type of 
rebellion in question. A rebellion seeking to overthrow the state will need to militarily 
match the state (which may in turn vary in power), while one based on predation in an 
area where the state is absent will have a very low threshold. Numbers cited on the 
initial sizes of different rebellions range from under a hundred to several hundred, with 
successful rebellions growing to several thousand, some even a hundred thousand226. 
Guevara even states that it is better for a guerrilla group to begin small (50-100 men), or 
at least divide into small separate groups, so as not to attract too much attention227.
If we come back to the new kind of insurgencies, it is worth asking what their overall  
strategic objective is. Whereas the classic objective of insurgency was to take over the 
state or secede territorially, Policzer writes that today: "many non-state groups have no 
interest in being a state. This --- is also a signal that many groups have opted to forego 
the benefits of statehood (such as international recognition of sovereignty) in order to 
avoid the costs associated with it, such as having to build and finance an administration"
228. One could also add the restrictive costs of international legitimacy. The objective 
then may be to merely weaken the state, or keep it weak. An additional objective may be 
getting approval from the global audience the insurgency is targeting for support, such 
as the diaspora or other sympathetic insurgent groups (rather than the local population)
229. In areas where the state is weak, conflict may be waged to establish the authority of 
one's own tribe or ethnicity, or to merely profit from a conflict economy - these two do 
not exclude each other.
2.5.2.5. Favourable physical and political context
The question of what are the physical and political conditions that make rebellion more 
likely is one that has received considerable academic attention. It is impossible here to 
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go through all of them, but I will list some key findings. It should be noted that even 
these suggestions are extremely contested.
Millen notes that "government pathologies,  and not insurgent strategy, are the major 
determinant of insurgent success". He argues that what makes rebellions successful is a 
government  that  1.)  pursues  policies  that  are  viewed  as  unjust,  2.)  represses  and 
consequently radicalizes  politically  mobilized  groups,  3.)  uses state  violence against 
these that is severe but not overwhelming enough, 4.) lacks presence especially through 
policing, and lastly 5.) practices policies that alienate pro-government elites into siding 
with  the  rebels230.  Reagan  and Norton  compare  protest  and rebellion,  and find  that 
whereas state repression reduces the risk of protest, it will increase the likelihood of 
rebellion231.  This  supports  the  notion  that  a  repressive  government  response  is 
significant, but that there also needs to be space to contest the monopoly of violence - 
autocracies  are  fairly  good at  preventing  rebellion232.  The findings  by  Collier  et  al. 
mentioned above, that  the French security umbrella reduces the risk of rebellion by 
making it militarily more difficult, support the idea that a strong state deters rebellion. 
They  however  found  the  level  of  political  rights  and  checks  and  balances  to  be 
statistically insignificant overall, putting into question the effect unjust policies might 
have233.
Some physical factors that have been found to correlate with the likelihood of rebellion 
are  also  related  to  state  capacity  or  control  of  territory.  It  would  seem  that  small 
countries are more likely to experience rebellions that try to take over the state, and 
larger countries face rebellions seeking secession. This implies that large countries will 
have hinterlands with discontented groups, where the state might not be able to project 
itself. These groups have a better chance of seeking secession than trying to take over 
the entire country. Conversely, in smaller countries the government is physically closer 
both  for  capturing,  but  also  repress  the  group  directly,  making the  government  the 
strategically viable target234. Also as mentioned, it has been argued by many scholars 
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that mountainous terrain increases the likelihood of rebellion - although forest cover has 
not been found to be significant235.
Another  physical  attribute  that  has  been  intensely  studied  -  and  disputed  -  is  the 
presence  of  primary  commodities  that  are  exportable  (such  as  oil,  gemstones,  and 
timber). These have generally been found to correlate with a higher risk of rebellion, 
although it depends on how much money is being made. Larger wealth decreases risk - 
it has been suggested that at this level governments can buy off opponents. Collier et al. 
suggest  the  risk is  generally  increased by primary commodities,  because  rebels  can 
either finance themselves from resources during conflict, or this can even be their initial 
motivation for getting into conflict236. This has been contested by Fearon, who claims 
that only oil is statistically significant, and this is not a source of start-up finance, but an 
ultimate  prize  of  conflict237.  Snyder  argues  that  exports  that  are  easily  lootable 
(lucrative, easy-to-transport resources, such as gems, tropical timber, and illicit drugs), 
and thus accessible for funding by rebels, can increase the likelihood for rebellion. But 
they  can  substantially  decrease  it  if  the  extraction  is  institutionalized,  effective  and 
organized so that both the government and private entities share the profits238. 
Large population size has been found increase the likelihood of rebellion, although the 
level  of  the  effect  is  contested.  The  effect  of  ethnic  fragmentation  is  extremely 
contested.  It  had  been  presumed  to  be  one  of  the  root  causes  of  conflicts,  but 
quantitative studies have had difficulty finding any correlation. Buhaug claims this is 
because ethnic diversity makes secessionist rebellion more likely, and that this variable 
has been previously omitted239.  In  a  newer study,  Collier  et  al.  found that  if  ethno-
linguistic and religious fractionalization are disaggregated, it multiplies the possibilities 
that two person in a society belong to different groups.  This was turned into an index 
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Lastly,  economic  conditions  have  been  shown  to  correlate  strongly  with  conflict, 
notably: level, growth, and structure of income. It has mainly been argued that these 
affect the opportunity costs for recruitment by rebels, state capacity, general discontent, 
and perceived differences between social groups241.
2.5.2.6. Leadership and narrative
Leadership is important. Weinstein writes that: "Rebel organizations are reflective of the 
voluntary  and  purposive  behaviour  of  their  leaders:  the  organizers  mobilize  initial 
recruits, define the agenda of the movement, and have great latitude to determine the 
structure and approach of the guerrilla army". Yet he also states that any leadership is 
constrained  by  the  conditions  they  work  in,  and  by  competition  between  different 
groups for essential  resources242.  Personality,  charisma and efficient  use of the rebel 
group's narrative are important. Leadership may be held through religious, clan or tribal 
authority243.
Narrative is the way the rebellion tries to gain legitimacy for its cause from its target 
groups (such as its sources of support and funding and the local population), as well as 
recruit soldiers. The narrative advances alternatives to existing conditions. This includes 
either material or non-material benefits arising from rebellion. Narratives are thus often 
based on grievances. They also often aim at collective identity-building244. Collier et al. 
state that: "While for purposes of propaganda rebel leaders are indeed likely to explain 
their  motivation  in  terms  of  grievances,  other  plausible  motivations  for  organized 
private violence would include predation and sadism"245. Thus, while grievances may be 
real and the narrative authentic, any narrative is essentially a political tool. Even so, 
when looking at peace negotiations in 2008, 85% of armed groups did not base their 
actions on a clear political ideology, but rather on territorial demands or control over 
natural resources246.
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3. Solutions to problems posed by insurgencies
In the previous section I concluded that of the different non-state armed groups, with 
respect to means (capacity) and end-goals, insurgencies pose the most significant threat 
to peace. I also analyzed the central security problems with insurgencies, effectively 
answering the first part  of my research question.  I  will  proceed to analyze different 
policy options used with respect  to insurgencies,  and answer the second part  of my 
research  question:  What  are  the  policy  options for  these  problems,  notably  through 
international outside intervention? What are the problems with these policies, and what 
has proven effective (solutions)?
3.1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Disarmament,  Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) has now become part of the 
standard post-conflict package247, as one of the key tools to deal with non-state armed 
groups. It should be noted that a DDR can also be implemented when downsizing the 
regular  armed forces  (this comprised one third of the cases in  2007).  DDRs almost 
always follow a peace agreement, an agreement to a ceasefire or a memorandum of 
understanding -  in effect,  an attempt to stop hostilities.  Today, DDRs are also often 
mentioned in the agreements themselves248.  This is  recommended by policy experts, 
although many argue that  it  is  not  done with enough detail249.  DDR is  a  long-term 
peacebuilding tool. It complements peace negotiations and the resulting agreements by 
acting as a confidence-building project between former conflicting parties, as well as 
building confidence in the peace process itself250. This is elaborated below. Lastly, a 
DDR can be part of a power-sharing process between conflicting parties, where the state 
armed forces are restructured so that some of the non-state fighters are incorporated and 
some  state  forces  are  demobilized,  although  this  has  proven  to  be  very  difficult251. 
247 Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.14
248 ECP 2008. p.1.
249 Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.14
250 Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. 
p.17.
251 ECP 2009. p.20.
76
Motivation for non-state armed groups to demobilize can include war exhaustion, fear 
of defeat, confidence that interests can be pursued equally well or better through non-
violent means, guarantees of amnesty or reduced sentences for crimes, and the promise 
of peace dividends.
A DDR is a program with three interrelated parts: disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of former combatants. While the parts are interrelated, they can also be 
implemented independently - there can for example be a disarmament program alone, or 
a demobilization and reintegration without disarmament252.
While DDR is often viewed as a policy-tool, often even a neutral one, it is essentially a 
project of social engineering and politics. In her report Pouligny for example goes to 
great lengths to show how a DDR is deeply embedded in local cultural, political and 
historical conditions, and that a program's success is dependent on understanding and 
adapting to these. DDR 'is not a culturally neutral process'253. A comparative study by 
the Escola de Cultura de Pau that tracks all current DDR programs states that lessons 
learned cannot be directly applied from country to country.  They conclude that DDR is 
not just a tool, but a context-dependent process254.
A DDR program is also part of post-conflict politics, because it can substantially change 
the balance of power in a society. While the apparent aim of a DDR program is to  
integrate former combatants into a peaceful civilian life, it  is in fact part of a much 
broader attempt to demilitarize society.  A DDR program and its success is therefore 
linked to a possible Security Sector Reform (SSR), which aims to reform and establish 
the legitimate authority of the state over internal security, namely through the police and 
military255.  A  DDR  program  in  Colombia  for  example  demobilized  former 
paramilitaries, but only partially. It also failed to establish a government presence and 
monopoly of use of force in these areas, while not solving the underlying cause of drug 
trafficking.  This  resulted  in  a  resurgence  of  new  paramilitary  groups  that  formed 
business alliances with organized crime groups256. In post-conflict societies the general 
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fabric of society is torn by distrust, and different armed groups pose security dilemmas 
to each other. Since they face acute commitment problems with both disarming and the 
peace process, a DDR program both depends on other confidence building measures, 
and is a confidence-building measure in itself257. DDR programs build confidence by 
communicating  benevolent  intentions  between  opposing  parties,  and  supporting  the 
peace process as a viable alternative to violent strategies.
3.1.1. Disarmament
As stated, DDR programs have three parts, of which the first is disarmament. The UN 
Framework for DDR programs defines disarmament as: "the collection, documentation, 
control  and  disposal  of  small  arms,  ammunition,  explosives  and  light  and  heavy 
weapons of combatants  and often also of  the civilian population.  Disarmament  also 
includes the development of responsible arms management programmes"258. There have 
also been demobilizations without disarmament.  While the main stated goal is often 
disarming combatants, a disarmament program should be accompanied by more general 
policies aiming at the reduction of weapons in a post-conflict society, contributing to the 
overall  aim  of  demilitarizing  society  (see  3.8.  arms  control  measures).  Some  say 
disarmament should have as its final goal the changing of attitudes towards weapons in 
a society259.
Disarming is a significant risk for combatants and can create power asymmetries. If not 
taken into account, this may lead to a destabilization of the situation260. Disarmament, 
together  with  grouping  former  combatants  into  camps  for  the  next  phases  of  DDR 
program can be done in stages, where groups disarm one at a time. Because of the risk it 
implies, groups rarely disarm completely. For example looking at eight DDR programs 
that  were ongoing in  2007, under  half  a  weapon per  person had been turned in  on 
average, though there was a great deal of variation between programs261. Turning in a 
functioning weapon can be a prerequisite for a combatant being accepted into a DDR 
257 Douglas, Ian; Gleichmann, Colin; Odenwald, Michael; Steenkeen, Kees & Wilkinson, Adrian 2004. 
p.47, 95.
258 unddr.org 2006. p.2. 
259 Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.5.
260 Ibid. p.5.
261 ECP 2008. p.26.
78
program,  although  in  2008  only  2  of  15  ongoing  programs  required  a  weapon262. 
Disarmament, together with demobilization, are the cheapest stages of a DDR program
263.
Pouligny lists the steps of disarmament as: (1) a weapons survey or weapons disclosures 
(often, in the past, the parties to the conflict have submitted weapons inventories which 
have usually been taken at face value); (2) weapons collection; (3) weapons storage; (4) 
weapons  destruction;  (5)  weapons  redistribution  to  national  security  forces264. 
Destroying weapons often also has symbolic value, and can be done publicly. Weapons 
storage is key in preventing weapons from being diverted to new use. An important 
post-conflict  task  relating  to  the  disarmament  of  a  society  is  mine  and  unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) clearance265.
3.1.2. Demobilization
The  UN  defines  demobilization  as:  "the  formal  and  controlled  discharge  of  active 
combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization 
may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the 
massing  of  troops  in  camps  designated  for  this  purpose  (cantonment  sites, 
encampments,  assembly  areas  or  barracks).  The  second  stage  of  demobilization 
encompasses  the  support  package  provided  to  the  demobilized,  which  is  called 
reinsertion"266. Though optional, demobilization is often done by gathering combatants 
into camps where they can hand in their weapon. Alternatively mobile units can go to 
the combatants267. In exchange for demobilizing, they receive counselling, vocational 
training and/or economic assistance268. Gathered in camps and disarmed, combatants are 
vulnerable - the security of the camps is key, and should preferably be provided by 
neutral  third  parties269.  Demobilization  can  also  be  done  in  phases.  A  handbook 
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developed  by  practitioners  recommends  that  the  time  combatants  have  to  spend  in 
camps should be as short as possible to achieve the necessary goals (e.g. counselling 
and training)270.  It  should be noted that demobilization can also occur through 'self-
demobilization':  groups  dissipate  on  their  own  (rather  than  as  part  of  a  program), 
because there is no longer any need or obligation to be part of an armed group271, for 
example after a peace accord.
Pouligny  states  that  the  essential  steps  to  demobilization  are:  (1)  planning;  (2) 
encampment; (3) registration; (4) disarmament; (5) pre-discharge orientation; (6) final 
discharge of ex-combatants. 
One key question is  how to  identify who is  a  combatant  and who is  not.  Relevant 
criteria include having a weapon, being listed as a combatant either through an objective 
evaluation of the armed group or a subjective one made by the group itself,  and an 
explicit commitment to the peace agreement or DDR. The weapons criteria can lead to 
the exclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, as not all  members of an armed 
group carry weapons. Generally women and children have often been neglected in DDR 
processes272, perhaps because they are not considered as serious a security threat as adult 
male combatants. Yet for example in 2007 almost 11% of demobilized combatants were 
children273. Being listed as a combatant was clearly the most used criteria in the DDRs 
that  were ongoing in 2008274.  There is a general tendency to inflate the numbers of 
troops by commanders in order to obtain more benefits during the negotiations, while 
during demobilization some troops are often left in the bush as a security guarantee275. 
In 2007, only 68% of troops listed for demobilization actually did so276.
Part  of  the  demobilization  phase  is  reinsertion.  The UN defines  reinsertion as:  "the 
assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term 
process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the 
basic  needs of  ex-combatants  and their  families,  and can include transitional  safety 
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allowances,  food,  clothes,  shelter,  medical  services,  short-term  education,  training, 
employment  and  tools.  While  reintegration  is  a  long-term,  continuous  social  and 
economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial 
assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year"277. Some authors have 
also regarded reinsertion as part  of the reintegration process278.  When looking at the 
benefits offered after demobilizing, programs can be differentiated into groups that offer 
benefits for half a year, and ones that do this for a year or more279. I will deal with 
reinsertion as part of reintegration, while keeping in mind that the main difference is the 
time-span of problems and corresponding benefits.
3.1.3. Reintegration 
Reintegration is the process of former combatants learning to lead a civilian way of life. 
While during disarmament and demobilization the unit of reference for the program is 
the  armed  group  and  individual  combatants,  and  possibly  their  families,  for 
reintegration  it  is  the  community  into  which  the  combatants  are  to  reintegrate. 
Reintegration  is  a  relational  process  between  combatants  and  community.  Both  the 
importance of the community and the depth of the reintegration phase are well captured 
by Pouligny:
"When violence and fear have become a way of life, when war has become an 
ordinary condition and no longer exceptional, everyday life has been changed. 
Such a devastating fragmentation of social ties and individual conscience may 
contribute to the paralysis of social  rehabilitation as well as of peacebuilding 
intervention,  even  after  war  is  supposed  to  be  over.  In  other  words,  it  may 
obstruct the reconstruction of a possible everyday life in communities that have 
lived through a long siege of violence and poverty"280.
The first year is a critical phase, and while attention is also paid to these deeper issues of 
reintegration, reinsertion efforts are done in parallel.  This refers to short-term benefits 
aimed at providing the basic means for a livelihood to combatants and their families.  
These can include transportation,  possibly accommodation,  food, civilian clothing,  a 
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short term job,  or seeds and tools281.  There have been good experiences with Quick 
Impact  Projects  (QIP),  that  combine  local  community  members  working  with  the 
former combatants to build something useful for the community. This both builds trust 
between combatants and the community, and ensures the combatants are perceived as 
useful to the community. Land issues can also be a major problem282. In the long-term 
however,  the  goal  is  self-sustainability  for  the  combatants.  Vocational  training, 
microcredit or grants in accordance with a market analysis, and both community and 
combatant  needs  assessments  are  key  components  for  success283.  Benefits  can  be 
divided  according  to  their  function  into  services  that  substitute  for  participation  in 
armed  conflict,  for  example  economic  benefits,  and  reconciliatory  services  like 
psychosocial assistance that aim to accommodate ex-combatants to communities284. It 
should be noted that local communities that have suffered from the conflict may view 
the benefits given to combatants as a reward for their deeds, and create resentment.
In the short- and long-term, providing the combatants with benefits is: "based on the 
widespread notion that demobilised persons will retake up arms unless options for their 
reintegration are not perceptibly better than life as a combatant". Four main areas have 
been identified where former combatants may feel they are losing out by not fighting: 
physical security, economic security, political influence and social prestige285.
In the long run, reintegration will require the evolution of functional communities. In 
addition to psychosocial assistance, combatants and communities may need to use other 
tools  of  peacebuilding,  also  at  regional  and  national  levels.  Some  of  these  include 
indictments  to  reimplement  the  rule  of  law  and  confidence  in  the  state,  and 
condemnations of human rights abuses; truth commissions that facilitate a culture where 
atrocities  are  condemned;  and  reparations  to  victims  and  relatives,  often  as  a 
consequence  of  transitional  justice.  The  goal  of  these  is  often  reconciliation. 
Reconciliation  poses the problem of forgetting vs.  remembering for  societies:  while 
justice can have a healing effect for the victims, it can also stir up resentment between 
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combatants  and  communities286.  Additionally,  the  leaders  that  have  signed  peace 
agreements  as well  as individual  combatants can be responsible for war crimes. Yet 
without giving them power and amnesty, peace may not be achievable287. 
The  reinsertion  and  reintegration  phases  are  the  longest  ones  in  a  DDR  program, 
making up an estimated 60-80% of the total costs of a program288. Yet they often suffer 
from donor fatigue or merely lack of attention289.
In conclusion, DDR is a significant part of the peacebuilding kit. Armed struggle has 
"created new networks of solidarity, new social structures, new strategies of survival, 
and new diffused and profoundly internalized relational models" for combatants, and 
these  persist  in  the  post-conflict  phase,  increasing  the  risk  of  return  to  conflict. 
Ultimately, even a successful DDR cannot dismantle these skills and relations acquired 
by  combatants;  the  success  of  demobilization  relies  on  the  peace  dividends  being 
perceived as greater than the advantages of taking up arms again. As depicted by the 
Colombian example, a DDR program also does not stand alone. It is dependent on other 
root causes of the conflict being tackled, as well as the guarantee that no power vacuum 
exists that can be filled by new entrepreneurs of violence.
3.2. Negotiations, mediation, and peace agreements form part of peacebuilding too
Since the focus of this paper is specifically on post-conflict environments, one would 
intuitively be tempted to exclude peace agreements, negotiations and other strategies 
that have already been completed at the post-conflict phase. However, there are many 
ways to arrive at the end of an armed conflict, and they produce different kinds of post-
conflict  environments.  Also, while in theory conflicts can be described as advancing 
neatly from one 'phase' to another, the reality is that certain methods are always context-
dependent. For example in 2008, there were a number of situations where no armed 
clashes were taking place, but parties to the conflict had yet to reach an agreement and 
had disputes pending. "Thus, the negotiations are relevant for preventing the beginning 
286 Ibid. p.14.
287 Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.9.
288 ECP 2008. p.2.
289 Pouligny, Béatrice 2004. p.20.
83
or resurgence of new armed confrontations"290, and since they are a de facto part of the 
post-conflict  policy  toolkit,  they  need  to  be  examined  as  well.  Most  importantly, 
negotiations are often needed in the post-conflict phase, because of its volatility, lack of 
trust between the parties, and the need to resolve snags in the peace process291.
This paper will examine these conflict resolution292 strategies from the perspective of 
transforming the relationship between warring parties towards a more peaceful one. It 
should be noted that this does not mean that the strategies themselves are necessarily 
peaceful,  since  victory  and  submission  of  the  other  party,  even  through  outside 
intervention, can also bring peace. Even though most of the literature and practice used 
for this analysis is based on relations between state and non-state actors, they are also 
applicable to conflicts between non-state armed groups. For example in the Gaza Strip 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which have often fought each other293, have both coordinated 
militarily294 and are said to be considering a merger295.
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Combining the perspective of pacifying relations between conflicting parties and the 
concept of positive peace, I have defined the peace process as a goal-oriented political 
process involving all  stakeholders.  The ultimate goal is a deep self-sustaining peace 
(positive definition), where the majority of the people concerned agree that  disputes 
should be solved in a non-violent way, and structures exist to support this and restrain 
actors  that  do  not.  The stakeholders  can  be  either  supportive  of  the  process  or  not 
(spoilers). Essential to the process is the building of trust between parties, notably for 
disarming,  in  order  to  demilitarize  politics.  As  a  concept,  'peace  process'  has  two 
components: 1.) It is a perspective taken from the point of  view of the political end-
goal, 2.) There has to be a substantial attempt towards peace by some stakeholders, and 
it  must  be  a  declared  goal,  often  expressed  through  willingness  to  negotiate  or 
eventually a peace agreement. 
3.3. To intervene or not
The debate on intervention/non-intervention here is not related to state sovereignty, and 
whether 'humanitarian interventions' in general are justifiable. Rather, it points to which 
option better guarantees long-term peace, and thus the security of individuals: letting 
war run its course, or intervention to prevent more civilians from being killed. Both are 
thus linked to the idea of human security and not state security, where the object whose 
security is to be protected is not the state, but individuals.
Luttwak laid out the argument in his article 'Give War a Chance' in 1999, stating that 
war  "can  resolve  political  conflicts  and  lead  to  peace.  This  can  happen  when  all 
belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that 
the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. Hopes of military success must 
fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat". He goes on to 
argue, that by freezing the situation, internationally sponsored ceasefires only give the 
sides a breather to gather strength and rearm – thereby avoiding war exhaustion296. 
296 Luttwak, Edward 1999. p.1.
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The second argument, in favour of intervention, can be divided into two. The first one is 
well  summed up in  arguments  for  the  Responsibility  to  Protect  (R2P).  Quoting  the 
International Crisis Group: 
"What is R2P?
The responsibility  of  states,  and  where  they  fail  the  international  community,  to 
protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
Why does R2P matter?
Because it's the right thing to do: our common humanity demands that the world 
never again sees another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda or Bosnia.
Because it's in every country’s interest: states that can't or won't stop internal mass 
atrocity crimes are states that can't or won't stop terrorism, weapons proliferation, the 
spread of health pandemics and other global risks.
What kind of action does R2P require?
Overwhelmingly, prevention:  through measures aimed in particular at building state 
capacity, remedying grievances, and ensuring the rule of law.
But  if  prevention  fails,  R2P requires  whatever  measures  –  economic,  political, 
diplomatic, legal, security or in the last resort military – become necessary to stop 
mass atrocity crimes occurring"297.
Thus, immediately stopping atrocities such as killings,  mass rape,  the destruction of 
infrastructure, forced displacement, the spread of malnutrition and protecting civilians is 
the  overriding  imperative,  not  least  morally.  Secondly,  it  is  argued  that  there  are 
techniques to stop warring parties during the active conflict phase and make peace - 
namely negotiations, mediation and power-sharing arrangements. I will deal with these 
later, and focus here on the arguments for why war should be given a chance, and why 
many argue it is the superior option to power-sharing arrangements.
Luttwak's  argument  has  been developed by many researchers,  and received support 
from statistical studies. Licklider finds that of the civil wars between 1945-1993, 85% 
of the wars that ended with military victory did not recur, while the figure for the ones 
ended by negotiations was only 50%. However, the type of war matters. In political-
economic  wars,  negotiations  are  about  as  sustainable,  while  in  identity-based  wars 
military victories are superior, but more likely to result in genocide-like atrocities after 
peace298.  Preventing such atrocities is  one of the arguments for power-sharing.  Toft, 
examining conflicts between 1940-2000, finds that only 12% of wars ending in military 
victory  recurred,  while  the  figure  for  negotiated  settlements  was  29%,  suggesting 
military victory is three times as stable as negotiated settlements299.
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The main argument for supporting (passively/actively) the military victory of one side is 
that when one side is effectively defeated, its capacity to restart conflict is reduced to a 
minimum (often referred to as the Wagner hypothesis). Naturally, there are very few 
cases  where the enemy is  completely destroyed300,  and as I have tried to argue,  the 
threshold for low-intensity asymmetric warfare in post-conflict environments today is 
relatively low. There will  probably be low-intensity violence in any case.  The more 
nuanced argument is that states facing internal conflicts must be suffering major internal 
problems,  that  need  to  be  resolved  in  the  post-conflict  stage.  Whereas  negotiated 
settlements produce notoriously dysfunctional governments with divided groups using 
veto powers to safeguard their interests, a consolidated government resulting from the 
victory of one side is  better  able to implement the difficult  but  necessary structural 
changes301. These arguments then, rely on the political nature of root causes of conflict.
Jeremy Weinstein has developed Luttwak's argument further in a compelling article. He 
however states that the conditions under which war will produce 'autonomous recovery' 
– the development of strong institutions and leaders capable of sustaining peace without 
outside intervention - are rare and difficult to create. "Sometimes it makes sense not to 
intervene,  or  to  intervene  actively  on  behalf  of  one  side".  This  is  because  while 
intervention can sometimes stop mass killings, it may bring to halt processes of internal 
institutional change, of which warfare is a symptom. In the long run, this will save more 
lives.  Weinstein  argues  that  war  generates  stable,  self-sustaining,  and representative 
institutional arrangements302. 
War, then, is a healthy competition between groups to have the monopoly in providing 
public goods, and the winner is the group that can most effectively combine generating 
resources, mobilizing them and turning them into power. Power is projected territorially 
against other competing groups - something Weinstein sees as an ongoing struggle in 
many weak states in the Third World, where governments are incapable of projecting 
complete  control.  Thus,  both  the  recruitment  and  mobilization  of  human  resources 
requires a convincing ideology, as well as the capacity to extract capital from people. 
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Both elements tend to create a dependency of rulers on the ruled. Weinstein's theoretical 
framework separately examines two key features of state-building 1.) capacity- and 2.) 
legitimacy-building by placing them on an axis according to whether their  source is 
internal  (domestic)  or  external.  Where  both  capacity  and legitimacy  are  completely 
externally provided, there is an occupation; where they are both internally derived, there 
is autonomous recovery. Weinstein then argues that: "for war-making to lead to state-
making, there must be a significant threat to the survival of the group or state, a strong 
domestic revenue imperative, and no external means to reduce the cost of fighting for 
survival". He however acknowledges that this is the case for few Third World countries 
today303.  Tull  for  example  argues  that  most  internal  wars  in  Africa  are  actually  not 
strictly  speaking  internal  -  outside  support  often  accounts  for  their  self-sustaining 
character304.
Interestingly,  Weinstein  claims  that  these  conditions  are  best  met  by  rebel  groups 
operating  in  areas  where  they  cannot  finance  themselves  through natural  resources. 
However, rebel victories also often produce leaders who are better at waging war than 
leading a state, resulting in monolithic parties and authoritarian rule - characteristics 
necessary for a rebel organization. "These tendencies --- might be seen as potential costs 
of non-intervention, but costs that must be weighed against the benefits"305. A statistical 
study by Toft finds that in general rebel victories tend to be both more stable, and have a 
better democratization effect306. Yet Weinstein also recognizes that rebel groups as well 
as governments may draw revenues from natural resources or illicit traffic, and have 
easy access to cheap weapons. Both of these cut the connection between waging war 
and the consent of the people from whom revenues would be extracted. He states that:  
"a serious commitment to state-building in the developing world will require concerted 
action to increase the costs of warfare"307. Thus, 'letting them fight it out' is a policy 
alternative - negotiated settlements have their  own set of weaknesses described here 
later. Notably, nearly half of them fail within the first decade.
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An additional point against ‘letting them fight it out’ is made by Paul Collier & al. in a 
wide World Bank study. They argue that since conflict is development in reverse, the 
longer a war lasts, the higher will be the negative secondary consequences in the post-
conflict environment. “Once disease has set in, a country may need years of peace to 
revert to its preconflict morbidity and mortality rates. Similarly, once an economy has 
experienced  a  wave of  capital  flight  and emigration,  this  tends  to  continue  once  a 
conflict is over. In addition, the regional escalation in military expenditure can persist 
---. In many cases, most costs of civil war occur only once they are over. --- Thus, in 
practice,  the attitude let  them fight  it  out  among themselves gives licence to  a  few 
thousand combatants and a few dozen of their leaders to inflict widespread misery on 
millions of others”308.
3.4. Ceasefires
In general a truce, a ceasefire, a cessation of hostilities and an armistice are all attempts 
to halt armed clashes as measures of good faith to build trust, and possibly communicate  
a credible desire for negotiation. All these measures, however, can also be used to buy 
time to rearm309. This was for example one of the central arguments expressed by Israel 
against the ceasefire with Hamas, that ended with Operation Cast Lead at the end of 
2008310. Ceasefires are extremely fragile, since they are easily violated for example by 
factions  that  disagree  with  them,  and  implementation  is  difficult  to  monitor.  Also, 
unclear  definitions  of  the  term used to  signify  a  ceasefire,  and lack of  detail  of  its 
conditions, can lead to a breaking down of dialogue311. What are the meanings of the 
different terms used for halting armed clashes?
There are cursory differences between the concepts, namely in the depth of detail and 
issues they cover, and the level of formalization. However, the concepts are essentially 
context-dependent, meaning that they will reflect whatever conditions are negotiated by 
the different parties, and how they are implemented on the ground. Concepts can also 





evolve during one conflict, or a different concept can be adopted to get a fresh start. The 
Escola de Cultura de Pau gives the following definitions312:
Truce Informal, parties enter talks, usually a short action in the battlefield e.g. evacuation of 
civilians.
Ending  of 
hostilities
Temporary suspension of all violence (incl. kidnappings etc.), does not include shifts 
in positions in the field. Usually at the beginning of the process, for a humanitarian 
action or gesture of good will, possibly to invite to negotiate. Can be unilateral, in 
hope of reciprocation.
Ceasefire Involves negotiations. At the beginning of a process, it will resemble a cessation of 
hostilities,  but  does  not  tackle  root  causes,  unstable.  But  further  on  during  the 
process, it will be more detailed and wide, might involve retreating and grouping 
forces  to  agreed  locations.  In  this  case  resembles  an  armistice.  Agreement  on 
behaviour, not issues.
Armistice A capitulation,  or  can  also  mean  the  imposing  of  an  end  to  hostilities  (more 
permanent), e.g. Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
There are certain key variables to ceasefires. Temporally, they can be either temporary 
with a declared beginning and ending date, either for humanitarian purposes or to put 
pressure  on  negotiations  and  renewal  when  they  expire,  or  they  can  be  indefinite. 
Temporary ceasefires can also be for specific events, such as the one negotiated between 
the government and some Taliban factions for the Afghan 2009 presidential elections313. 
Indefinite ceasefires are usually unilateral, either for strategic reasons or to express a 
desire for a long-term halt to hostilities. Thus, a ceasefire can be unilateral, bilateral, or 
multilateral if more parties are involved. Usually the declaration of a bilateral ceasefire 
is preceded by some form of contact - though it can also be the result of reciprocating 
unilateral  ones.  Ceasefires  are  also  common  between  non-state  armed  groups. 
Additionally, they may be imposed by outside actors, such as the UN. Ceasefires are not 
necessarily declared, they can also be informal or "de facto" ceasefires. Lastly, they may 
be confined to certain areas, for example to create safe zones for civilians314. 
312 Ibid. p.4-5.
313 guardian.co.uk 13th August 2009. 
314 ECP 2007.
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It is common for negotiation processes to need repeated declarations of a ceasefire as 
well  as  numerous  agreements.  Violations  of  ceasefires  have  been  one  of  the  most 
common reasons for the breakdown of peace negotiations in recent years315. It should be 
noted that there are also cases of negotiations being realised without a ceasefire. The 
agreements increasingly include not only military aspects, but ones designed to assist 
the civilian population. Most ceasefire agreements will include the following elements: 
1) the identification and definition of prohibited actions; 2) separation of armed forces; 
3) verification, supervision and control mechanisms; 4) grouping of forces to barracks, 
if there is to be a demobilization. Of these elements, the separation of forces is the most  
important. It can include the definition of: security zones for a mediating third party 
physically separating the forces, coordination zones (for example for troop movement), 
the  number  of  troops  and  types  of  allowed  armament,  as  well  as  the  methods  for 
verification of these, and the mapping of mined zones316. 
The  main  difficulties  in  implementing  a  ceasefire  are  the  formation  of  dissenting 
factions (splinter-groups) and possible reluctance on the side of the armed forces, who 
are either unable to accept peace with their former enemies or fear for their jobs in the 
advent of peace. As already mentioned, there can also be fear of the ceasefire being a 
strategic  ploy  to  build  up  forces317.  Ceasefires  reflect  the  security-dilemmas  and 
difficulties of building trust that are inherent to the peace process. While I have mainly 
described  ceasefires  as  the  beginning  of  a  process  for  negotiations,  ceasefires  and 
stalemates between parties (where sides are unable to defeat each other militarily) can, 
by  themselves,  eventually  lead  to  peace.  According  to  Toft,  they  ended  a  fifth  of 
conflicts in the 1990s. Her study also suggests that ceasefires tend to produce a more 
sustaining peace than negotiations and power-sharing do. "Stalemates/ceasefires result 
in  situations  where  both  sides  remain  organized  as  separate  political  and  military 
entities, poised to take up the fight if it comes to that". There is no agreement for a unity 
government. She argues that generally the sustainability of post-conflict peace hinges 
both on the benefits of sticking to peace as well as the harms that would result from 
reverting  to  violence  for  both  sides.  Toft's  argument  is  that  negotiated  settlements 
315 ECP 2009. And, ECP 2007. 
316 ECP 2007. p.14-17.
317 Ibid. p.17.
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provide benefits, but little possibilities for coercion318. In a ceasefire however, it is clear 
that the sides keep their coercive capabilities.
3.5. Negotiations
"Negotiation  is  understood  as  meaning  the  process  in  which  two  or  more  clashing 
parties (either countries or internal stakeholders from the same country) agree to discuss 
their differences within a concerted framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to 
their demands. This negotiation can take place either directly or through facilitation by 
third  parties".  Successful  negotiations  commonly  form  a  process  beginning  with 
informal contacts, towards more formal ones, with the form of contact increasing in the 
extent it is binding, beginning with explorations and ending with negotiations and an 
agreement.  Negotiations  can  be  I-track,  referring  to  meetings  between  the  official 
leaders of groups, or II-track negotiation, referring to unofficial representatives of the 
leaders, that can benefit from a less charged atmosphere, and who then communicate 
possible solutions to leaders319. It is important to note, and it is one of the main points of 
this paper, that the singing of a peace agreement is only the beginning of a long peace 
process and peacebuilding320. Indeed, 40% of post-conflict situations revert to conflict 
within the first decade321. Additionally, negotiations continue to form part of the post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts in order to resolve disputes that arise between parties.
The  Escola  de  Cultura  de  Pau  states  that  negotiations  in  conflicts  fall  into  five 
categories or models (although they can also combine more than one), depending on the 
end-goals  pursued:  a)  Demobilisation  and  reinsertion;  b)  Political,  military  or 
economic power-sharing; c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for 
withdrawal, peace for recognition of rights, etc.); d) Confidence-building measures; e) 
Formulas for self-government or an “intermediate political  architecture”322.  The 
main focus here will be on power-sharing arrangements, because 1.) today: "externally-
driven state-building efforts tend to set in place mediated agreements that bring warring 
318 Toft, Monica 2005.
319 Fisher, Ronald 2007.
320 ECP 2009. p.9.
321 Collier, Paul 2007. p.213.
322 ECP 2009. p.10.
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parties  into  power-sharing  arrangements"323,  and  2.)  power-sharing  arrangements 
actually incorporate the other categories.   Internationally mediated agreements today 
often have a demobilisation component. Exchanges are also inherently related to power-
sharing as are many forms of autonomy (although secession cannot be considered a 
power-sharing arrangement).  Confidence-building measures are a part  of most  peace 
agreements, and power-sharing itself is intended to be a confidence building measure. It 
should be noted, that not all negotiations result in power-sharing. For example in the 
case  of  the  AUC  in  Colombia,  the  deal  that  was  struck  led  to  the  unilateral 
demobilization  of  the  AUC,  in  exchange  for  amnesty  or  reduced  sentences  for 
confessing their crimes and turning in their weapons.
Why and when would warring parties come to the negotiating table? Many of these 
conditions have already been listed with respect to ceasefires. The parties in conflict 
might have reached a hurting stalemate, where neither side is capable of defeating the 
other, and there is war-fatigue. The parties may be forced to negotiate with each other 
by  outsiders324.  There  may  also  be  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  power,  prompting 
negotiations. One side may achieve military victory - yet even in these cases, the enemy 
is rarely completely destroyed, forcing the sides to deal with each other325. Negotiation 
can also be a strategy to buy time to rearm, or simply to benefit materially from outside 
aid  before  reverting  to  conflict326.  Participating  in  negotiations  can  also  be  used  to 
increase international standing327.
Another  central  question  that  has  received academic  attention,  affecting  the  parties'  
willingness to negotiate and their ability to come to a compromise, is the divisibility of 
the stakes under negotiation. In these studies, negotiations are viewed as a means to 
resolve the distribution of political goods328. The more divisible the stakes, the easier it 
is to come to a compromise; the more total, or absolute are the goals of the different 
sides, the more difficult it is. Issues are indivisible when: "neither side can get most of 
what  it  wants  without  depriving  the  other  of  most  of  what  it  wants".  For  example 
complete control of a country, the elimination of a rival, or the revolutionary overthrow 
323 Weinstein, Jeremy 2005. p.27.
324 Catano, James 2007. 
325 Toft, Monica 2005. p.30.
326 Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.392.
327 ECP 2009. p.10.
328 Vaughan, Frank 2007.
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of a hated political, economic, or social system have been mentioned as less divisible 
issues329.
Monitoring peace negotiations in 2008, the ECP found that the main reason for crises 
were: lack of trust in the mediators, the lack of a ceasefire and splits within the armed 
groups.  The ECP also  found that  of  the conflicts  they studied,  only 7.5% ended in 
military victory, and 81% had negotiations underway. This leads them to suggest that 
the "vast majority of conflicts end at the negotiating table". Also, conflicts in this decade  
have opened up negotiations earlier, and reached an agreement quicker330. It should be 
noted, that while the ECP's study examines more recent conflicts, Toft's study puts the 
number for military victories during the 1990's at 39% of conflicts331.
3.5.1. Power-sharing agreements
Commonly,  power-sharing agreements aim  to  set  up  a  unity  government  between 
former warring parties332. The usual format promoted by the international community is 
a transitional government that is in place until elections are held, at a date set in the 
agreement.  In  theory,  this  provides for  a  peaceful  transition  of  power333.  As Catano 
states:  "power sharing provisions have developed into the international  community’s 
preferred  manner  for  structuring  post-conflict  governments  ---"334.  Power-sharing 
provides a number of benefits, but it has also been heavily criticized.
Firstly, the apparent attraction of power-sharing arrangements is their capacity to get the 
groups to stop fighting and reach a compromise. Considering that civilians are the ones 
who overwhelmingly suffer from today's wars, there are strong moral arguments for not 
letting "war run its course". It should be noted though, that plenty of authors argue that 
in the long run, this would guarantee a more sustainable peace in many conflicts (see 
3.3. To intervene or not). Secondly, power-sharing arrangements "minimize problems of 
state-building in the post-conflict environment with respect to balancing, dividing and 
329 Walter, Barbara 2001. p.12-13.
330 ECP 2009.
331 Toft, Monica 2005. p.11.
332 ECP 2009. p.20.
333 Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.386
334 Catano, James 2007b.
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distributing not only power,  but also burden and responsibility  ---"335.  Notably,  such 
arrangements are supposed to guarantee that groups are able to protect their interests as 
they commit to non-violence336. 
The  idea  behind  power-sharing  arrangements  is  that  by  accommodating  rebel 
movements,  the political  context  can be demilitarized.  This,  and working in  a unity 
government, is thought to promote moderate, compromise-seeking behaviour based on 
cooperation, and a perception that all parties benefit from pursuing political ends by 
non-violent means337. Increased dialogue, and having an overview of the parties' own 
interests  by  being  in  the  decision-making process,  both  reduce  political,  economic, 
social and military uncertainties338. What kinds of issues are dealt with in power-sharing 
arrangements, and which agreements succeed?
Power-sharing  agreements  can concern  many  different  sectors.  Hartzell  and Hoddie 
analyze  agreements  according to  whether they provide power-sharing provisions  for 
political,  territorial,  military  or  economic  sectors.  They  argue  that  power-sharing 
agreements are about defining how decisions will be made in a new polity, but also 
about who will have access to state resources. As the main political concerns they list 
electoral  proportional  representation,  administrative  proportional  representation,  and 
executive  proportional  representation.  Territorial  issues  relate  to  the  division  of 
autonomy  between  central  and  local  governments.  Economic  issues  concern  the 
capacity to allocate state resources, whereas military power-sharing mainly deals with 
the police and the army. While their article does little to criticize power-sharing in itself, 
they find that of the different power-sharing arrangements they analyze, the ones with a 
higher number of power-sharing provisions in different sectors, and enforced externally, 
are  the  ones  that  have  best  guaranteed  sustained peace.  They speculate  that  this  is 
because: "the failure of any one aspect of power sharing may not necessarily result in 
groups becoming permanently marginalized or unable to provide for their own security"
339. Catano lists similar key issues: a shared executive with divided powers, guaranteed 
political  representation,  assured  allocation of  bureaucratic  jobs,  certain  allocation of 
335 Ibid.
336 Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew 2003. p.319.
337 Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.387.
338 Catano, James 2007b.
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resources, the decentralization of society, and assured recognition of ethnic, cultural or 
other interests340.
Yet Barbara Walter points out, that: "the biggest challenge facing civil war opponents at 
the negotiating table, therefore, is not how to resolve disagreements over land reform, 
majority rule, or any of the underlying grievances that started the war. --- The greatest 
challenge  is  to  design  a treaty  that  convinces  the  combatants  to  shed their  partisan 
armies  and surrender  conquered territory even though such steps  will  increase  their 
vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other terms". This is why I 
think that even when an agreement is reached, and parties enter a unity government, 
their power bases in the new polity will still be based on their armed organizations. In 
essence, even if demobilized and reintegrated, their former conflict organizations will 
remain the source of their power and coercion to achieve their interests, by threatening 
to revert to conflict, or using low-level violence. As Tull and Mehler argue, many rebels 
who enter government will actually not change their behaviour, but profit  from both 
their  wartime economies  and government  resources341.  Additionally,  a  power-sharing 
agreement  institutionalizes  the  people  who  are  professionals  at  using  violence  for 
political ends, and given their power bases, it is debatable whether parties will come to 
view  non-violent  politics  as  a  positive-sum game,  where  both  parties  benefit  from 
cooperation.  While  in  theory elections  will  ultimately enable  a  change of  power  in 
society,  the  truth  is  that  the  groups  will  consolidate  their  power  bases  and  future 
electoral success while in government. Elections have often been set as the defining 
milestone for many outside interventions. Yet the calming effect of elections has come 
into question. Collier  et al. for example find that a pre-election calm is followed by 
post-election violence that in total  increases the risk of reversion342.  All  in all,  mere 
elections do not guarantee a peaceful transition of power.  Contending for power by 
elections  often  seems  to  be  ultimately  resolved  through  use  of  political  violence 
between opposing factions, outside mediation and pressure, and some form of power-
sharing. This has happened in countries that are not even in a post-conflict situation, 
such  as  in  Kenya  after  the  2007  elections343 and  in  Zimbabwe,  where  conclusive 
340 Catano, James 2007b.
341 Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005. p.393.
342 Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns 2007. p.470-471.
343 washingtonpost.com 7th March 2008.
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elections  were  prevented  through violence344.  Elections  do  not  necessarily  make  for 
effective peacebuilding. Achieving security, and rule of law are better guarantees for 
peace, and thus eventual democratization as well. This is one of the key findings of this 
study.
Looking  at  23  peace  agreements  that  included  pledges  to  found  a  transitional 
government, the ECP notes that in 70% of cases the coalition governments have not 
worked345.  Additionally,  power-sharing will  sideline any non-violent opposition there 
has been. Using power-sharing as a policy tool has prompted many opposition parties to 
arm themselves in the hope of getting a seat in the government, and created an incentive 
structure for would-be rebels346. Setting up quotas for public offices and government 
will also lock in place differences between communities, especially in ethnic contexts, 
since these will be the base for political competition.
Thus, Toft's argument is compelling. A truly completed power-sharing arrangement, that 
would actually demilitarize politics, would leave both parties with benefits from peace, 
but with little capacity to harm or coerce groups that defect or become spoilers. Walter 
states that: "--- it is almost impossible for the combatants themselves to arrange credible 
guarantees on the terms of the settlement. Negotiations frequently do not fail because 
the  conditions  on  the  ground  are  not  ‘ripe  for  resolution,’.---  Adversaries  often 
compromise on the basic issues underlying their conflict ---. Negotiations fail because 
combatants  cannot  credibly  promise  to  abide  by  terms  that  create  numerous 
opportunities for exploitation after the treaty is signed ---. Only if a third party is willing 
to enforce or verify demobilization, and only if the combatants are willing to extend 
power-sharing guarantees, will promises to abide by the original terms be credible and 
negotiations  succeed"347.  This is  why Toft  argues  that  the  long-term presence  of  an 
outside actor, with both the will and means to prevent defection, is what is needed to 
support power-sharing agreements. This is also what Hartzell and Hoddie's statistical 
study finds. Yet at the end of the day, a self-sustaining peace can only be guaranteed by 
a  democratically  controlled  domestic  security  sector  into  which  both  parties  are 
integrated, again emphasizing the importance of SSR. In conclusion, it is one of the key 
344 news.bbc.co.uk 30th January 2009.
345 ECP 2009. p.11.
346 Tull, Denis & Mehler, Andreas 2005.
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findings of this study, that  power-sharing arrangements inherently pose a number of 
security problems, are themselves extremely fragile, and will benefit from third party 
monitoring or enforcement. The fact that they are often combined with quick elections 
does not necessarily pacify the situation nor necessarily guarantee representation.
3.6. Mediation
Roughly, there are three ways to peacefully resolve a conflict:  1) direct negotiations 
between  parties,  2)  various  forms  of  mediation,  good  offices  and  conciliation,  3) 
binding  methods  of  third-party  intervention  (e.g.  arbitration,  adjudication)348.  I  will 
focus here on mediation, which is a central tool the international community uses for 
facilitating negotiations between conflicting parties. It is thus a technique to increase 
positive  outcomes  in  negotiations.  While  it  is  often  used  in  the  context  of  peace 
negotiations, an outside party monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement will 
also be acting as a mediating agent. Bercovitch defines mediation as "a complex and 
dynamic interaction between mediators who have resources and interests in the conflict 
or its outcome, and the protagonists [of the conflict] or their representatives". Mediation 
is by definition a voluntary process: the parties to the conflict retain control over the 
outcomes,  although  the  mediator  may  set  the  agenda.  It  may  be  conducted  by  an 
individual, a state, or an organization or institution349.
There  are  many reasons  why mediation  is  effective.  Empirically,  Walter  notes  that: 
"civil war combatants almost always chose to return to war unless a third party stepped 
in  to  enforce  or  verify  a  post-treaty  transition.  If  a  third  party  assisted  with 
implementation, negotiations almost always succeeded, regardless of the initial goals, 
ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not, these talks
almost always failed"350. Essentially, mediators enter a conflict so that the parties may 
reach a more optimal outcome than they would on their own. 
While much of the literature reviewed describes a mediator as neutral and having no 
decision-making power, a mediator is always part of the relationship between the parties 
348 Bercovitch, Jacob 2007. p.164. 
349 Ibid.
350 Walter, Barbara 2001. p.3.
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through the very act of mediating and having his/her own interests.  How neutral or 
forceful a mediator is in actuality will vary. All mediators consciously or unconsciously 
bring  with  them  their  own  ideas,  resources,  interests  and  assumptions  of  both  the 
conflict and the party they represent, to the negotiation table. The mediator's role can 
vary from being a representative  of  a  third party,  being  expected to  invent options,  
performing monitoring functions, or being a scapegoat for failure. The following table, 
adapted from Bercovitch,  shows the  kinds  of  tasks  and roles the  mediator can  play 
aiming at enabling the parties to achieve outcomes they could not on their own351:
Strategies Tactics
Communication- Clarify situation
facilitation Develop rapport with parties
Make parties aware of relevant information
Rehearse each party in appropriate behaviour





Strike a power balance
Provide direction and act as spokesman for weaker party
Reduce tensions
Move from simple to more complex issues
Keep discussion focused on issues
Summarize the agreement
Act as sounding board for propositions and tactics
Directive (more forceful) Help a party undo a commitment
Suggest trade-offs
Help parties save face
Contrive a prominent position
Reward parties' concessions
351 Bercovitch, Jacob 2007. 
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Highlight costs of non-agreement
Claim authorship for party's proposals
Offer carrots or threaten with sticks
Threaten to quit or bring in an arbitrator
Bring third party ultimatums to the interaction/negotiation
We can see that the central functions of mediation are facilitating communication and 
building trust, providing the actual context for negotiations, and bringing in carrots and 
sticks. Bercovitch notes that while all mediation is context-dependent, two key issues 
affecting  success  are  proper  timing and  a  power-parity  (a  hurting  stalemate,  where 
neither side can defeat the other, but the human and economic costs of war continue to 
rise).  Severe internal  disorganization of parties hinders success.  Some evidence also 
points to more forceful techniques of mediation being effective - though not in all cases
352. There has been an increase in mediation of conflicts - while during the Cold-War 
period,  there  was  mediation  in  approximately  30% of  conflicts,  the  post-Cold  War 
figure is 64%. During the whole period, 62% of cases that asked for mediation reached 
an agreement,  while  of the ones  without  mediation only 27% did353.  This may also 
indicate that seeking mediation reflects commitment to the process on both sides354.
3.7. Monitoring implementation of the peace process
The entire peace process is one of building trust between the conflicting parties,  by 
creating carrots for keeping with the process and sticks for breaking with it. The peace 
agreement is only a piece of paper until actual implementation begins - a process with 
dangers  and  many  snags.  As  Walter  pointed  out  in  what  she  termed  the  'credible 
commitment  theory',  it  may  quite  simply  be  impossible  for  combatants  to  credibly 
promise to abide by treaties that create numerous opportunities for exploitation355. One 
example is the demobilisation phase. Another is the difficulty of truly engaging in a 
unity government and relinquishing violence as the base of power. As with mediation in 
352 Bercovitch, Jacob 2007.
353 ECP 2007. p.17.
354 Bercovitch, Jacob 2007. p.183.
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negotiations, outside monitoring and implementation can assist the sides in achieving 
better results than they could by themselves. 
Monitoring refers to the methodology of observing, monitoring and reporting. A mission 
can be primarily a monitoring mission or have monitoring as one of its components. The  
EU concept paper for monitoring missions for example states that monitoring differs 
from other conflict management methods by its 1.) lack of a coercive deterrent capacity, 
2.)  tendency  to  lack  an  inspective  capacity,  3.)  uninvolvement  in  implementing 
programmes. Missions are impartial and reactive rather than proactive356.  Monitoring 
can be military or civilian. There are a wide number of objects of monitoring: borders, 
established  security  zones,  cantonment  sites  for  ex-combatants,  weapons  stockpiles, 
human rights, the judiciary, elections and so forth. Monitoring missions can often be 
part of a peace agreement. Producing information is the key task, meant to guarantee 
objective  assessments  of  the  situation  on  the  ground  to  both  parties.  Thus  the  EU 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia for example is: "monitoring the implementation by both 
parties  of  the  peace  agreements  ---.  One  important  step  in  this  respect  was  the 
withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the adjacent areas ---. EUMM also monitors 
the Georgian police in taking over executive power in these areas. --- Its presence in 
Georgia [aims] to  help normalize  and stabilize  the  situation  on the  ground. EUMM 
reports on the human rights situation, the respect of international humanitarian law, rule 
of law and security situation, as well as the return of internally displaced persons and 
refugees"357. Monitoring can also involve low-level mediation between parties. While 
monitoring is generally considered non-coercive, with respect to the implementation of 
peace  processes,  more  forceful  strategies  can  also  lead  parties  to  beneficial 
compromises (see 3.6. Mediation).
Hartzell and Hoddie find that the presence of a third-party enforcer after the signing of a 
peace agreement reduces the risk of failure by 83%358. If we take a peacekeeping force 
as a proxy for enforcing an outside presence, Fortna finds that their presence in civil 
wars in the post-Cold War period reduces the risk of reversion by 84%359. 
356 Council of the European Union 2003. p.4-6.
357 eumm.eu.
358 Hartzell, Caroline & Hoddie, Matthew 2003. p.327.
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At the end of the day however, a self-sustaining peace will require building up local 
capacity. This will also be the exit strategy for outside intervention. The available local 
capacity  varies  greatly  in  post-conflict  environments  (see  1.9.  The  state-centric 
approach and weak states), and will partly determine the need for capacity-building by 
outsiders. In post-conflict environments the capacity of the state to provide security is 
often the most  acute issue.  Yet either  weakness or factionalism of the state security 
sector may have been a cause of the conflict, emphasizing the importance of a proper 
SSR360.  Thus today,  instead of  mere monitoring,  many outside  interventions  include 
complex state-building activities. Yet such interventions have risks and negative effects 
of their own (see 1.10. Intervention - why it is not a solution to every problem). What 
statistical  studies  seem to  support  is  a  phased  transition  with  a  sizeable  legitimate 
outside  force  for  a  considerable  portion  of  the  post-conflict  phase361,  while  local 
capacity is developed as intensely as possible with an appreciation that this takes time. 
The 'light footprint' approach for example, emphasizes that since outside interventions 
are  temporary,  missions  should  do  their  best  not  to  undermine  local  structures  of 
governance, and give as much ownership over the state-building process as possible to 
the locals362. Economic development also reduces the risk of reversion363. 
3.8. Arms control measures
Arms control measures can target and have an effect on both state and non-state actors. 
While  the disarmament  of  non-state  armed groups through DDR has  been analyzed 
above,  I  will  here  look  at  arms  control  measures  for  post-conflict  societies  more 
generally.  The  two  are,  as  mentioned,  complementary.  Broadly  speaking,  DDR 
addresses  the  effects  of  the  conflict  by  disarming  groups,  whereas  arms  control 
measures  affect  the  causes  of  conflict,  by reducing the  availability  of  weapons and 
affecting  the  potential  conflict  environment.  The  focus  is  on  small  arms  and  light 
weapons. Roughly, arms control measures can be divided into two categories: supply- 
and demand-oriented364.
360 Fearon, James & Laitin, David 2004. p.36-37.
361 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke 2004. p.4.
362 CMI 2004. p. 4, 11. 
363 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke 2004.
364 smallarmssurvey.org : Practical Disarmament.
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3.8.1. Supply-side measures
Supply-side measures have been the main focus of international efforts to control the 
flow of arms. These include export and import controls, marking and tracing, reigning 
in brokers, and measures to take illegal weapons out of circulation. Each one of these 
measures aims to reduce the availability (supply) of weapons by affecting some or all 
parts of the chain from 'production' to 'end-use'. The chain can be described as follows: 
Production  -->  Stockpiles  and  stockpile  management  -->  Brokering  -->  Trade  and 
transfer --> End-use365. 
The main international actor is the UN with its Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW 
process.  There is  currently  a  process  in  the  UN to  develop  an international  legally 
binding arms trade treaty (ATT), which has the support of most member states366. The 
ATT is  intended  to  give  a  global  set  of  common standards  for  import,  export  and 
transfer of conventional arms. While opposed by some, the idea is to anchor the treaty 
in the states' obligation to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law 
(IHL)  and human  rights  standards,  as  well  as  to  prevent  threats  to  global  security. 
Effectively, transfer would not be allowed to parties or areas where there would be a 
substantial risk of abuse, either with respect to irresponsible end-users or diversion367.
Most of the world's SALW production is legal, that is, with the consent of the host-
nation. Thus the diversion into illegal traffic happens at other points in the chain. In a 
small number of cases however, illegal production can also have a considerable effect 
locally368. With respect to production, one of the central issues to counter proliferation is 
the transfer of technology. All major arms producers have licensed out production of 
weapons they have developed and also produce themselves. This poses two different 
problems: first it increases the global know-how to produce weapons (information is a 
good that cannot be retrieved), and it increases the risk of unlicensed, and thus illicit 
production. Proliferation of technology is significant. The Small Arms Survey (SAS) 
found that with respect to small arms, there were only 17 countries where the original 
365 Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006. p.4-5.
366 Amnesty International, Instituto Sou Da Paz, Oxfam, Project Ploughshares, Saferworld & Albert 
Schweitzer Institute 2009. 
367 Amnesty International 2008. p.4-11.
368 smallarmssurvey.org : Producers. 
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technology was developed, while production with or without a license was taking place 
in 52 countries. Taking into account countries and companies where the technology had 
been transferred, only 57% of these arms were being produced under a license. Often, 
production continues after licences have expired.
With respect to light weapons, there has also been a proliferation of technology and 
lethality. The ratio of licensed to unlicensed production is 31 countries to 26. Many non-
state armed groups today produce their own unguided light weapons, such as rocket-
propelled grenades,  mortars,  grenade launchers and IEDs, and have acquired guided 
weapons369. Thus, proliferation of technology and diversion are key issues.
Another  factor  increasing  undesirable  proliferation  in  addition  to  the  diversion  of 
technology, is irresponsible exports by producers who have received the technology. 
One  response  is  tougher  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  laws  to  stem 
unlicensed  production.  The  SAS however  estimates  that  the  most  effective  way  to 
prevent irresponsible exports is through tougher export control measures,  namely by 
obliging states to grant licenses for production in the same manner as direct transfers of 
small arms. They should be: "refused if there is a significant risk that the transferred 
technology or weapons to be produced under licence would be diverted or misused by 
the recipient"370.
According to Saferworld: "the great majority of illicit or unauthorised SALW have been 
sourced from diversion from authorised official or civilian holdings, through loss, theft, 
corruption or neglect". Diversion from stockpiles can occur at any stage of the process, 
be it waiting for shipment, during the transfer (the weakest point), or from stocks of an 
authorised  end  user  (most  common  source  for  insurgencies).  Key  loopholes  in  the 
process are the lack of risk assessments by exporting countries on whether the receiving 
countries have the capacity to store weapons safely, and the low cooperation between 
the  two  actors  on  the  issue.  A 2009  Saferworld  report  estimates  that  there  is  a: 
"reasonably strong normative framework for international action to enhance stockpile 
369 SAS 2008.
370 SAS 2007. 
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security  issues",  but  that  awareness  amongst  the  relevant  national  officials  is 
disturbingly low371.
There are both legal and illegal arms transfers. With respect to legal ones, the policies 
that are promoted focus on more responsible export policies and prevention of diversion 
to illicit markets. Capturing illegal transfers focuses on law-enforcement efforts.
Arms  brokers are  middlemen  that  can  either  find  suppliers  for  their  clients,  buy 
weapons  from  suppliers  and  then  sell  them  onwards,  or  organize  the  transfers 
themselves.  Evidence  suggests  that  arms  brokers  have  procured  weapons  to  many 
irresponsible  end-users  that  could  not  have  obtained  weapons  from  a  government-
authorised entity. Despite clear evidence of brokers often being involved in diversions 
to illegal  markets, they are still  fairly commonly used,  because most states have no 
effective legal and regulatory measures in this area372. Evidence suggests that most of 
the big dealing by arms traffickers is done by relatively few individuals, who combine 
both licit and illicit trade373. While there are some regional agreements, most of these are 
voluntary (with the exception of the EU). Most of these agreements  are based on a 
system of licensing individual transactions as well as national registries of the brokers 
used, which reflects a consensus on the kind of system needed. Saferworld estimates 
that, if implemented, such measures would considerably reduce the risk of diversion by 
brokers374.
End-user certificates (EUC) declare that the weapons are intended for the buyer only, 
and they will not be reshipped elsewhere. In practice, these documents have often been 
copied, forged or provided by corrupt government officials. The fact that the system 
relies solely on paper end-user certificates, and that their authenticity is seldom checked, 
leaves the system open for abuse. As of January 2009, only 68 states reported having 
some kind of EUC-system, of which half were in Europe. While there seems to be an 
international  consensus  on the  need for a  system in general,  this  is  not  case for  its 
371 Saferworld 2009. p.71-73.
372 Saferworld 2009. p.43-45.
373 Griffiths, Hugh & Wilkinson, Adrian 2007. 
374 Saferworld 2009. p.43-45.
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possible content or procedures. Saferworld suggests that a risk assessment and licensing 
system would be the best guarantees against misuse375.
A further way to prevent the entry of arms to areas where they might be misused is 
through arms embargoes. Their effectiveness has however come into question - of the 
UN arms embargoes between 1990-2006, every single one has been violated. SIPRI 
estimates that only in a quarter of the cases did the embargo affect the behaviour of the 
target. Key factors were the level of support by the Security Council members for the 
embargo, the presence of U.N. peacekeepers, and the level of cooperation and border 
control  of the neighbouring states376.  A report  by Control  Arms states that the main 
problems are the impunity of sanction busters, and lack of resources and mandate of the 
UN Sanctions  Committee  and  UN Investigative  teams.  This  lack  of  UN capability 
forces it to rely on Member States for monitoring, where national controls are often 
inadequate or inexistent.  Additionally, Control Arms argues that arms embargoes are 
often imposed too late, when conflict areas are already flush with arms377.
Instruments  aiming  to  make arms  dealing  more  transparent  include  the  Wassenaar 
Arrangement,  The  UN  Register  of  Conventional  Arms,  and  the  International 
Tracing  Instrument  (ITI)378.  The  Wassenaar  Arrangement  is  a  multilateral  export 
control regime consisting of arms exporting countries and covering a range of different 
weapons, not just SALW. It is not however binding, in the sense that implementation is 
fully  up  to  signatory  states.  The  main  focus  is  on  providing transparency  for  arms 
exports  and  to  prevent  diversion379.  Its  data  is  not  public.  The  UN  Register  of 
Conventional Arms keeps track of arms exports on the basis of data submitted to them 
by Member States. In 2006, 50 states participated every year, 170 had participated once 
or more and 25 had never done so. In 2003, reporting SALW sales was also officially 
recommended, but in 2004 for example, only 6 states reported such information380. One 
expert considers that even of the states that do submit data, many do so incompletely381. 
375 Ibid. p.36-39.
376 SIPRI 2007.
377 Control Arms 2006.
378 Also known as the 'International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and 
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons'.
379 wassenaar.org : Introduction. 
380 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 2007. p.30-31.
381 Wood, Brian 2006. p.4.
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The ITI is a result of the UN Programme of Action, adopted in 2005. It is a politically, 
but not  legally,  binding instrument,  that sets  out  ways in which weapons should be 
marked.  Ammunitions  and explosives  were  excluded from the  ITI,  which  has  been 
considered one of its major deficiencies. Additionally, it only commits states to marking 
weapons at the manufacturing level, leaving import markings, and marking the use by 
government  forces,  on  a  voluntary  basis.  This  leaves  tracing  highly  dependent  on 
importers for accurate record-keeping382. 
3.8.2. Demand-reduction
Demand-reduction is one set of policy-strategies aimed at the reduction of SALW that 
has received less attention, according to the Small Arms Survey. Demand reduction is a 
necessary complement to supply reduction, as: "interventions to restrict the supply of 
weapons will only succeed if factors driving demand are carefully diagnosed and acted 
upon"383. Demand reduction is significant in the sense that its object is the society as a  
whole, not just security forces or non-state armed groups. Most of the world's firearms 
are held by civilians384.
Demand  reduction  is  based  on understanding individual  and group motivations  and 
resources (both monetary and non-monetary) for weapons acquisition. With respect to 
motivation, security can be a powerful motivation for acquiring weapons. An approach 
where  weapons  are  reduced  but  security  is  not  provided  by  the  state  can  render 
communities more vulnerable, and create shifts in the balance of power. For example in 
societies where the state security forces are absent, or conversely are predatory, there 
tends to be higher misuse of civilian firearms. This emphasizes the complementarity of 
SSR and disarmament (see 1.9.2. Security Sector Reform). Demand can also be affected 
by socially constructed norms on status or manhood. The extent of resources needed for 
acquiring weapons will  depend on their  price,  which in turn is  also affected by the 
supply of weapons in a given society.  Thus, "demand is also a function of real and 
relative  prices,  which  can  act  as  a  constraint  on  the  realization  of  preferences". 
Disarmament programs can thus be aimed at changing the norms surrounding weapons, 
382 McDonald, Glenn 2006.
383 Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006. p.xv
384 smallarmssurvey.org: Issue Areas: Measures and Initiatives.
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providing better security at the community level, and offering development projects (but 
not cash) in return for firearms. These elements are interdependent. Practitioners have 
found that programs based on the local level that include an assessment of the needs of 
the  population  have  been  most  successful.  This  contrasts  with  the  often  top-down 
supply-side approach385.
In addition to demand reduction, misuse of civilian firearms can be managed through 
regulation of possession, ownership, storage, carrying, and use of small arms and light 
weapons386.
In conclusion, arms control measures aim at reducing the availability of weapons in 
post-conflict areas as well as the demand for them, changing one of the key facilitators  
of rebellion. On the supply-side, key policies are focused on creating regulatory systems 
located at the global level, tighter controls and cooperation at the regional level, and 
effective  implementation  of  regulation  at  the  national  level.  Demand  reduction  is 
important at the national and local level.
3.9. Sanctions
Sanctions are a group of policy tools, that can be used to target states, non-state groups, 
or individuals, with the aim of achieving specific political objectives. These objectives 
may include punishing or weakening a target, signalling disapproval, inducing a change 
in  policy,  or  bringing  about  regime  change.  Often,  there  are  multiple  objectives, 
although one may be overriding, and objectives can vary greatly in ambition. While this 
study is mainly concerned with sanctions aiming to have a positive impact on peace, 
sanctions can also be used to pave the way for war387.
Sanctions can be divided into economic and non-economic ones. Economic ones can 
include  restrictions  on  trading,  services,  or  financial  relations388.  These  could  be 
implemented in the form of a freeze on funds and assets, a ban on transactions,  the 
385 Atwood, David; Glatz, Anne-Kathrin & Muggah, Robert 2006. 
386 smallarmssurvey.org: Issue Areas: Measures and Initiatives.
387 House of Lords, Select Committee of Economic Affairs 2007. p.7-8.
388 Ibid. p.7.
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imposition  of  investment  restrictions,  restrictions  on  trade  in  certain  commodities 
(especially 'conflict-resources' such as diamonds or timber) and restrictions on aid389. 
Non-economic sanctions can for example include arms embargoes (see in 3.8.1. Supply-
side measures), restrictions on the use of technologies or equipment (notably military), 
travel bans, air traffic constraints, diplomatic constraints, and restrictions on culture and 
sports.  Sanctions  can  be  used  together  with  other  tools  of  foreign  policy,  such  as 
diplomacy, economic or political incentives, and the threatened or actual use of force. 
Studies find that it is crucial to use many kinds of sanctions, as well as accompany them 
with other mentioned policy tools in order to achieve the stated political objectives. For 
example, economic sanctions alone fare poorly390. 
Other  key  elements  determining  the  effectiveness  of  sanctions  are  monitoring  and 
implementation,  'naming and shaming'  strategies,  and punitive elements for sanction 
busters. 'Naming and shaming' strategies are usually effective only on parties that seek 
legitimacy from the international community391.
Sanctions can also be roughly divided into the older comprehensive sanctions, that are 
generally applied to a country as a whole, and the newer targeted or 'smart' sanctions. 
Comprehensive  sanctions,  especially  economic  ones,  were  found  to  cause  great 
suffering among the general  population of the country,  even if  sanctions included a 
planned  exemption  for  humanitarian  assistance,  while  political  leaders  could  often 
isolate themselves from the intended harms392. Targeted sanctions on the other hand are 
intended to be directed at individuals (government officials, rebel leaders), companies 
and organizations, or restrict trade in key commodities. Thus, asset freezing, travel bans 
and naming and shaming are intended to have a targeted effect on the people assumed to 
have the decision-making power. Restricting trade in key commodities (also known as 
targeted commodity sanctions) however, will necessarily have an impact on the overall 
population as well, as it affects entire sectors of the economy393. 
389 Confédération Suisse, SECO. 
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Sanctions  can  be  imposed  by  an 
international 
organization,  of  which 
the  UN  is  the  most 
important  actor, 
accompanied  by  the 
growing  importance  of 
the EU; a group of states; 
or  individual  states394. 
One  way  to  think  about 
sanctions is illustrated in Table 7.
I will shortly present the two most discussed forms of sanctions: financial ones - namely 
asset freezing - and targeted commodity sanctions. I will finish with an example, which 
highlights the importance of a regional approach.
Targeted commodity sanctions, when used as a peacebuilding approach, are intended 
to cut off the access of warring parties to external markets for a specific product that is 
used to fund war. The specific commodities talked about here are also referred to as 
'conflict-resources'. According to a leading NGO, Global Witness, the UN had passed 
targeted sanctions on natural resource exports six times up until 2006 (all directed at 
either diamonds or timber), while the NGO estimated that in reality a very wide range of 
resources finance conflicts worldwide395. Thus, a specific resource, like diamonds, may 
or may not be a conflict resource depending on the context and its use.
One of the most famous regimes controlling a resource that can fuel conflicts is the 
Kimberley Process (KP), which manages international trade in rough diamonds. The 
main  idea  is  that  members  (states)  using  the  KP diamond  certification  scheme for 
legitimate diamonds will not trade with non-members. Due to the fact that the majority 
of  trading  countries  became  members,  in  practice  any  country  wishing  to  trade  in 
diamonds needs to voluntarily become a member396. While the KP is a relative success, 
394 House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006.
395 Global Witness 2006. p.14 & 4.
396 Smillie, Ian 2005.
Table 7. Sanctions: key actors and actions
110
some experts estimate that it would be impossible to create a similar process for each 
natural resource. They argue that it would be more fruitful to have a common definition 
for conflict resources and making judgements on a case-by-case basis, with a permanent 
body for oversight397. Regulating the trade of any resource will depend on the resource 
itself  (how  easy  is  it  to  smuggle,  geographical  concentration  for  control,  costs  of 
extraction) and character  of the industry (how much of it  operates underground, are 
there a few big players or many dispersed ones, how sensitive it is to public image)398.
There  is  currently  no  official  definition  of  'conflict-resources',  which  significantly 
complicates efforts to target sanctions. States have, under international law, the right to 
use available resources for self-defence. Global Witness argues that a natural resource 
should be considered a conflict resource, and defined as such, when it is used to finance 
illegitimate conflicts  where there are breaches of international humanitarian law or  
human rights 399. 
It is important to note, that companies trading in conflict resources can also be complicit 
and  liable  for  crimes  committed  in  conflict  zones.  While  the  monitoring  of  such 
companies is today often up to ad hoc UN Panels of experts or relevant NGOs, punitive 
measures  are  up  to  the  states  in  which  such  companies  are  based.  These  kinds  of 
measures,  while  not  constituting  sanctions  as  such,  have  targeted  a  wider  range  of 
natural  resources400.  In  conclusion,  these  measures  regulating  potential  conflict 
resources have two peacebuilding end-goals: 1. preventing illicit exploitation of natural 
resources,  and  2.  guaranteeing  transparent  and  proper  management  of  revenues401. 
Depending on who is trading in conflict  resources, sanctions will  thus ideally affect 
parties for whom the conflict guarantees continued access to resources (spoilers), the 
general finances of non-state armed groups (feasibility), or states in breach of IHL or 
human rights, or the level of corruption in states (legitimacy).
Financial  sanctions can  be  general,  such  as  sanctions  against  North  Korea 
(comprehensive sanctions), or targeted sanctions against individuals or groups, whether 
397 House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.34-35.
398 Global Witness 2006. p.3. And Smillie, Ian 2005. p.1-3.
399 Global Witness 2006.
400 House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.34-40.
401 Global Witness 2006. p.16.
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state or non-state (smart sanctions). The UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, US and 
EU have extensive lists of targeted individuals, of which many are included on the basis 
of counter-terrorism402.
Financial  sanctions and monitoring serve two purposes: 1.  freezing assets,  but more 
notably  transactions  (which  is  likely  to  be  a  much  larger  sum),  and  2.  collecting 
intelligence by observing transactions. As stated by expert Peter  Fitzgerald: "at their 
core, economic sanctions are controls that are directed primarily at, and implemented 
by, banks and financial institutions".  It is therefore through the lens of the financial 
sector that much of the implementability of economic sanctions need to be addressed: 
whether the demands on self-surveillance imposed on banks are realistic; whether banks 
will calculate that it is more profitable to monitor transactions effectively, or 'pay' for 
failures when caught; whether banks will be penalized for revealing mistakes after the 
fact403.
One of the central problems today associated with financial sanctions on persons is the 
current  lack  of  due  process  guarantees  for  listed  individuals  and  organizations404. 
Secondly,  there  is  relatively  little  evidence  on  whether  or  not  financial  sanctions 
-targeted  or  general  -  are  effective.  A report  commissioned by the  House  of  Lords 
concluded that: 
"Economic  sanctions  used  in  isolation  from  other  policy  instruments  are  extremely 
unlikely  to  force  a  target  to  make  major  policy  changes,  especially  where  relations 
between the states involved are hostile more generally.--- Even when economic sanctions 
are combined effectively with other foreign policy instruments, on most occasions they 
play a subordinate role to those other instruments. Economic sanctions can be counter-
productive in a variety of ways, including when more vigorous coercion in the form of 
force  is  needed  but  is  forestalled  by  those  making  inflated  claims  for  the  value  of 
sanctions  as  an  alternative.  Sanctions  may  also  be  counter-productive  when  what  is 
required is a much greater emphasis on economic, diplomatic and security incentives"405.
Lastly, I will give an example to highlight the importance of the regional dimension. In 
2001, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Liberia,  including a ban on rough diamonds, 
timber, arms trade and a travel ban for key individuals involved. Key members of the 
Liberian government and armed forces had been trading weapons with the RUF-rebel 
402 House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.24.
403 Fitzgerald, Peter 2007. 
404 Lopez, George; Cortright, David; Millar Alistair & Gerber-Stellingwerf, Linda 2009. 
405 House of Commons, International Development Committee 2006. p.35-36.
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group in Sierra Leone for rough diamonds. The result of the bans was pushing the arms 
and  diamond  economies  further  underground,  but  successfully  limiting  the  trade  in 
illegal rough diamonds. However,  some neighbouring countries that did not produce 
diamonds, began exporting diamonds (supposedly smuggled from or through Liberia). 
The travel bans were bypassed by using multiple passports, including diplomatic ones, 
also  granted to  known smugglers.  Government  forces  reportedly  patrolled with new 
weapons during the ban. The sanctions also had severe negative effects on the Liberian 
economy as a whole, for example by discouraging foreign investment. Yet at least to 
some degree, the Panel of Experts' report of 2002 considered that the circumstances had 
changed since 2001, in that the Liberian government claimed that it had disassociated 
itself from the RUF, and the Panel viewed that the continuation of sanctions ought to be 
reviewed406. An independent evaluation by the Uppsala University in 2006 deemed that 
while all the sanctions had experienced problems, on a general level they had all had a 
positive  stabilizing  effect.  Interestingly,  the  evaluation  also  recommended  extending 
sanctions  further  into  the  post-conflict  phase,  to  give  space  for  the  government  to 
establish control over key sectors (notably natural resources)407.
In conclusion,  sanctions form a combination of tools for either  putting pressure on 
groups to change their behaviour (e.g. 'naming and shaming') or limiting their capability 
to aggravate conflict (e.g. conflict resource sanctions, arms embargoes). While 'smart' 
sanctions are being increasingly used, many forms of sanctions (e.g. conflict resource 
sanctions) do have negative effects on the civilian population as well. Sanctions will 
work best when subordinated to other foreign-policy tools, meaning that they need to 
have clear political objectives and an exit strategy. For example, it can be more fruitful 
to threaten sanctions instead of directly imposing them, giving the target the possibility 
to change behaviour without losing face. Again, monitoring, evaluation, implementation 
and punitive measures are key. Sanctions might also play a positive post-conflict role in 
giving time to establish reponsible state-control over conflict-resources.
3.10. Counterinsurgency
406 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia 2002. 
407 Wallensteen, Peter; Eriksson, Mikael & Strandow, Daniel 2006. p.7-15. 
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Counterinsurgency (COIN) refers mostly to the military effort  against insurgency or 
non-state  armed  groups.  Counterinsurgency  differs  significantly  from  conventional 
warfare in two ways. Firstly, it differs in the weight accorded to the political efforts over 
military ones for achieving overall success. Secondly, insurgency is asymmetric warfare 
with  the  guerrilla  tactics  used  by insurgents,  including  terrorism.  Most  importantly, 
fighters  are  often  indistinguishable  from  civilians  and  use  this  to  their  benefit. 
Moreover,  insurgent  operations  are  conducted  covertly  and  direct  confrontation  is 
avoided by insurgents,  unless they calculate they will  win. These conditions impose 
very specific tactics for counterinsurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency is a delicate tool, 
that  can be counterproductive  in many cases.  I  will  focus  on the general  theory on 
counterinsurgency and its strategic considerations, leaving the tactical level aside.
As a peacebuilding effort by outsiders, counterinsurgency involves roughly four actors 
whose roles and relations may vary according to their interests in the conflict: the host-
nation and its COIN capabilities (HN), the insurgents, the outside actors, and the general 
population. The analysis here is based mainly on texts examining US, British and Israeli 
counterinsurgency  experiences,  all  of  which  reflect  different  military  or  strategic 
cultures. While the US has previous counterinsurgency experience, for example from 
Vietnam,  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan it  has  had  to  'relearn'  counterinsurgency.  US 
counterinsurgency is always based on the idea of it being an outside intervening force 
supporting  a  host-nation,  with  a  heavy  emphasis  on  purely  military  action  against 
insurgent forces. British counterinsurgency comes from a wide experience from colonial 
eras and Northern Ireland, emphasizing a more political, small-unit approach aiming to 
engage  the  local  populace.  The  Israeli  approach  stems  from  the  acceptance  of  a 
permanent asymmetric threat in its proximity as well as long-term occupation with no 
outside intervention. As a result, it is less focused on the political aspect or winning 'the 
hearts and minds' of the passive population in order to achieve a self-sustaining peace, 
as it is on militarily reducing the insurgent threat to a minimum. It should again be 
noted, that the frame of analysis taken here is not neutral, but strictly pro-government 
and anti-insurgent.
3.10.1. General theory and strategic considerations
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While Clausewitz stated that war is the continuation of politics by other means,  the 
interdependence  of  the  two,  and  importance  of  the  political,  is  even  greater  in 
counterinsurgency. As the US counterinsurgency manual states: "Political power is the 
central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to 
accept  its  governance  or  authority  as  legitimate,"  and  when  balancing  military  and 
political goals, "political factors have primacy in COIN"408. Or, as Israeli Major-General 
Yaakov Amidror concludes when putting forward the concept of 'sufficient victory' and 
'temporary victory' (compared to total victory): 
"Temporary  victory  and  sufficient  victory  do  not  provide  a  solution  to  the  ideological 
conflict  that  forms  the  basis  of  the  armed  struggle  and  terror.  As  long  as  any  reason 
whatsoever  exists  –  political,  national,  ethnic,  economic,  religious,  ideological,  or  an 
amalgam of all these ---, one must expect terror to continue or to be renewed. A military 
effort cannot be expected to solve a problem of historical dimensions. --- Nonetheless, one 
must reemphasize: a political solution is not the affair of the army, and efforts to obtain it  
cannot be divorced from the obligation to fight determinedly against any attempt
by the enemy to secure achievements through violence."409
The  primacy  of  political  factors  over  immediate  military  goals  is  linked  to  the 
asymmetric nature of counterinsurgency efforts, and the fact that it is often impossible 
to  distinguish  insurgent  from  civilian.  The  environment  in  these  conflicts  is  often 
described as having a small minority of the population supporting government efforts, a 
small  minority  supporting  the  insurgents,  and  crucially,  a  passive  majority.  The 
counterinsurgents aim to co-opt willing factions of the insurgency, destroy the rest, and 
most  importantly  tip  as  much  of  the  passive  majority  onto  their  side  as  possible. 
Winning over the passive majority is tied to two central issues: 1) legitimacy of the 
counterinsurgency effort, most crucially that of the host-nation and its forces that will 
stay behind after outsiders leave, and 2) perception of victory - most people will side 
with who they think will win in the long run. While tied to real achievements, both are 
essentially questions of perception. As stated by the chief strategist on counterterrorism 
at the US State Department, David Kilcullen: "--- information is the basis for all other 
activities. This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over 
population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but 
to  be  effective  they  must  rest  upon,  and  integrate  with  a  broader  information 
strategy"410.  This is  also reflected in the insurgent tactics in asymmetric warfare,  as: 
408 US Army 2006. p.13, 34.
409 Amidror, Yaakov 2007. p.8.
410 Kilcullen, David 2006b. p.4.
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"terrorist and guerrilla attacks are usually planned to achieve the greatest political and 
informational impact with the lowest amount of risk to insurgents"411.
Essentially,  there  is  often  a  tension  between  the  military  goal  of  destroying  the 
insurgents,  and the  political  goal  of  winning the  hearts  and minds of  the people in 
COIN.  The US COIN manual  for  example  notes  that:  "Clearly,  killing  or  capturing 
insurgents  will  be  necessary  ---.  However,  killing  every  insurgent  is  normally 
impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks 
generating  popular  resentment,  creating  martyrs  that  motivate  new  recruits,  and 
producing cycles of revenge"412. This is exemplified in the British counterinsurgency 
approach of 'minimum use of force', or 'escalation of force' for Americans, which refers 
to  using  the  least  amount of  force  possible  to  achieve  the  set  out  goals,  while  not 
limiting the right to self-defence. Additionally, it means taking these factors into account  
already when considering a mission, and weighing whether what is required to achieve a 
certain  military  goal  will  do  more  harm  than  good  for  the  overall  political  goal. 
Excessive use of force that alienates the civilian population will also negatively affect 
collecting intelligence from human sources, which is extremely important for COIN. It 
should be noted, that while Israelis note the importance of separating insurgents from 
their  civilian support base, they do not employ minimum use of force.  Quite  to the 
opposite, they rely on deterrence: "generally speaking, a small country like Israel can 
deal with terrorism and guerrilla organizations only if its response is not proportional 
and is carried out in such a way as to convince the other side that it too has something to 
lose"413.
It is important to note, that it is the host-nation that has to have the capacity to defeat 
insurgencies in the long run, even if outsiders have helped defeating it initially. People 
will side with who they think will win in the long run, which is for example a very 
current question for people in Afghanistan. A successful counterinsurgency and self-
sustaining peace is ultimately dependent on developing host-nation capability. This is in 
effect the exit strategy for outsiders.
411 US Army 2006. p.74.
412 Ibid. p.35.
413 Amidror, Yaakov 2007. p.38, 39.
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According to the US counterinsurgency manual, the overall  objective then is for the 
host-nation to regain control. This is a much more comprehensive goal than suppressing 
the insurgency militarily or even achieving stability. One could crudely divide the goals 
into  three  progressive  stages:  1)  defeating  and  clearing  an  area  of  insurgents,  2) 
achieving a hold over the area, 3) establishing host-nation control over the area. This 
‘clear  and hold’ or  ‘clear-hold-build’ strategy begins in  key areas,  from where it  is 
expanded geographically. Primacy is given to providing security for the population in 
the area under control, preferably through host-nation police patrolling, if or when this 
capacity  exists.  A sustained  effort  to  minimize  insurgent  activity  is  essential,  as  is 
preventing reprisals for cooperation. At the tactical level, population control measures in  
the area are performed. Secondly, basic services such as food, water and electricity are 
given attention. Thirdly, longer term host-nation institutions are set up, most notably the 
security sector to achieve the rule of law. These are all linked to building confidence in 
the victory and legitimacy of the host-nation. This is a very long-term approach. While 
clear-hold-build approaches are employed in certain areas,  it may not be possible to 
enter all insurgent strongholds.  In these cases, there is nonetheless a need to attack, 
disrupt insurgent capability and leave, which in turn will temporarily reduce attacks on 
cleared areas414.
One  example  of  the  difficulties  of  clearing,  holding  and  building  can  be  seen  in 
Afghanistan. A documentary filmed in 2007 of an American military base in Kandahar 
with two dozen soldiers near rural stronghold Taliban areas describes a small base that 
has an area of operations containing over a 100 villages, some a day's drive away. The 
American  soldiers  can  listen  into  the  Taliban  fighters   constantly  reporting  their 
positions farther out from the villages, and possibly from inside the villages as well, as 
they enter to inspect. While inspecting, they also give medical aid and distribute food. 
One day during the filming of the documentary, village elders from all over the region 
come to the American base, risking Taliban retribution, to ask the soldiers for either 
their protection and presence in exchange for cooperation, or to ask the Americans not 
to make their villages the battlefield. As it is presented in the documentary, with the 
forces at their disposal, it is clear that it is not possible for the Americans to actually  
protect the villagers from the Taliban415. Overall, this shows the amount of troops, either 
414 US Army 2006. p.120-127.
415 National Geographic 2007. 
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by outsiders or the host-nation government that would be needed to control even areas 
that might be welcoming. Many argue that in Iraq a surge of forces helped reduce the 
level  of the insurgency. The Afghan insurgency however is  largely a  rural  one in a 
country 1½ times larger, and would require a much larger presence. Yet neither foreign 
troop levels or domestic capabilities are as of November 2009 anywhere close to Iraq 
even after troop reductions there416.
By examining Israeli experiences in counterinsurgency Major-General Amidror argues 
that six conditions need to be met, without which defeating 'terrorism' is impossible. He 
uses  the  term terrorism largely  as  a  synonym for  insurgency,  with  an  emphasis  on 
terrorist attacks inside Israel proper. These conditions are 1.) a political decision to deal 
with terrorism, and the stomach to bear the political costs, with a clear goal - defeating  
terrorism - and mandate for the security forces. Amidror argues that what is possible to 
achieve by military, and not political, means is a 'sufficient victory'. "This is a victory 
that does not produce many years of tranquillity, but rather achieves only a 'repressed 
quiet',  requiring the investment  of continuous effort  to  preserve it.  The terror is  not 
destroyed  but  is  contained  at  a  minimal  level,  with  constant  efforts  to  prevent  its 
eruption". He argues that this is what the Israeli army has achieved in the West Bank 
after the second intifada. 2.) Controlling the territory. This refers to the ability to operate 
effectively over the entire area in question. For this, it is necessary to 'clear' the area of 
insurgents, and have highly mobile troops that can make decisions independently (this 
compensates for permanent presence within dense urban areas). Control is also achieved 
by controlling the movement of people through checkpoints and roadblocks. It should 
be noted, that Israel has no intention of policing or setting up a government apparatus in 
the areas under its control, nor of assisting the 'host-nation' to build these capabilities. 
3.) Relevant intelligence. Without relevant intelligence, insurgents cannot be fought, and  
gathering intelligence, notably human intelligence, is linked to controlling territory. 4.) 
Isolating the territory within which the insurgency takes place. To operate, insurgencies 
need safe havens in neighbouring countries, weapons, financial backing, and recruits 
(both regular soldiers and experts). These all need to be cut off. 5.) Cooperation between 
intelligence  and  operations.  This  means  effective  cooperation  between  different 
intelligence  agencies  such  as  the  military,  police,  internal  and  external  intelligence 
agencies, and delegation of decision-making and intelligence gathering to lower ranks in 
416 The Economist 17th-23rd October 2009. p.31.
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the  field  where  there  are  constant  encounters  with  the  insurgency.  It  also  requires 
timeliness and the capacity to act on intelligence, which can have a short life-span. 6.) 
Separating  the  civilian  population  from  terrorist  entities.  Today's  insurgencies  are 
dependent on the fear, passiveness or cooperation of the civilian population. COIN aims 
to sever this connection, which is again linked to the control of the territory. Especially 
important in this effort, is preventing collateral damage. The separation can result from 
making efforts to spare civilians, creating a conflict of interest between civilians and 
insurgents, or enabling and creating a willingness among the civilians to take up arms 
against  insurgents,  for  example  through  the  use  of  citizens'  militias417.  It  should  be 
highlighted again, that the Israeli approach does not aim so much at achieving control of 
a territory for the population in that territory, as it is on militarily reducing the threat of 
insurgency. Notably, it prefers deterrence over 'hearts and minds'.
Lastly,  texts  examining  American,  British  and Israeli  counterinsurgency doctrine  all 
concur  that  the  essentials  are:  a)  primacy  of  the  political  over  the  military,  b)  the 
adaptability of the effort due to a constantly changing environment, c) the importance of 
control of territory in all meanings of the word, d) the necessity to operate in small units  
with  high  mobility  and  extensive  powers  delegated  to  lower  ranks  in  the  field  for 
decision-making, e) the supreme importance of intelligence, f) and good relations with 
the civilian population to facilitate the above.
In  conclusion,  counterinsurgency  is  unfortunately  a  necessary  part  of  post-conflict 
operations  in  many cases,  where  some other  rebel  groups do not  join in  the  peace 
process,  or  hard-line  factions  splinter  as  a  result  of  the  peace  process  and  become 
spoilers.  Counterinsurgency  capability  of  the  host-nation  is  also  key  to  prevent 
resurgence. Yet, counterinsurgency is messy at best, with an inherent tension between 
political goals of winning the hearts and minds of the populace, and the military goals 
of defeating indistinguishable rebels. It is just one tool that should be submitted to the 
overall political process, and because of its often delegitimizing effect, should be used 
sparingly.
417 Amidror, Yaakov 2007.
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4  . Conclusion  
In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  summarize  the  answers  this  paper  gives  to  my  research 
questions,  and  present  its  central  findings.  Whether  what  I  termed  'rule-of-thumb' 
peacebuilding corresponds with effective peacebuilding merits some space. I will deal 
with it last, since it brings together all the results of the paper. One of my questions was:  
"What are the typical features of today's post-conflict environments?" While this was 
not my central question, these features have been described all along the paper,  and 
some remarks are included in this conclusion. I also asked whether the 'rule of thumb' 
model could be applied from one post-conflict setting to another. Because of the 
research framework, I cannot conclusively answer this second question. There are no 
comparative case studies - I study general policy analyses, which in turn can only result 
in  a  general,  non-comparative  study.  This  may  give  the  mistaken  impression,  that 
conflicts and effective peacebuilding policies are identical from case to case. 
Firstly,  however,  all  policy-analyses,  regardless of the issue in question,  emphasized 
context-dependency.  Further,  they emphasized  the  need for  policies  to  be  inclusive, 
often based on needs assessments and adapting to local  culture. This was especially 
important  for  policies  engaged  at  the  local  level.  This  points  to  a.)  differences  in 
situations, and respectively differences in applicability of policies, and b.) the fact that it 
is  the  locals  who will  ultimately  determine  the  success  of  peacebuilding.  Secondly, 
especially  with  respect  to  non-state  armed  groups,  the  analyses  of  the  problems 
themselves described immensely different contexts, suggesting that what might work in 
one case, might not in another.
This  points  to  what  I  suggested  in  presenting  the  research  framework:  while  it  is 
questionable  how much should be generalized about  conflicts,  there  are some clear 
logics  that  are  common  to  most  post-conflict  environments  and  peacebuilding 
environments. These however are always tied to the local culture, and take on local 
expression, with each post-conflict situation having its own particularities.
One of  my central  research  questions  was:  what  are  the  main security  problems 
posed by non-state armed groups? By analysing the means and end-goals of different 
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kinds of groups, I concluded that for both, insurgents posed the most existential threat to 
the  state.  The  legitimate  state  structure  in  turn  was  posited  as  the  instrument  to 
guarantee the security of individuals. Of the different non-state armed groups, gangs 
could be used as proxies for violence towards political goals by other actors, organized 
crime could militarize and question the monopoly of violence of the state, and PMCs 
could be tools of organized violence for groups with wealth. However, only insurgency 
was specifically militarily structured and had as its aim either taking over the state or 
seceding from it.  Militias,  paramilitaries and warlords had some,  but not all,  of the 
threatening aspects of insurgencies. 
A more  detailed  analysis  of  today's  insurgencies gave  a  more  complex picture 
however. First, it is evident that there are converging interests between different non-
state armed groups and that they are increasingly cooperating and creating networks. 
Secondly,  many  of  today's  insurgencies  have  little  resemblance  with  the  classical 
insurgency  aiming  to  take  over  the  state.  Some  are  cell-based,  loosely  coordinated 
groups, maintaining their power through low-intensity conflict.  They may instead be 
seeking to pursue the interest of their own faction (ethnic group, tribe, or other) through 
violence,  using their  territories  or  simply their  networks  to  profit  from illicit  trade, 
which is in turn dependent on a chaotic environment. Their interests are contrary to the 
peace process (spoilers) and they aim to derail it if possible.
I  have  further  argued  that  the  threshold  (or  feasibility)  for  such  groups  is  low: 
availability of SALW and low prices, ruined economies with a large demographic of 
young men providing cheap recruits, the exchange of information on tactics by different 
groups,  an  increase  in  the  lethality  of  different  asymmetric  tactics,  the  increased 
political effect of terrorism through increased media coverage, the lower requirement 
for group size compared to  traditional military organizations,  access to international 
markets for funding and possibly export of conflict resources or narcotics (an end in 
itself for some groups), and advanced global underground networks - all enable easier 
formation. Many of these factors can be linked to globalization. Yet it should be noted, 
that while the sources of key requirements for organized armed violence are new (global 
networks and markets), the question should be asked if and how these differ from the 
Cold War period. During the Cold War, weapons, finances and training, as well direct 
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military support,  were provided by the superpowers -  what  are the quantitative and 
qualitative differences with the phenomena described in this study?
Secondly, I asked  what were the main policy-options open to outside interveners 
with respect to non-state armed groups, what worked, and what was problematic. 
The  focus  was  purely  on  insurgencies,  since  these  posed  the  greatest  threat. 
Peacebuilding  solutions  for  insurgencies  focus  on Disarmament,  Demobilisation and 
Reintegration  (DDR)  programs,  mediation  and  negotiation,  possible  amnesties  and 
power-sharing  agreements,  sanctions,  arms  control  measures,  limiting  access  to 
finances, and possibly counterinsurgency (COIN). Peacekeeping, unfortunately left out 
of this paper, would seem to be key. Roughly said, DDR, mediation and negotiation, 
power-sharing,  sanctions  and  COIN  largely  deal  with  the  effects  of  conflict  -  the 
existence of non-state armed groups. Targeted commodity sanctions and better control 
over conflict resources, arms embargoes and arms control measures, and limiting access 
to finances in general, all aim to address the environments that enable insurgent groups 
to appear;  in some sense, the root causes of conflict.  Security Sector Reform, while 
relating  to  the  state,  is  also  an  essential  part  of  preventing  the  resurgence  of  rebel 
groups.
It  should  be  noted that  quite  few of  these  address  the  political  root  causes,  that  is  
grievances, that are often thought to be at the root of conflict (with the exception of 
DDR and power-sharing). Arguably, the rule-of-thumb peacebuilding model is designed 
to address just  these,  notably by 1.)  supposing that insurgents  represent  interests  of 
groups  that  have  political  grievances,  and  that  these  interests  are  represented  once 
insurgents gain access to power, and 2.) general grievances will be addressed when the 
state capacity has been built up, and eventual democratic elections will guarantee that 
the  interests  of  most  people  will  be  represented.  This  paper  questioned  whether  a.) 
insurgent leaders genuinely represent the interests of a larger group, and b.) how well 
power-sharing arrangements combined with elections will guarantee representation in 
the long run. The policies that are intended to make the state in general more inclusive 
and accountable are not handled in this paper, because firstly the subject of this paper, 
non-state  armed  groups,  excludes  the  state,  and  secondly  the  perspective  taken  of 
peacebuilding suggests a different set of policies for the state and for non-state armed 
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groups.  This  may  give  the  false  impression  that  resolving  political  root  causes  - 
grievances - is not central to peacebuilding.
Coming back to the global nature of many of the problems described above, many of 
the policy answers that are required are also global. New global structures need to be set 
up,  and  it  is  in  the  interest  of  most  of  us  to  prevent  global  'public  bads'.  Here, 
international law and treaties, and notably effective implementation at national levels, 
would  seem to  be  key.  The  regional  level  was  also  central  to  many  problems and 
respective  solutions,  notably  to  trafficking,  cross-border  warfare,  and  outside 
involvement in internal warfare. Internal conflicts are also a regional threat.
Finally I will assess the 'rule-of thumb' peacebuilding model more generally, and its 
possible problems (this  was my working hypothesis).  I have described the model as 
follows:
First,  I  will  make some points on the general  theory behind the  model.  Again,  this 
model largely deals with conflict as having political root causes (grievances), that can 
be solved through solutions of political architecture (namely, sharing power). While it 
does address some deeper social and political problems, namely through elections, the 
main focus is on the existing insurgent group and the government. This is of course the 
most urgent problem, but I argue that the attention given to this in relation to more 
comprehensive  and  longer-term  measures  is  counterproductive.  Focusing  on  visible 
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in the immediate post-conflict phase takes attention away from the long-term problems 
of effectively implementing the changes these are meant to bring about. In this model, 
the factor that does more generally affect the environment that enables insurgent groups 
to come about, is the Security Sector Reform. I assumed insurgencies were relational 
vis-à-vis the strength of government forces. 
Secondly, I have mainly examined the different policy components in this model, and 
described  a  number  of  inherent  problems.  To  my  mind,  the  most  prominent  ones 
involved power-sharing. 1.) Power-sharing arrangements are shaky, and especially their 
implementation is extremely difficult and full of commitment problems, notably with 
respect to the violence machinery of the state; 2.) It institutionalizes experts in the use of 
violence, whose power base was founded on organizations of violence. It is unlikely 
that  these people would give up this  base of power; 3.) It sidelines any non-violent 
opposition that might exist, and creates incentives for using armed rebellion as a way of 
achieving power, notably for opposition groups; 4.) While elections are supposed to 
guarantee  a  peaceful  transition  of  power,  positions  in  government  can  be  used  to 
consolidate  positions  ahead  of  elections.  Violence  is  also  often  used  to  intimidate 
opponents.  Additionally,  not  all  rebel  leaders  necessarily  represent  group  interests, 
possibly leaving underlying grievances unresolved. Whether there is a possible formula 
for  power-sharing  that  would  help  overcome  most  of  these  problems,  or  they  are 
inherent to any arrangement, is beyond the scope of this paper. Other key problems were 
the apparently negative effects of the post-election period, and the light and too short 
presence  of  international  peacekeepers.  Lastly,  the  short  time  perspective  and 
expectations of quick results, as well as lack of attention to longer-term tasks (not least 
by donors), such as the reintegration phase of the ex-combatants, make achieving self-
sustaining results difficult. There is now fortunately a consensus that merely drawing up 
a constitution and organizing elections, implementing a quick DDR and SSR, and then 
withdrawing the intervention, will not bring a self-sustaining peace. 
What  might  be needed for  more effective peacebuilding? First  of all,  many of the 
studies quoted in this paper emphasize the need for a longer presence of peacekeeping 
troops with a sufficient mandate and troop strength to deter spoilers. Parallel to this, the 
implementation of the political side of the peace process is enhanced by long-term and 
perhaps  more  forceful  outside  monitoring  -  this  would  include  mediation  for  the 
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problems that will  occur.  Thus, what are often listed as tools for the active conflict 
phase need to be continued in the post-conflict phase, as the mere silencing of guns does  
not mean that any of the underlying structural problems have been dealt with. One of 
the key findings was that one aspect of the peace process, notably disarmament, is also a 
security dilemma for the two parties, and conversely, the peace process is about building  
trust. An external security guarantee for a considerable amount of time helps conflicting 
parties overcome security dilemmas and reach a more optimal solution than they could 
on their own. At the same time, local capacity in governance and the security sector 
need to be built up, however by emphasizing quality (accountability) over quantity, and 
by  also  placing  importance  on  policing.  Policing  is  what  most  directly  affects  the 
population and provides for rule-of-law, and overly military responses can delegitimize 
the  government.  At the  same time,  there should be  capacity,  first  international  then 
local, to deal with post-conflict  low-intensity violence. In general, the SSR needs to 
include all different sectors, and needs to emphasize accountability.
With  respect  to  power-sharing,  it  is  clear  that  places  in  government  need  to  be 
guaranteed to non-violent opposition in a quantity that guarantees effective power. This 
leaves open the possibility of solving other grievances through non-violent ways. This 
needs to be enforced by outsiders, as it is unlikely parties negotiating will willingly give 
up power. Elections should eventually be held, but perhaps not right away, with an eye 
on guaranteeing equal opportunities for parties not in the transitional government, as 
well as the potential for consequent post-election violence as a means to contest election 
results.  Another  option  would  be  to  have  no  power-sharing  agreement,  but  merely 
disarm and reintegrate insurgent groups by enticing them with amnesties and generous 
peace dividends. An additional tool is the decentralization of power for groups who are 
located in a certain territory, guaranteeing them a degree of autonomy.
In general however, in the long-term the environment should be made as unfavourable 
to  insurgencies  as  possible.  Economic  growth  for  example,  raises  the  costs  of 
recruitment  and  gives  potential  fighters  peace  dividends  in  the  regular  job  market. 
Economic growth and poverty reduction are thus also important. This is of course hard 
to  achieve  without  first  having  security.  Displacement  needs  to  be  dealt  with. 
Additionally,  creating  a  'domestic  revenue imperative'  or  the  'taxation-representation 
nexus', is extremely important for effective governance in the long run. Thus, foreign 
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aid donors should ideally not be the government's main constituency further down the 
line.   This  is  also  tied  to  creating  responsible  management  structures  for  natural 
resources in post-conflict areas, since this can also cut the government's dependency on 
taxing the population. Corruption needs to be avoided, as it will lead to a culture of 
patronage and delegitimization of the government. Thus, it needs to be remembered that 
massive long-term interventions can also be the source of both corruption with loose use 
of money, and the lack of a taxation-representation nexus. While this study did not focus  
on interventions as a whole, but rather on separate issue areas, it was apparent from the 
majority of texts that outside interventions continue to be plagued with coordination 
problems in multiactor environments, even though this has been the center of attention 
for quite some time. It is one of the key conclusions of this study that peacebuilding is 
social engineering. This implies that as in ecology, a change in one part of the system 
will affect the whole system. In addition to testifying to its complexity, it also means 
that  all  peacebuilding activities are linked and optimally complementary.  Thus there 
needs  to  be  planning and coordination  of  all  programmes  at  the  strategic  level  for 
peacebuilding intervention to  be more effective.  Finally,  with extreme reservation,  I 
would like to say that it needs to be weighed out, whether the intervention intended (and 
all interventions are not equal) will actually do more good than harm418.
418 For an article supporting many of the conclusions drawn in this paper, see: Ashdown, Paddy 2007.
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Annex I. Conflict management dictionary
As defined in this paper
Arms  brokers are  middlemen  that  can  either  find  suppliers  for  their  clients  -  the 
receivers  -,  buy  weapons  from suppliers  and  then  sell  them  onwards,  or  can  also 
organize the transfers themselves.
Ceasefire  -  an  agreement  that  regulates  the  military  behaviour  of  actors  without 
resolving any underlying issues (which would make it a peace agreement).
Conflict resolution - strand of theory and practice in dealing with conflicts. Refers to 
resolving disputes between parties at conflict. In conflicts it is often used during the 
active conflict phase to stop the fighting. Key tools include negotiations, mediation and 
sometimes peacemaking.  Conflicts  are between two parties,  and can be resolved by 
creating a win-win situation out of their interests.
Conflict-resource - any resource (although diamonds and timber are the most famous) 
when  it  is  used  to  finance  illegitimate  conflicts,  where  there  are  breaches  of 
international humanitarian law or human rights. 
Conflict  transformation  -  strand  of  theory  and  practice  in  dealing  with  conflicts. 
Builds on the idea of resolving deep root causes of conflict, especially injustices and 
inequalities,  that  are  embedded  in  society  by  transforming  the  discourses  and 
perceptions  that  create  conflicting  positions.  Often  referred  to  as  the  bottom-up 
transformation of society, especially through civil society. 
Disarmament,  demobilisation  and  reintegration,  DDR  -  a  program  with  three 
interrelated  parts:  disarming,  demobilizing  and  reintegrating  of  former  combatants. 
They can also be implemented independently. DDR is one of the most important long-
term peacebuilding tools  in  relation to  insurgencies  (can  also  be  conducted to  state 
forces).  A DDR  communicates  goodwill  and  builds  confidence  between  opposing 
parties and their intentions, as well as in the peace process itself as a viable alternative 
to  violent  strategies.  Disarmament is  the  collection,  documentation,  control  and 
disposal  of  small  arms,  ammunition,  explosives  and  light  and  heavy  weapons  of 
combatants  and  includes  the  development  of  responsible  arms  management 
programmes.  Demobilization is  the  controlled discharge  of  combatants  from armed 
forces  or  other  armed  groups.  Troops  are  gathered  into  camps  designated  for  this 
purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). Reintegration is 
the  process  of  former  combatants  learning  to  lead  a  civilian  way  of  life,  and  is  a 
relational process between combatants and community. This is the longest part of the 
process. As part of this, reinsertion refers to short-term benefits aimed at providing the 
basic means for a livelihood to combatants and their families. The long-term goal is 
self-sustainability for the combatants. Often vocational training, microcredit or grants 
are given. DDR is based on the notion that demobilised persons will retake up arms 
unless options for their reintegration are not perceptibly better than life as a combatant.
Displaced persons. These are civilians who have fled or been forced to flee their homes 
because of conflict, and have not returned during the post-conflict period. While people 
can be displaced for a number of reasons, for example environmental ones, this paper is 
strictly concerned with conflict-induced displacement. Displaced persons contains two 
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categories: 1.)  internally displaced persons (IDPs) - people who have moved within 
their country, and 2.) refugees - who have crossed an international border. Both groups 
are unique in being especially vulnerable in a number of ways.
Diversion - weapons are diverted, when they are transferred from authorized possession 
to unauthorized and illegal ones.
Do no harm -approach - Originates from the humanitarian field: to minimize the harm 
that one may be inadvertently doing simply by being present and providing assistance. 
For example, when aid is used as an instrument of war by denying access or attacking 
convoys; aid is an indirect part of the dynamics of the conflict because it creates jobs, 
gives incomes in form of taxes, etc; or aid exacerbates the root causes of the conflict by 
securing rebel activities. In this paper, I use it to emphasize that all interventions have 
(negative) effects, since interventions are also a player in the conflict relationship.
Ending of hostilities -  Temporary suspension of all violence (incl. kidnappings etc.), 
does not include shifts in positions in the field. Usually at the beginning of the process, 
for a humanitarian action or gesture of good will, possibly to invite to negotiate. 
Feasibility hypothesis -  Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner suggest that "where rebellion is 
feasible, it will occur", key variables being military and economic feasibility.
Gangs - loose groups that have informal ownership of small urban spaces through a 
local monopoly of force. They provide some measure of entrepreneurial opportunity as 
well  as  local  prestige  and  warrior-glamour;  they  frequently  act  as  neighbourhood 
militias to police public spaces, enforce or resist ethnic and racial borders.
Human security - A post-Cold War security paradigm. Whereas the traditional goal of 
‘national security’ has been the defence of the state from external threats, the focus of 
human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals. Closely associated with the 
weakening of state sovereignty in the sense of non-intervention in internal affairs, and 
used to justify outside interventions.
Humanitarian law - is a subset of international law that comes into force when there is 
an armed conflict. It seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who 
are  not  or  are  no  longer  participating  in  the  hostilities  and restricts  the  means  and 
methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or 
the  law  of  armed  conflict.  Generally  speaking,  it  does  not  apply  to  post-conflict 
situations.
Humanitarian  space  -  The  conceptual  'space'  in  which  humanitarian  actors  work. 
Often  used  to  emphasize  that  a  distinction  needs  to  be  made between military  and 
humanitarian  actors.  By  adhering  to  the  key  operating  principles  of  neutrality  and 
impartiality, and distinguishing themselves from the military, humanitarian actors create 
a working space that guarantees their safety, as well as capacity to operate effectively.
 
Hurting stalemate -  neither side is capable of defeating the other, both human and 
economic costs are rising on both sides, and there is war-fatigue.
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IEDs - improvised explosive devices -  non-standardized explosive devices, types of 
bombs, used in asymmetric warfare. Can be made from common medical or agricultural 
supplies, and are hard to detect because of variation.
Intensity of conflict - often measured in battle-related deaths.
Insurgencies  (also  rebellion,  guerrilla,  insurrection). An  organized,  protracted 
politico-military  struggle  designed  to  weaken  the  control  and  legitimacy  of  an 
established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing 
insurgent control. Can have one of two goals: to overthrow the existing government, or 
to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space 
that  they can control.  Insurgencies are strongly associated with asymmetric  warfare, 
where there is a disparity of power between opposing sides.
Internal conflict (also intrastate conflict, civil war) - An internal conflict is a conflict 
where there are two or more parties to the conflict within a country. Different threshold 
vary from over 25 battle-related deaths a year, a minimum of 100 deaths, to a 1000 
deaths (a war). A minimum of five percent of deaths have to have been incurred by each 
side - otherwise it would be massacre or genocide. Note that it is only civil war after the 
1000 mark has been reached. Intrastate war can also be waged by two or more non-state 
armed groups.
Internationalized  internal  conflict  -  an  internal  conflict  becomes  internationalized 
when another country becomes involved, either directly by invasion or indirectly by 
actively  supporting  one  of  the  factions.  Indirect  support  can  include  sending  arms, 
providing training and advisers, or use of own territory for launching attacks. Also in 
applies in conflict spillover.
Mediation - a central tool used for facilitating negotiations between conflicting parties 
to increase positive outcomes in negotiations. Can help achieve results parties could not 
on their own due to lack of trust. It is a voluntary process: the parties to the conflict  
retain control over the outcomes, although the mediator may set the agenda. Varies in 
neutrality/forcefulness.
Militias are  armed  ‘self-defence’ groups  of  civilians,  that  can  support  government, 
parties or local rulers. They can be volunteers, and do not specifically aim to take over 
the  state  or  secede,  but  are  significant  for  political  patronage  networks  in  many 
countries.
Negotiations -  process in which two or more clashing parties agree to discuss their 
differences within a concerted framework in order to seek a satisfactory solution to their 
demands. This negotiation can take place either directly or through facilitation by third 
parties  (mediation).  Often  used  in  relation  with  processes  that  result  in  a  peace 
agreements.  Negotiations  can  be  I-track,  referring  to  meetings  between  the  official 
leaders  of groups,  or II-track negotiation,  referring to  unofficial  representatives who 
then communicate possible solutions to leaders.
Non-state  armed groups  - all  organized  armed groups,  that  are not  regular  armed 
forces of the state such as: gangs, organized crime, militias, paramilitaries, warlords, 
private military companies (PMCs) and insurgencies. 
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One-sided violence -  The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a 
formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. 
Targeting has to be direct and intended at civilians.
Organized crime can be defined as groups organized primarily to make economic gains 
in different illicit markets. They often rely on use of violence, which can give them a 
comparative advantage in licit markets as well.
Outside  intervention  -  (here) any  international  intervention,  be  it  military, 
humanitarian or civilian crisis management that claims to be done to establish peace in a 
given country. Often multilateral, and combines different activities, e.g. peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding, development and possibly humanitarian efforts.
Paramilitaries  - refers primarily to  the type of  organization and tasks  the group is 
meant to conduct, which are military in nature. Can be 1.) part of the regular armed 
forces or police, but do not have same status as regular military, or 2.) irregular or non-
official forces with a military character, that often have unofficial ties to the government 
and either the armed forces or police.
Peace  -  Negative  peace:  the  absence  of  conflict.  Positive  peace: A society  with 
structures of peace.  These are institutions (broadly speaking) that make possible the 
resolution of conflicts in non-violent ways. Also implies dismantling the structures that 
cause conflict and its manifestation through violence in the first place. These are often 
called the 'root causes' of conflict
Peace agreement -  an agreement between parties that on paper, resolves underlying 
issues and stops hostilities and thus the conflict.
Peace dividends -  originally meant the additional resources obtained through defence 
cuts after the Cold War (guns vs. butter). Here it refers to any benefit (economic or 
otherwise) that comes to a party from peace in contrast to continued conflict.
Peace  process  -  A goal-oriented  political  process  involving  all  stakeholders.  The 
ultimate goal is a deep self-sustaining peace (positive definition), where the majority of 
the people concerned agree that disputes should be solved in a non-violent way, and 
structures exist to support this and restrain actors that do not. Stakeholders can be either 
supportive of the process  or not (spoilers).  Essential  to the process is  building trust 
between  parties,  notably  for  disarming,  in  order  to  demilitarize  politics.  Has  two 
components: 1.) It is a perspective taken from the point of view of the political end-
goal, 2.) There has to be a substantial attempt towards peace by some stakeholders, and 
it  must  be  a  declared  goal,  often  expressed  through  willingness  to  negotiate  or 
eventually a peace agreement. 
Peacebuilding - refers to all the different longer-term activities conducted in the post-
conflict phase, that have as their primary goal the building of a just and self-sustaining 
peace  with  an  emphasis  on  civilian  efforts.  This  excludes  humanitarian  aid  and 
development aid that have different primary goals. It does not exclude peacekeeping or 
counterinsurgency, but places the accent on non-military efforts.
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Post-conflict - Generally refers to the period after the signing of a peace agreement. 
Optionally, it can also be described as a function of conflict intensity. A country is in the 
post-conflict phase, when no battle-related deaths exceeding the threshold mentioned 
occur for consecutive years. This is in fact a negative definition in relation to relapse 
into conflict. This is the definition taken here, since battle-related deaths are a better 
proxy of cessation of hostilities than a peace agreement, which in itself guarantees little, 
except sometimes a consequent peacekeeping mission. There can for example be peace 
through a ceasefire without any agreement. A figure that is often sited, is the first decade  
of peace being post-conflict. The post-conflict phase has a very high risk of reversion to 
conflict,  and has certain structures inherited from the active conflict phase, of which 
non-state armed groups are some.
Power-sharing agreements -  agreements that bring warring parties into power-sharing 
arrangements,  often  mediated  by  outsiders.  Commonly,  aim  to  set  up  a  unity 
government between former warring parties that is transitional until elections are held, 
which  are  also  set  in  the  agreement.  Key  components  include  posts  and  quotas  in 
different branches of the state, and the control over the state's organisations of violence 
are  often  the  most  debated.  The  agreement  can  also  include  a  demobilisation 
component, forms of autonomy for regions and confidence-building measures. The aim 
is to end the conflict,  and demilitarize politics by making parties participate in non-
violent politics together.
Private military companies (PMCs) (also private military firms, PMFs, or private 
security  companies,  PSCs) -  private  business  entities  that  provide  different  kinds 
military and/or security services from combat to supply activities, and some of them are 
transnational in nature.
Responsibility to protect, R2P -  the responsibility of states, and where they fail the 
international  community,  to  protect  civilians  from  mass  atrocity  crimes.  An 
operationalization of the human security paradigm.
Reversion - a return to active conflict.
Sanctions - a group of policy-tools, that can be used to target states, non-state groups or 
individuals,  with the aim of achieving specific  political objectives.  These objectives 
may include punishing or weakening a target, signalling disapproval, inducing a change 
in policy, or bringing about regime change. Sanctions can be divided into economic and 
non-economic  ones.  Economic  ones  can  include  restrictions  on  trading,  service  or 
financial  relations,  for  example:  freezing  funds  and  assets,  a  ban  on  transactions, 
imposing investment  restrictions,  restricting trade  in  certain commodities (especially 
'conflict-resources'  such as diamonds or timber,  also known as  targeted commodity 
sanctions)  and restrictions on aid. Non-economic sanctions can for example include 
arms embargoes, restrictions on the use of technologies or equipment (notably military), 
travel bans, air traffic constraints, diplomatic constraints, cultural and sport restrictions. 
Secession, secessionist conflict - one party to the conflict is looking to secede from the 
state  within which war is waged, and form an independent state.  Can also result  in 
forms of autonomy.
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Security dilemma - a game-theoretic model, where both sides are unsure of the others 
intentions,  and arm up to increase their  security. This leads the other side to do the  
same, leading to a cycle that effectively decreases the security of both.
Security sector reform -  narrowly understood, the reform concerns the core security 
actors  and their  reform:  police,  defence and intelligence,  and broadly  four  types  of 
actors and their reform: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice 
and rule of law, and non-statutory (unofficial) security forces. The broader definition is 
used  in  this  paper.  The  objective  of  an  SSR is  to  guarantee  that  the  state  has  the 
legitimate monopoly of violence in its territory.  The reform aims at building up the 
capacity and accountability of the security sector.
Spillover - a conflict in one country spills over to other countries, for example through 
rebel movement. Then becomes internationalized internal conflict,  and have in some 
cases led to regional wars.
Spoilers - leaders and parties who believe that peace threatens their power, worldview, 
and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.
Terrorism - military tactic of asymmetric warfare, where the target of violence, often 
civilians, are struck to create fear in order to have a political effect on the actual target.
Wagner hypothesis -  civil wars that end by military victory produce a more lasting 
peace  than  negotiated  endings,  since  military  victory  guarantees  the  losing  party's 
organizational structure has been destroyed. In negotiated settlements, both sides retain 
their capacity to fight.
 Warlords - individuals who autonomously control a territory through military power. 
Often used in the context of weak or collapsed states today.
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